**IN THE NAME OF ALLAH,
THE ALL-BENEFICENT, THE ALL-MERCIFUL**

A Study of the Root Causes and Process of the Islamic Revolution in Iran

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Table of Contents

Transliteration Symbols

Symbol	Transliteration	Symbol	Transliteration
	ʾ		a
	b		t
	th		j
	ḥ		kh
	d		dh
	r		z
	s		sh
	ṣ		ḍ
	ṭ		ẓ
	ʿ		gh
	f		q
	k		l
	m		n
	h		w
	y		ah
Long Vowels		**Short Vowels**	
	ā		a
	ī		i
	ū		u
Persian Letters			
Symbol	**Transliteration**	**Symbol**	**Transliteration**
	p		ch
	zh		g

Preface

The Islamic Revolution in Iran is considered as one of the greatest revolutions in the 20th century, which brought about significant consequences for Iran, the region and the world. The revolution occurred in a country where the U.S. President Carter called the stability island in the Middle East. The CIA reported that any revolutionary upheaval was impossible to happen in Iran in those days hence nobody predicted a revolution at all.

On the other hand, the revolution destroyed a political regime that was regarded as one of the strongest one in the region, possessing huge military equipment and suitable political relations with the West and East blocs. Iran represented an important ally of the United States and its gendarme in the Persian Gulf region leading the United States to heavily invest in the regime's preservation and survival.

Furthermore, despite the secularization process under way in Iran, the Revolution became able to replace the regime ancient with a religious-based political system, thus enhancing the influence of religion in sociopolitical areas and revitalizing Islamic values.

This revolution can be viewed as paving the way for the emergence of many contemporary Islamic movements in the Muslim and Third World

countries. This set the ground for propensity to spirituality in the world and revival of Islamic values in the Muslim countries and generated a new wave of uprising and Islamic awakening in the region.

Given these parameters, certain questions remain for researchers of revolutions to be answered that why the revolution occurred in Iran? Why did it find Islamic character? And which factors did influence the advent of this great revolution?

This research seeks to answer the aforementioned questions and present a comprehensive and at the same time brief explanation of the advent of revolution in Iran. This aims at explaining this huge event while looking at the subject literature and considering the realities of Iranian society.

Principally during the three decades following the Islamic Revolution, explanation of factors causing the revolution has attracted the attention of analysts and theorists of revolution. They have investigated it using different approaches from various perspectives. A study of research works related to the explanation of the Islamic Revolution will demonstrate that in principle these studies have been conducted from several perspectives. Some of them are indeed memoirs lacking specific theoretical framework. A significant number of these works, however, have relied upon theoretical approaches in order to explain the revolution in Iran. In this relation, many writers have tried to explain the Islamic Revolution according to different theories which are found in various approaches to the phenomenon of revolution. These studies have sought to apply existing theories to the Islamic Revolution as a case for empirically testing them.

In general, such scientific explanations can be classified as single factor and mixed (multifactor) approaches, given their emphasis on the root cause of the basic influential factor, the single factor approach can be divided into political, security, economic, cultural, social and psychological approaches. Mentioning various factors, the mixed approaches try to prioritize them. The first chapter of the research deals with such approaches and their critiques so that the reader can become familiar with the current discussions in this field and acquire suitable account of the roots of the revolution.

In order to get a better understanding of the country's political conditions on the eve of the revolution, alignment of political forces opposing the second Pahlavī regime will be examined and their place and role in the occurrence of the revolution will be assessed. To this end, Marxist, liberal and Islamist political groups have been identified and

studied. Most of the two first groups lacked the ability to influence the process of revolution in late Pahlavī era, since a large number of their leaders and members had been detained, jailed and/or executed. Also some of them had left the country and exerted little influence in the country's political scene. Hence, only Islamist current possessed relative strength for exerting influence. Therefore, a deeper and more comprehensive study needs to be conducted for explaining the cause of the revolution that will dealt with in chapter three.

There are basically two overall theories about the phenomenon of revolution. A theory analyzes revolution as a game played by players present in the scene who make a revolution, thus views the role of free agents as substantial in bringing about revolution. The second theory considers revolution as separate from the will and choice of the free agents and actors present at the scene and holds that indeed grand structures and history give rise to the phenomenon of revolution. For this reason, these theorists believe that revolutions occur and are not made, meaning that the revolutionary leader leads the revolution with the knowledge of existing structures. In new outlooks in revolution studies, emphasis in mainly put on mixed approaches and a combination of structural and voluntarist outlooks in which revolution is viewed as a result of a set of structural and non-structural conditions. They have a multidimensional and multilevel outlook towards the revolution and believe that one-dimensional outlooks cannot answer the explanation of revolution at all. Indeed, a set of structural and voluntary conditions in the past years and decades before the revolution went hand in hand and paved the way for the advent of a revolution.

In fact, the causes of revolution should be looked at from a multidimensional and multilayered perspective. In this context, political, economic, cultural and social structures influencing the formation of the revolution. The study of the structures, however, is not enough, so attention must also be paid to the grounds for revolution, that is voluntary factors leading to the revolution like the role of leadership, ideology, and mass mobilization.

In this framework, it should be noted that long-term causes of the Islamic Revolution in Iran are manifested in political, economic, cultural and social problems in Iranian society. These structural problems that took shape in long time and became deep-rooted created grounds for a fundamental change (revolution). On this basis, to recognize the structural factors influencing the advent of the revolution, such factors as rigid political

structure in Iran, dependent economic structure and uneven cultural structure, are mentioned and structural problems in these areas gave rise to dissatisfaction with the existing conditions are scrutinized.

Nonetheless, voluntary factors, i.e. the role of agents' will have to be addressed along with the structural ones in causing the revolution. In fact, although structural problems at that time acted as the disease situation in the pre-revolutionary society paving the way for change, organization and mobilization of opposing forces and appearance of revolutionary leadership, and formation of necessary mindset for the rise of revolutionary ideology are among the voluntary factors that are reinforced by exploiting structural diseases, generating grounds for revolution in the fault lines created because of the structures. In fact, inattention to such voluntary factors and mere emphasis on structural factors lead to a kind of tautological statement that fails to present a suitable explanation of the revolution.

Therefore, the study continues to examine significant voluntary factors leading to the Iranian Revolution including Imām Khomeinī's role as the revolutionary leader, formation of revolutionary ideology and determinants of mass mobilization in the Iranian Islamic Revolution as well as the roles played by political groups and parties in the occurrence of the revolution.

Fundamentally, the Islamic Revolution owes to the personality of its great leader, namely Imām Khomeinī. That why and how such a totally revolutionary personality comes out of the inner conventional Shīʿī jurisprudence and clergy who overthrows the 2500-year monarchical system is a fascinating phenomenon that should be properly explained in theoretical terms.

In this relation, it can be argued that Imām Khomeinī's standpoints, positions and ideals involving his criticisms of the status quo and his alternative pattern for the ideal situation were among the factors gathering the masses around him. Hence, they expressed their acceptance of his leadership. These viewpoints and positions were proposed in a particular political, cultural and social situation of the society paved the way for the acceptance of Imām Khomeinī's discourse. Stressing on the existence of the closed despotic system, on the unjust nature of economic system and on existing cultural conflicts in the society that threatened national identity, Imām Khomeinī became successful at attracting the masses who were suffering from unsuitable social, political and cultural conditions and due to the identity crisis sought for a savior. On the other hand, while criticizing the

status quo, the explanation of the Islamic government on part of Imām Khomeinī as the ideal pattern also strengthened Imām's popularity as the revolutionary leader.

Along with Imām's leadership, revolutionary ideology should be also added to the other important voluntary factors. Based upon existing realities, Shī'ī Islam became able to implement properly routine and multiple functions of ideology in political mobilization in the process of Islamic Revolution. Shī'ism's success as revolutionary ideology must be evaluated by considering the process of the decline of other ideologies and thought currents which were potentially actually its rival.

Under circumstances where such ideologies as socialism and liberal nationalism as major ideological rivals of Shī'ī Islam in Iran, were faced with theoretical impasse and failures in implementation, the Shī'ī Islam in its new form, which claimed to have innovative and original solutions considering the time's social issues came out to complete with the imported thoughts and finally as the winner of the battle managed to lead the mass mobilization leading to the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

Revolutionary ideology represents those traits of Islam and Shī'ism that thought rooted in people's history and doctrinal tradition, has been revived in a particular way. The revival of such an outlook on Shī'ī teachings were largely manifested in Imām Khomeinī's guidelines, gathered social forces around him and started the engine of the revolution.

The Muslim intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s made attempts to present a rational and complement picture of Islam by criticizing the rival ideologies; an Islam that is able to manage the contemporary world. Negating the incompatibility between science and religion, they tried to take effective steps in portraying the Islamic ideology as the superior one by scientifically justifying religion and compatibility of reason and revelation as well as knowledge and faith. Emphasizing the proof of inadequacy of empirical, philosophical and materialist knowledge for responding to all human needs as well as philosophically defending religion and metaphysics, they attempted to portray Islam as rational and humanistic. They also defended religion against political and social doubt and charges like the theory of opium nature of religion as expounded by Marxists. Furthermore, they rejected determinist and fatalist theories on the one hand and critiqued traditional values as well as modernism on the other. Although such discussions attracted most of intelligentsia, what made them spread among

the masses has been inclination of the young generation of clergy and the presence of Imām Khomeinī as a religious leader. Indeed, Imām emerged as link complementing the revolutionary ideology attracting various forces. This reading of Islam that was accepted by the new generation of clergy and Muslim intellectuals as well as a large number of academic graduates was the same victorious ideology that appeared as the dominate public opinion among the masses because it conformed with the Muslim people's culture. It could create great epics among millions of people in 1978-79 and give rise to popular mobilization and demonstrations.

In the final chapter, a summary of the chronology of events occurring in 1978-79 will be presented for learning about the precipitating factors in the Islamic Revolution. In a nutshell, this work is a brief but comprehensive explanation of the root causes of the Islamic Revolution in Iran that is hoped to be useful. ✐

Chapter 1

A Review of Different Approaches to the Study of the Islamic Revolution in Iran

The causes of the revolution in Iran and the fall of the Shāh's regime as an important event has attracted the attention of analysts and theorists of revolution and has been subject to study from a variety of approaches. Principally revolution as a sociological phenomenon seldom occurs in comparison to similar phenomena and can be expected hard, hence it cannot be said that when and were revolution will take place. In spite of vast academic attempts at the theorization on revolution, few people could expect the collapse of the monarchy and the establishment of Islamic Republic as well as turbulent in the stability island of the Middle East just before the outbreak of unrest and even some time after the fall of the Shāh.[1] That is the reason why revolutions are explained only after the occurrence.

An investigation of some research works on explanation of the Islamic Revolution indicates that these studies have been generally undertaken from some different perspectives. Some have studied the revolution with approaches lacking and specific theoretical framework.

Some of these works are memoirs in which the writers have compiled their personal memoirs of the revolutionary period. The works written by the

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[1] In his visit to Iran on the eve of the Revolution, Carter called Iran a stability island in the Middle East and in its report, the CIA rejected any possibility of revolutionary transformation in Iran.

Pahlavī regime's politicians, diplomatic agents and foreign ambassadors resident in Iran are mainly among such works.[1]

These analyses are generally evidenced by various chronological or topic events, and the writer tries to make a connection between them based upon his or her own mentality. They put a set of factors such as personalities, economic situation, social structure, military conditions, army and son on together in order to extrapolate the revolution. These analyses are characterized by lacking a theoretical framework. Obviously these works are valued for academic studies since most of them can serve as mere data for the study of Iran's Revolution. They, moreover, offer certain points that ought to be attended precisely.

In addition to the aforementioned analyses on the Islamic Revolution, which largely lacked a specific conceptual framework for explaining the revolution, another layer of studies seeking to explain the revolution in Iran mainly by relying on various theoretical approaches can be mentioned. In this relation, many writers have tired to extrapolate the Islamic Revolution according to different theories found regarding scientific approaches to the phenomenon of revolution. These studies intend to use the Islamic Revolution as a case for empirically testing existing theories, though certain adjustments have been made to the old narratives and existing theories in this way. Some have also tried to look at the Islamic Revolution from a different standpoint thus explaining it through a mixed approach with a combination of different theories.

Overall, this kind of scientific explanations can be classified as single factor approaches and mixed (multifactor) approaches. The single factor approaches can be categorized according to the main determining factor including political, security, economic, cultural, social and psychological approach. We will continue to deal with such studies within the above approaches.

A) Cultural Approaches in the Study of the Revolution (with an Emphasis on the Shī'ī Denomination's Role)

Those studies, which stress on the cultural importance of the Revolution, see the root of revolution mainly in the anti-Islamic actions done

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[1] See William Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, Trans. Manhood Ashleigh, Tehran: Hafted, 1982; Anthony Parsons, *Mission in Iran*, Trans. Pasha Scarify, Tehran: Rāh-e Now, 1984; Robert Hoyer, *Mission in Tehran*, Tehran: Iṭṭilā'āt, 1986.

by the regime. In this respect, some believe that a religious response took shape in the 1970s vis-à-vis the efforts made during the post-World War Two period at imposing a special reading of the Enlightenment project based upon separation of religion from politics and relegation of religion to the private sphere.

From this point of view, the root cause of the revolution has to be sought in religious and cultural factors rather than in economic and material factors. While attacking the materialist account of the causes of the revolution, the writers of this outlook view the spirit of Iranian Revolution as religious-cultural and see a proper explanation of it as conditional on a study of the role of ideology, religion and leadership in the revolution. For instance, 'Alī Davānī in his work, The Movement of Iranian Clergy,[1] by examining the history of struggles by Iranian Shī'ī clergy believes that in general the Islamic Revolution is a continuity of the same struggles and the reason for the fall of the Shāh's regime should be sought in popular mobilization based on Islamic slogans. 'Abbās 'Alī 'Amīd Zanjānī has also considered the Shāh's anti-Islamic policy as the main cause of his fall.[2]

Manūchehr Muḥammadī describes de-Islamization as the root cause of the Revolution.[3] Except for writes who sympathize with the Revolution, even those are critical of the Revolution also looked at the Islamic Revolution from this perspective. Said Amīr Arjomand who largely stresses the ideological significance the Revolution is one of such writers.[4] French Islamogist, Ian Richard, also attaches importance to the issue of Shī'ism in his *Shi'ite Islam: Polity, Ideology and Creed*, while studying the domestic developments of religious discourse in Iran, proposes the Revolution as a stage in the change in Shī'ī discourse. He emphasizes that contrary to the Western outlooks, Shī'ism is not an integrated whole, multiplicity and plurality of spokespersons is a characteristic of Shī'ism. He considers the Iranian Revolution as a factor that has turned Shī'ism from a transcendental faith to a radical ideology.[5]

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[1] 'Alī Davānī, *the Movement of Iranian Clergy*, No Place: Imām Riḍā Cultural Foundation, No Date, 10 Volumes.

[2] See 'Abbās 'Alī 'Amīd Zanjānī, *the Roots of Islamic Revolution, Tehran*: Political Books Publication, 1992.

[3] Manūchehr Muḥammadī, *An Analysis of the Islamic Revolution*, Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1986.

[4] Said Amīr Arjomand, *the Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 91-189.

[5] Ian Richard, *Shi'ite Islam: Polity, Ideology and Creed, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.*

These cultural outlooks seek to explain revolution with the element of ideology and culture and view it as the main cause of revolution. Despite the crucial role this factor players in the occurrence of revolution, one cannot rely just on this actor in explaining revolution. The empirical problem we will particularly have is the comparison between 1963-64 years and 1977-78 ones. We saw radical perceptions of Islam in the early 1960s, but no revolution took place. It can be suggested that in fact the element of cultural and ideology which certainly part of the explanation of the Islamic Revolution refers mainly to the Islamization aspect of the revolution, rather the entire revolutionary movement.

In spite of its reference to the fundamental factor in the Islamic Revolution, the religious outlook in the Revolution is unable to extrapolate all aspects and causes the Revolution, because it fails to explain most of important questions. An important question in this respect is why the June 1963 movement, which was similar to the 1978 uprising in ideological terms, did not lead to victory but the 1979 Islamic Revolution happened? Why did Islamic movements fail in other Muslim countries? The main problem with such theories is one-sided character and that they examine the religious factor apart from the general trend of socio-political developments within the Iranian society. As John Furan put it, the problem with this outlook is that by emphasizing the role cultural factors, Shī'ism and the clergy played, they ignore the role played by social forces and other political-economic factors.[1]

B) Emphasis on the Importance of Sociological Factors in the Advent of the Revolution

Since revolutions represent a collective action and target the social structure of the societies, social outlook to political changes in societies is among the main approaches to the study of revolutions in the main approaches to the study of revolutions in the world. The necessity of separating social conditions and factors arise from a number of presumptions. First, the phenomenon of revolution is a multifactor one and a combination of conditions and causes interact to give rise to revolution. Second, revolution is a collective action and every collective action apart from any factor causing its occurrence becomes possible within the framework of social solidarities, forms and alignments through communication networks and patterns of collective action. Third, revolution as an idealist, militant and

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[1] John Furan, "The Iranian Revolution of 1977-79: A Challenge for Social Theory," Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 163.

relatively lengthy collective action is related to such categories as social structure more than any other collective action does. On this ground, a number of theorists ascribe the advent of re in society to characteristics of its social structure and view a specific social structure as paving the way for the occurrence of revolution.

Three are different viewpoints among political sociologists as to which society is more prone to revolution. Some regard revolution as a result of mass society meaning a society that lacks social cohesion or has weak ethnic, national, local and class cohesion, or weak social stratification, class differentiation and weak variegated autonomous political and professional associations.[1]

Unlike them, another group of political sociologists hold that revolution needs revolutionary mobilization and mobilization, in turn, needs social associations and communication networks. Therefore, revolution needs the presence of civil society and strong associations and cohesion within the society; something that will make people class-conscious and provide the grounds for mobilization.[2]

A third group of sociologists argue that revolution needs intermediate situation of civil society and mass society, for the existence of vast communication networks or total absence thereof preclude revolution and revolutionary mobilization; hence revolution breaks out only in transitional period, i.e. in intermediary situation.[3]

Within the context of these three grand outlooks, certain researchers have tried to explain social conditions of revolutionary mobilization in Iran.[4]

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[1] E. Walter, "Mass Society: The Late Stage of an Idea," Quoted in Sandor Halebsky, *Mass Society and Political Conflict*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 44-46.

[2] See Stan Taylor, *Social Science and Revolutions*, New York: Martins Press, pp.21-22; also Alvin Stanford Cohen, *Theories of Revolution*, Trans. ʿAli Riḍā Ṭayyib, Tehran: Qūmes, 1990, pp. 65-125.

[3] See Ḥusayn Bashīriyyah, *Revolution and Political Mobilization*, Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1993, pp. 29-35.

[4] See, A. Najmābādī, "Iran's Turn to Islam: From Modernism to Moral Order," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 41, Spring 1987, pp. 202-217.

- J. Green, "Countermobilization in the Iranian Revolution," in *The Origins of Revolution*, pp. 126-138.

- E. Brurck and P. Lubek, "Explaining Social Movement in Two Oil-Exporting States: Divergent Outcomes in Nigeria and Iran," *Society for Comparative Study of Society and History*, 1987, pp. 560-644.

Overall, sociological theory approach, in spite of its strength and significance, suffers from theoretical deficiencies and revolution. In an all-out and inclusive manner, if it fails to other issues like cultural and psychological factors. Its main weak point includes one-sided look at the events in humanities field and ambiguity found in causal relationship between this factor and the advent of revolution, thus making it an improper explanation.

C) Stress on Economic Factors in the Occurrence of the Revolution

Theoretical background of the impact f society on social transformation began with Karl Marx's critical sociology. The economic theories on the Islamic Revolution hold that the major role in the occurrence of Iran's Revolution was played by economy, economic plans and related problems; hence the other factors are just secondary. In this perspective, other cultural, social and political factors are not negated as having no influence, but they have not been the main factors and the rise of such factors depended on economic causes. Unfortunately, there is few works on the influence of economic factors on the advent of the Islamic Revolution in comparison to the other factors. Certain theories can be found among the researchers who deal with the causes of the Islamic Revolution in Iran from an economic standpoint including the oil despotism theory, uneven development theory, and the rentier state theory.

For example, emphasizing the oil despotism theory, Homāyūn Kātūziyān believes that the rise in oil prices in the early 1970s led to the extreme autonomy of the state from society and social classes emboldening the state to do whatever it liked without any regard for the society's reaction. Anti-Islamism, extreme nationalism, Westernism, hostility toward traditional economic classes, political and financial support for the newly emerging domestic and foreign capitalism, militarism and finally the irrational policy of combating economic crisis, inflation along with arresting the same capitalists who were backed for years, as well as bothering other economic classes, all indicated the rise of regime's power. Thanks to the gift of oil revenues, the regime saw itself able to do any action including the suppression of political opponents and subjugating foreign friends and enemies. It harmed the interest of the entire society with such arrogance which ultimately led to the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution; a

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- H. Enayat, "Revolution in Iran 1979: Religion as Political Ideology," in *Revolution in Third World*, pp. 191-194.

comprehensive revolution in which most of social and economic classes took part because of their dissatisfaction with the status quo.[1]

Another researcher, Robert Looni, seeks the roots of Islamic Revolution in the uneven strategy of economic development.[2] To him, such factors as the implementation of development strategy without attention to institutional reforms, economic injustices, short-term but extensive social transformations, and improper prediction of problems arising from development led to economic crisis, inflation, unemployment, huge class interval and particularly regime's irrational handling of inflation control are among major economic classes of the advent of revolution in Iran.

Theda Skocpol in a paper employed the term rentier state which was proposed by certain researchers previously, as a conceptual framework for explaining the Islamic Revolution.[3] According to this theory, Iran's central government became a gigantic structure due to huge oil revenues and managed to show itself as the determinant of everything within the country. The government just received oil revenues and with such huge wealth determined the type and degree of concessions to groups like the emerging capitalism, opposition to traditional capitalism and the type of allies both within and outside the country. However, the state financial crisis due to decrease in oil prices and revenues especially in 1977 made the regime a target for all social strata since the entire society became dependent on the government. In other words, because of a financial crisis derived from oil prices, the state was no longer capable of giving welfare services to the entire society; so economic hardships made all social strata target the regime.[4]

In assessing such outlooks, it should be argued that the popular discontent with the regime was not exclusive to 1977, but it had a long history. In addition, merely economic approach to Iran's revolution without attending to the socio-cultural structure like the role of ideology (religion) and leadership is unable to offer a complete explanation of the Islamic Revolution. It should be noted that oil despotism dominated many countries

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[1] See Muḥammad ʿAlī Homāyūn Kātūziyān, *Political Economy of Iran*, Trans. Muḥammad Riḍā Nafisi, Tehran: Markaz, 1993.

[2] Robert E. Looni, *Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.

[3] Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shīʿah Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society*, May 198, vol. 11, p. 3.

[4] *Ibid*.

including Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, but it did not result in revolution. Furthermore, according to studies conducted by economic experts and the existing statistical date, people's conditions not only did not deteriorate during the last years of the Shāh's regime, but also they improved significantly.

D) Emphasis on Domestic and International Political Factors in the Advent of the Revolution

Those theories that regard the causes of revolution as domestic political factors and pay attention to political processes of the society as major factors affecting developments are mainly derived from the functionalist approach or political conflict approach or mixed approaches between the two aforementioned ones.

Taking advantage of the functionalist theory in particular Talcott Parsons' outlook respecting the four functions of every social system to survive and keep its balance, some believe that modernization in Iran in the 1970s caused imbalance in the whole system. This imbalance arose from the fact that as modernization proceeded in the country, the Shāh failed to create new institutions, consequently new groups and classes arising from the modernization process wishing to participate in political power, felt lack of identity and sought to overthrow the government as the only solution to fill the gap between themselves and the government.

Abrahimian, as one the proponents of this analysis, writes:

"Revolution occurred in Iran because the Shāh began to modernize the social-economic level, thus expanding the new middle class and industrial labor class, but he failed to develop at the political level and such a failure inevitably exacerbated the gap between the communication channels between the political system and the entire population, widened the gap between the governing circles and new social forces and most importantly it broke some bridges connecting the political establishment and traditional social forces notably the bazaar and religious authorities."[1]

Some other scholars have put emphasis upon the power of opposition to mobilize resources. Using Charles Tilly's theory, they point to the coalition of dissidents from various walks of life and to their vast communication

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[1] Ervand Abrahimian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," *Middle East Research and Information Research Reports*, no. 81, May 19080, p. 21.

networks. They regard the Pahlavī regime's inability to mobilize the society (mobilization and demobilization) as the cause of the Pahlavī regime's collapse.

By relying on Tilly's theory, in his *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*, Mīthāq Pārsā explains the appearance of revolutionary coalitions based on group and class interests, communication networks, ideology and leadership in the Iranian Revolution and analyzes the actions of major groups participating in the revolution like the clergy, the bazaar merchants and the labor.

He is of the belief that the bazaar merchants were the first groups to be mobilized and directed their struggles though the mosques. The mosques constituted national networks of mobilization and safe havens for gatherings and communications. The policy of opening political space on the part of government provided an opportunity for other discontented groups especially in economic dimensions, but most of their demands became political and a vast coalition of social classes which all embraced Āyatullāh Khomeinī's leadership. Finally an amalgam of social cleavage, weakness in military apparatus, and attack on the armed forces paralyzed the government and dual sovereignty took shape that led to the victory of revolutionaries and overthrow of monarchy.[1]

One of the other researchers has applied the crises theory of political development in order to explain the Iranian Rev. He holds that since the Iranian legitimacy crisis resulting in four other crises including influence crisis, efficiency crisis, participation crisis and identity crisis. The combination of these five crises caused the regime to collapse.[2]

Certain researchers have identified international political conditions and pressures on the states as an important political factor creating revolutionary situation. In this respect, Theda Skocpol, contemporary structuralist theorist, emphasized the factor of international pressures along with the two other categories, i.e. state and social structure for analyzing the origins of revolutions. For Skocpol, international pressures on and threats to the state and social fabric (social classes) play a significant role in bringing about

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[1] Mīthāq Pārsā, *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*, New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1984.

[2] H. E. Shahābī, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, New York: Cornell University, 1985.

revolutionary conditions.[1] She believes that revolutions happen in area and structure when international pressures and actions in transnational relations are exerted on a state and she gives preeminence to transitional factors in comparison to national ones.[2]

In her viewpoint, international pressures and tensions in an unequal structure make the state bring some changes into socioeconomic fabric of traditional society. Naturally, this type of authoritarian modernization from above, in Skocpol's standpoint, may be a potential factor for creating revolutionary crisis.[3]

Johan Furan believes in this respect that in explaining Iran's Islamic Revolution, one has to begin with the international political economic aspects as well as those of Iran's international relations. He also adds that the nature of international system and the great powers are important in studying the international causes of the Islamic Revolution.[4] Furan argues that deponent development along with a number of factors led to Shāh's downfall. One factor was the sudden fall of oil prices in the last two years of the Shāh's government. The second one was the opening of international system under Carter and finally the US abandoning policy and lack of support for the Shāh; this abandoning was a result of flexibility of the international system.[5]

Respecting these theories, it should be noted that using the grand variables of the world system in explaining revolution cannot be extrapolated many events, i.e. why the revolution found an Islamic character and why the state was inadequate in managing and transferring form the periphery to semi-periphery. Such questions are not answered at the international level with systemic variables and to respond to them we have to address social variables the world system can serve to explain the nature of state and class structure in Iran. Moreover, with the inception of revolution in Iran, not only U.S. pressures on Iran for opening up political space withered away, but the United States backed the Shāh rigorously and omitted prior constraints. Obviously, such extensive support contracted the acceptance of the presence of the international system's pressures on the Shāh.

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[1] Skocpol, op. cit.

[2] See Nāṣir Hādīan, "Theda Skocpol's Theory and the Islamic Revolution," *Rahbord Quarterly*, No. 9.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Furan, op. cit.

[5] *Ibid.*

Some scholars point to security factors and insufficient use of the suppressive and coercive apparatus as an important factor leading to the Rev. As a researcher puts it, all political regimes from the military regimes to the most democratic ones have agreement on use of coercive force as the last resort when deemed necessary. They just might have essentially disagreement on the timing (the right time) to use force. The major point here is that if this instrument, when its use is deemed necessary by the establishment, lacks sufficient effectiveness the regime's persistence is seriously endangered. In other words, the opponent's victory or regime change will become imminent. According to him,[1] based on a study carried out on the fall of the Shāh's regime, the following can be considered as the most important factors in making the coercive force of political regimes: ineffective misinterpretation of security threats; inadequacy of the country's security structure, the establishment's ambivalence in using the coercive apparatus divisions. It led to its failure in using its force resulting in its dissolution.

Regarding this analysis, it should be however argued that the weakness of the suppressive approaches was rooted in other factors, the rise of revolutionary mobilization, influence of revolutionary ideology within the military, the revolutionary leader's appropriate statements, and the political, cultural, economic and social conditions of revolutionary mobilization and it cannot be viewed as the major factor.

E) Emphasis on Individual and Collective Psychological Factors in the Advent of the Revolution

Psychological analysis refers to explanations that deal with individual's attitudes and behavior and see them as their mental processes, regarding them as determinants in formation of collective actions. Such analysis has been applied to the case of the Iranian Revolution and some have scrutinized the Shāh's personality characteristics. Thus Marvin Zonis in his *Majestic Failure* believes that the Shāh's personality traits resulting from his training in childhood and adolescence reared him up as ambivalent and indecisive in decision-making which brought about his failure.[2]

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[1] Farhād Darvīshī Setalānī, *Security Analysis of the Collapse of the Shāh's Regime in Iran*, Tehran: Sūrah, 1998.

[2] Marvin Zonis, *Majestic Failure*, Trans. 'Abbās Mukhbir, Tehran: New Design, 1991.

Such an approach may account for the adoption of certain policies during his reign or inability of the suppressive apparatus within the last moths of the regime, but these characteristics cannot explain the revolution. Besides, some countries have had personalities like the Shāh throughout history, but they have not collapsed with the revolutionary movement; thus this approach is unable to present an appropriate explanation of the revolution due to inattention to long-term, macro and structural parameters.

In this line, by adopting a more general approach within the social psychology approach have tried to explain the revolution some of them have applied Davies and Gurr's theory (i.e. relative deprivation school) to the Iranian Rev.[1] Another one has used Davies' J Curve in order to explore people's sudden discontent in the second half of the 1970s. He argues that according to Davies' theory, if we have economic growth for successive years and along with the rise of expectations, then if a sudden fall in economic growth occurs, the gap between such declining economic growth and escalating expectations will reach an intolerable level and revolution occurs and such a situation occurred in the Iranian Rev.[2] That is because overall socioeconomic changes in the 1960s and early 1970s had led to a continuous improvement of living standards in Iran, but after this period of relative welfare, suddenly decline happened in the mid-1970s when the state faced considerable decrease in economic growth rate. The resultant gap between the emerging expectations and the level of fulfilled needs created cognitive structures and provided the ground for revolutionary wrath.[3]

Stressing upon Ted Robert Gurr's relative deprivation theory, Farrukh Mushīrī also regards the gap between collective and value expectations of the *'ulamā'* and their declining influence and strength as the cause of the clergy's dissatisfaction, giving rise to the revolution.[4]

Such type of approaches relying on social psychology theories suffer from a variety of problems the most important of which is their tautological nature and inconsistency with the realities of the Iranian Rev. Contrary to the views of those who favor such arguments, Iran's economy in 1976-1977 did not witness intensive decline. In addition, another problem related to this

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[1] James C Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in Kelly and Brown (eds.), *Struggles in the State*, New York: Wiley, 1970.

[2] Ḥusayn Bashīriyyah, *State and Revolution in Iran: 1962-1982*, London: Croom Helm, 1984.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] Farrukh Mushīrī, *The State and Social Revolution in Iran*, New York: Peter Lang, 1985.

theory is the generalization of micro-level data to the macro-level and impossibility of proving a correlation between individual expectations and their extension to the collective expectations and collective discontent. Principally, cyclic trends of increased expectations and then the state incapability to meet them (in Davies' theory) have not resulted in collective uprising in most of the societies. The leap from individual deprivation to collective deprivation (in Gurr's theory) cannot also explain sufficiently collective movement and people's following the clergy. Other groups' deprivation may not be deduced from the clerical deprivation; the very decline in clergy's collective abilities is under question.

In addition to making efforts at explaining the revolution with reliance on psychological variables, some have sought to use such factors in describing the revolutionary process. Charles Kurzman proposes the issue of perception and how the perception of state vulnerability is more important than the reality of state vulnerability. Kurzman suggests that indicators demonstrate that the Pahlavī government was not been a vulnerable government in that period but people's perception of vulnerability was something else. They believed that if the opposition was enhanced, balance would be lost and the state would become vulnerable. So according to this perception they moved and they could change the objective condition through such a perception. In other words, they reinforced the opposition and proceeded to a pint where they could paralyze the state suppressive apparatus. Thus according to Kurzman, the state was not vulnerable at all and the people thought that they were able to weaken the state and so they did actually.[1] However it should be a suitable reason and other factors have to be attended to in the government's vulnerability. In general, psychological theories cannot offer a complete explanation of the revolution.

F) Multifactor and Mixed Approaches

Most of the revolution analysts hold that revolution is a result of coincidence of various factors along economic, political, cultural and ideological lines and single factor analyses are unable to present a comprehensive explanation. Such an approach has attempted at offering a multi factor explanation of revolution by combining other approaches. Of course, previous writers have more or less proposed other factors, but they emphasize that they have a multifactor look at revolution. For instance,

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[1] Ch. Kurzman, "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979," *American Sociological Review*, 19996.

Michael Fisher addresses Shī'ī denomination and culture, but in explaining the revolution, he observes that the origins of the revolution and its timing were economic and political, while its place and form was a result of religious protest tradition.[1] Nikki R. Keddie identifies a combination of various factors such failure in economic development policies due to its adverse impact upon social groups and classes, suppression and lack of freedoms as paving the way for revolution and transformation in the Shī'ī thinking as the revolutionary ideology.[2]

Fred Halliday also counts a number of causes like weakness of the regime, coalition of opposition forces, role of Islam and international parameters as the roots of the revolution.[3] Farīdah Faraḥī suggests that two things should be taken seriously. First the balance of class forces in Iranian society is affected by political and economic processes of the world system, and second is the role of ideology at which Faraḥī looks as hegemony and the failure of dominant class in exercise of its hegemony and formation of hegemony by non-dominant groups and its extension to the entire society.[4] John Furan also seeks to look at the revolution through a multifactor approach or a synthesis of aforementioned approaches.[5] Stressing on such variables as the world system, internal modes of production, social structure, type of the state that is influenced by domestic historical factors and world economic trends as well as the presence of a set of opposition tradition in Iran, he notes that a combination of such factors give rise to the revolution. Valentine Muqaddam sees the advent of the revolution arising from the conjunction of several factors; first economic crisis and emigration that underpin the revolution and mobilization, and then a network of 80,000 mosques financed by the bazaar and Iran's leadership. His teachings manifested the demands of social groups, provided the ground for all-inclusive mobilization and displaced a populist discourse.[6]

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[1] Micahel Fisher, *From Religious Dispute to Revolution*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.

[2] Nikki R. Keddie, *Roots of Iranian Revolution*, Trans. Abdurrahim Govahi, Tehran: Office for Dissemination of Islamic Culture, 1996.

[3] Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, New York: Penguin Books, 1979.

[4] Farīdah Faraḥī, "State Disintegration and Urban-Based Revolution Crisis: A Comparative Analysis of Iran and Nicaragua," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 21, 1988, pp. 231-256.

[5] Furan, op. cit.

[6] Valentine M. Muqaddam, "The Revolution and the Regime Populism; Islam and the State in Iran," *Social Compass*, pp. 415-450.

As seen above, Iranian Islamic Revolution challenged all existing theories on revolution in social sciences and displayed that most of these theories were unable to fully explain the revolution. It can be claimed that none of the aforementioned accounts can alone explain the mass revolutionary action in Iran. However, the multifactor approach seems to help better understand and explain such an important historical event, providing that various causes and parameters are organized and set within a precise theoretical framework. ✍

Chapter 2

Prominent Ideological-Political Groups in the Country and Their Part in Formation of the Revolution

Understanding the situation of important ideological-political currents of the country in the eve of the revolution may help better explain causes of the political, social, economic and cultural development that occurred after the revolution. To recognize such currents as historical agents of the developments can map different ends and orientations as well as post-revolutionary conceptual challenges. Hence, this research first will review briefly realistic situation of ideological political alignments in the era of the Revolution so that a realistic picture of the influential factors in post-revolutionary developments can be offered.

Principally, influential groups in Iran's sociopolitical developments are affected by a variety of political subcultures dominating contemporary Iran. What accounts for such plurality is the expansion of sociopolitical sphere and increasing involvement of various social groups in political affairs on the one hand, and the entry of new and mainly foreign ideological and intellectual currents into Iran and their impact upon different social groups on the other. In general, it can be said that there major political-ideological currents including Islam, socialism and liberal nationalism have emerged simultaneously during Iran's contemporary era. Each of these three currents, in turn, has taken various shapes, depending on their social, economic and political substance, thus sometimes reformist and sometimes revolutionary tendencies in socioeconomic terms. They have tended to authoritarianism and sometimes to democracy politically and have appeared sometimes in peaceful and sometimes violent forms in terms of political action. Although

each of these currents have played a more curial part in a period of Iran's contemporary history, while reviewing the process of the formation of these groups, we will examine their situation and capabilities in directing and affecting the developments in the eve of revolution in Iran and in post-revolutionary period.

A) Socialism

A-1) Tūdeh Party

The first important political current in the country is the leftist intellectual current as affected by Marxism and Socialism, whose seeds were planed with the establishment of the Soviet Union in Iran's northern borders. In later years, this ideology influenced significantly Iran's political-intellectual atmosphere with the creation of the Tūdeh (literally the masses) Party, intending to establish a leftist government and socialist system in the country.[1]

Essentially, following the occupation of Iran by the Allied Forces (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union) in August 1941 during the World War II and the fall of Riḍā Shāh, numerous political prisoners were released thus generating a more suitable political space. Among the released political prisoners was the so-called 53-member group. They comprised of 53 Marxists who created a study group led by Dr. Taqī Arani. But these persons were mostly detained at the inception. These persons were mostly old Iranian communists and some of them were the *'Idālat* (Justice) Party's members in Baku. They created the Communist Party in Bandar Anzalī as recommended by the Third International in 1921 following the entry of the Red Army to Iran during the First World War. Following their release from prison (in October and November 1941), they underpinned the nucleus of the Tūdeh Party and succeeded in expanding the Party's organization.

Through its strong organization egalitarian and anti-colonialist slogans, the Tūdeh Party could attract adherents from all walks of life and incrementally acted as one of the strongest political parties in Iran in the 1940s. The founders of the Tūdeh Party were Marxist (as future events showed, they were advocates of the Soviet Union), but they did not call themselves Communist. The reason could be the party leaders' fear of

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[1] Abrahimian, op. cit., p. 346.

'ulamā' as well as the 1931 law banning any Communist ideology. In addition, since the government's 25-year propaganda had created a hostile outlook towards socialism-communism, and the Soviet Union, so the Tūdeh Party wishing to attract the reformists, radicals and progressive revolutionaries, decided to declare itself as Marxist, knowing the fact that the industrial working class constituted a small part of the whole population.[1] Emphasizing sociopolitical and economic struggles and deciding to propose such categories as metaphysics, historical materialism and philosophical discussions in general, it tried to disarm its opponents who might wish to harm the Party's social prestige in this way.[2]

During its heyday in the years before the1953 coup, the Tūdeh Party directed hundreds of trained personnel, newspaper, numerous weekly and monthly magazines and held the control of trade unions. It also gathered enormous followers from within the universities, schools, artists, writers and even the military.[3]

Nonetheless, following the August 19, 1953, the Tūdeh Party which was seen as the Soviet lackey in Iran collapsed suddenly and suffered from heavy strikes so it lost much of its strength in the late 1950s just a small part of the once strong party remained. According to a researcher, four factors caused the decline: First, harsh strikes by the regime's security forces against the Party's leaders which led to the extensive arrests and execution of a number of its leaders and a large number of its advocates; second, the regime's propaganda that regarded the Party as Stalin's agent and dependent on the Soviet Union, its fifth column in Iran, an enemy of Islam, monarchy and private ownership in Iran; third, social transformation resulting from rapid modernization and industrialization process in Iran which indeed disarmed the Party; and fourth weakening of the Party leadership which gradually happened because of the elders' death.[4] Apart from the heavy suppression of the Party in 1955-56 that made thousands of the Party members appear in military courts, he entire performance of the Party in its authority period on the one hand and the Party leaders' weakness, oblivion and appeasing policy towards leaders' weakened, oblivion and appearing policy toward the coup

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 348.

[2] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 240.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.

[4] Abrahimian, op. cit., pp. 555-558.

led to loss of much of the Party's popularity among the intelligentsia and the radical currents.

In the post-coup period, the Party faced the regime's suppression on the one hand, and encountered many questions by their advocates respecting the Party leadership's treatment of the coup and their policies under Dr. Muṣaddiq's government. Most of these questions often remained unanswered. Moreover, the remaining Party leadership was forced to leave home and had to stay in East Europe. To be away from Iran added another problem to the multitude of problems the Party already faced with. From the strong, organized and influential Tūdeh Party between 1941 and 1953, what remained was small, weak group called the Tehran Organization that led ten persons in Tehran, Iṣfahān and industries affiliated to the Party sporadically. This group's activity during these years was reduced to publishing People's Appendix and the South Flame both published by the remnants of the Party after the coup.[1] The Tūdeh Party's activity in the 1960s and 1970s mainly focused on the East bloc and was limited to publication of a magazine, issuing statements, operating a radio station abroad and the activity of certain tiny resistance cells, which acted underground.

Furthermore, the Shāh's expanded relations with the East bloc countries and the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s further restricted the Tūdeh Party's activities when it relied heavily on this bloc. Such dependence on the East and the Party's unconditional support for the Soviet stances led to decrease in its popularity among the Iranian intellectuals. Consequently, the leftist groups and currents that came into being in the 1960s, shared a substantial feature despite their multiplicity, that is distancing from the Tūdeh Party and condemning its leadership.[2] Such factors resulted in schisms in the Tūdeh Party in the 1960s. The formation of the People's Fadā'iyān Guerilla Organization in the late 1960s which later attracted many young Marxist forces, further undermined the Tūdeh Party's position and influence. Nevertheless, the Party retained its secret organization on in Iran till the advent of the revolution, though its leaders mostly lived abroad.

A-2) People's Fadā'iyān Guerilla Organization

From within the Tūdeh Party, leftist currents emerged in Iran, which struggled against the second Pahlavī regime, given the Tūdeh' Party's

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[1] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 241.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 243.

experience by adopting a new strategy. These new forces first planned armed action against the regime separately then formed Iranian People's Fadā'iyān Guerrilla Organization (PFGO) in March 1971 and adopted armed struggle within the urban guerrilla warfare as the main goal of the organization.

The roots of this new current can be found in the political openness during 1960-63, which coincided with Kennedy's residency and pressures in Iran. With the activation of political environment of universities in those years, the way was paved for the activity of the remnants of the youth organization of the Tūdeh Party. Bījan Jazānī was one of these students who studied Latin American Marxist-Leninist writings and proposed armed struggles as the only way of emancipation by creating a study group. With the help by seven of his comrades a group later called Jazānī-Ẓarīf pursued armed struggle strategy practically. The main motto of the group whose members resorted to armed struggle from 1970 to 1973[1] could be summarized as follows: Debate over armed struggle and violent method has to be replaced with its practice and implementation.[2] Within such a small cell, Marxism-Leninism was introduces as the group's formal ideology under which the ultimate objective was cited as proceeding with modern democratic revolution[3] whose realization depended upon armed struggle.[4] To Jazānī, since under the rule of comprador bourgeoisie, radical and opposition forces were not allowed to have political activity and since imperialism itself would intervene ultimately, if the comprador bourgeoisie was undermined or failed, there was only one way to force liberating revolution that was waging an armed mass war in which the whole people would struggle imperialism in an armed conflict.[5] Jazānī's views became very popular among the radical forces during the 1965-1976 decade, but the identification of the group by State Security Organization (SAVAK) when the Jazānī group sought to carry out its first operation (robbery of a bank in north Tehran in 1967), SAVAK

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[1] Bījan Jazānī, *the 30-Year History*, Tehran: Māziyār Publications, 1979, p. 61.

[2] Jazānī Group, Ẓarīfī*; Pioneer of Iran's Armed Movement*, No Place: Mazdak, 1976, p. 41.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[4] Muḥammad Ṣādiq 'Alawī, p. 62.

[5] Bījan Jazānī, *A Summary of Iran's 30-Year Struggles and an Analysis of the Society's Current Economic Conditions*, Tehran: People's Fadā'iyān Guerilla Organization Publications, pp. 71-152.

began arresting its members,[1] which led to the detention of most of the Jazānī group's elements.[2]

This armed action was followed by similar actions through Ḥamīd Ashraf (a member of the Jazānī Group) in the next years. They intended to follow the Jungle Movement's actions in Siyāhkal Jungles in north Iran in 1970 as a starting point for armed struggle, but they were killed when trying to attack the Siyāhkal Gendarmerie station or were arrested. In sum, nine of the members were killed or arrested and the detainees were also executed one month later.

Along with the appearance of the Jazānī Group, a similar current was shaped by three Mashhadī students in Tehran called Pūyān-Aḥmadzādeh Group. They tended to armed struggled under the Marxist influence. They, however, emphasized urban guerrilla warfare and the role of the intelligentsia. Later, they succeeded in creating a new organization in 1971 entitled Iranian People's Fadāʾiyān Guerilla Organization.[3] In this way, the Organization came into being by the three remnants of the aforementioned group, i.e. Jazānī-Zarif group, Ḥamīd Ashraf (Jungle group) and Pūyān-Aḥmadzādeh group in April 1971.[4] this group as influenced by the idea of urban warfare, succeeded in attacking the Qolhak police station in Tehran in1971 and assassinating Marshal Farid, head of the Army Justice, but SAVAK and the army managed to arrest the Organization's members. The organization incurred a big loss in this incident and only a limited number of them managed to escape SAVAK's chase. They engaged in certain activities in later years, but with their detention, the organization was seceded (the Majority and the Minority) in 1976. Then in the heyday of the Revolution, since the Organization lacked the ability for extensive serious activity or its limited number of advocates possessed scant ability, it was abolished.

A-3) Other Marxist Forces

Apart from the Fadāʾiyān Guerrillas, some other small groups appeared in Iran with the Communist ideology some of which began their activity before the Fadāʾiyān but they were linked to them. They, among others, included Manūchehr Dāmghānī group in Tubrat Ḥaydariyyah, Palestine

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[1] *A History of Guerrilla Organizations in Iran*, op. cit., p. 28.

[2] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 250.

[3] See Ervand Abrahimian, op. cit., p. 598; Muḥammad Ṣādiq ʿAlawī, op. cit., p. 63.

[4] Muḥammad Ṣādiq ʿAlawī, op. cit., p. 64.

Group created by Shukrullāh Pāknejād, and some other armed groups in Kurdistan in the 1970s. People's Cause Group in Luristān and Marxists broken out of the Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization like the Peykār (Struggle) Organization and the Labor's Way were also among other Marxist groups.[1] However, all these groups disappeared in the threshold of the Revolution from the political scene, or most of them were arrested or were in exile.

One of the organizations which were extensively used by the Marxist forces outside the country was the Confederation of Abroad Students. The Organization was seemingly in essence a student grouping whose statute described it as an associational organization. In the 1950s, with the creation of certain links between student unions of Iranian students in various European countries and the United States, the World Confederation of Iranian Students (National Union) was established. With the rise of the number of Iranian students, the Confederation was considered as the main base for abroad Iranian students in the 1960s and Germany and the United States represented its significant centers.

The Confederation moved to a completely political direction and it did not engage in anything but political activities. From its inception, the Confederation turned into an arena for the activities of different political currents such as the Tūdeh Party, National Front, the Liberation Movement, the Third Force, the Nation Party, and so on. But communists particularly the Tūdeh Party incrementally dominated it. From the beginning, divisions, alignments and ideological and group rivalries became the main feature of the Confederation and indeed such divisions within the Confederation reflected the domestic oppositions. Most of the members and advocates of the Confederation returned home after the Islamic Revolution.

B) Liberal Nationalism

After the 1940s, nationalism has been a dominant school that attracted part of political forces in Iranian society, but there were different versions of nationalism. Liberal nationalism is one of this period's tendencies which was influenced by the French Revolution and particularly emerged as a school of thought during the Constitutional Revolution in Iran.

Within the liberal nationalist thinking, nation enjoyed the right to self-determination and the right could not be restricted by any other factor

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[1] Mas'ūd Raḍawī, op. cit., cited in: Bījan Jazānī, *Sociological Plan and Fundaments of Iranian People's Revolutionary Movement's Strategy*, Tehran: Māziyār Publications, no date, p. 72.

including religion. Secularization of society and separating religion from politics was one of the goals pursued by this group. Mīrzā Fatḥ'alī Khān and Mīrzā Āqā Khān Kermānī, Mīrzā Malcolm Khān and Mustashār al-Dawlah were among the early supporters of this school. Other pioneers of the school viewed imitation of the West and adopting European civilization as a way to save Iran.

In the early 1940s, the continuity of this nationalism became a significant political current in the period. Although liberal theoretical foundations of this current were initially overshadowed by these groups' anti-imperialism, they gradually turned to an independent current with the transparency of these groups' theoretical positions.

Part of the forces that were members of the National Front in the 1940s and 1950s could be considered as advocating this school of thought. Since the National Front was composed of various parties and associations and nobody was able to become a member of the National Front initially without first being a member of a particularly party or association, the Front included in 1949 a combination of nationalist and religious forces. They were affected by nationalism, Islam, liberalism, and socialism and shared the cause of struggle against despotism and colonialism, considering parliamentary institutions and protecting the constitution.

The Iran Party was one of the important groups that joined the National Front and played a crucial part in it. They party initiated its political activity during Second World War when Iran was under occupation with the cooperation of certain young intellectuals. The party was established by intellectuals inclined to take advantage of U.S. power vis-à-vis Great Britain and Russia,[1] whose ideology was based upon the belief in democracy and national sovereignty,[2] rejection of any arbitrary rule and dictatorship, establishment of provincial and city councils for preservation of local customs and traditions along with protecting the country's territorial integrity and in foreign policy good neighborhood, peaceful coexistence with foreign states, rejection of any foreign intervention and struggle against imperialism and in economic dimension, belief in a kind of socialism and realization of social justice that everybody has to work according to his/her aptitude and

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[1] Karīm Sanjābī, *Sanjābī's Memoirs*, London: Milliyyūn Publications, 1989, p. 69.

[2] Ja'far Ḥaq-Panāh, "The Role of Nationalist Groups (National Front) in the Islamic Revolution," *Thesis in Political Science*, Tehran University, 1995, p. 14.

enjoy the fruits of the work.[1] The Party's teachings reveal clearly its secular orientation.[2] In 1949, the party was just one of the influential parties in the National Front's leadership, and its activities declined following the 1953 coup. Some party members joined the National Resistance Movement and as such they were imprisoned. When the Second National Front was formed in 1960, most of its leaders were composed of the Iran Party's ranks, which led to tension between religious and secular elements within the National Front and ultimately to dominance of secularist thinking on the Front. The central committee of the Iran Party issued a declaration confirming the six-point White Revolution despite the National Front's stance which faced the opposition by religious forces. With widening divisions among various forces within the National Front and prevailing strangling after the June 1963 uprising, the Iran Party's activities underwent a decline and no activity was seen from the Party from 1965-1977.[3]

Pan-Iranist current was another current advocating liberal nationalism which erupted out of the general nationalist current in the 1940sin response to Iran's occupation by the Allied Forces. This current believed that Iranian plateau should be under Iran's flag and named Pan-Iranist by Muḥammad Afshār referring to certain cultural currents.[4] The current gradually entered political activities and in 1977 Pan-Iranist school took an organizational shape. It aimed at reviving ancient Iran's grandeur and battling against the Tūdeh Party.

During the oil nationalization struggles and Muṣaddiq's rise to power, division unfolded among Pan-Iranists with respect to supporting Muṣaddiq. A group came to believe in a type of royal nationalism and while being optimistic about the Shāh and advocating the Court, they backed Muṣaddiq, the other group believed in social nationalism and disapproved of the Court due to its foreign dependence. Of course, individual ambitions and struggle for power also played a crucial part in expanding the division, leading to the creation of the Iranian Nation Party by Dariush Foruhar. He entered his party after breaking from the Pan-Iranists in the National Front. The Party's base lied in universities and high schools.[5]

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[1] *Ibid.*, cited in: *Iran Party's Socialism*, Tehran: Iran Party's Publications Center, no date, p. 4.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 17, cited in: Interview with Dr. Nāṣir Takmīl Homāyūn.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

Following the 1953 coup in early 1955, the liberal current built coalition with religious and socialist elements once again, but doctrinal disagreements again prevented continued cooperation. In this relation, some individual members of the Front re-entered political scene under the new title of National Resistance Movement. This Movement which originally included secular and religious forces and a coalition of social groupings such as the bazaar, clergy, academics, workers, villagers, and political parties like the Iran Party, Iranian People Party, Iranian Nation Party, and Iranian Nation's Tailors Party (the Third Force) and called for the continuity of national movement, restoration of Iran's prestige and independence, establishment of national government, and battle against foreign colonialism and their domestic lackey.[1]

Some prominent leaders of the Movement included Karīm Sanjābī (main spokesperson of the Iran Party), Ḥusaynī, Zīrakzādeh, Pārsā, Shāpūr Bakhtiyār, Dariush Furūhar (founder of the Iranian Nation Party), Khalīl Malikī (founder of the Third Force Party), Mahdī Bāzargān, Āyatullāh Ṭāliqānī, Āyatullāh Zanjānī and Yadullāh Saḥābī.[2]

Nonetheless, because of ideational incompatibility among the aforementioned forces, coalition turned to division and schism and disagreements heightened between the Movement's leaders following the adoption of the Consortium Agreement in November 1954. The leaders of the Iran Party believed that the coup regime was a legal regime recognized by the countries of the world, possessing parliament and related institutions. With the adoption of the Consortium Agreement and by receiving foreign aids, the government's economic situation would improve day by day, hence we have to admit it as a reality and act as opposition.

On the contrary, the other faction of the Movement including Āyatullāh Zanjānī, Mahdī Bāzargān, Dr. Sanjābī, Karīm Aṭā'ī, 'Abbās Rād-Niyā and some others believed that the regime had come to power with American-British coup and subversion of a national, legal government. It governs by instigating fear and terror coercively and it lacks legitimacy. As a result of such divisions, the Iran Party separated from the Movement and with the withdrawal of the Tailors Party (the Third Force), the Movement further

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 37.

[2] Ervand Abrahimian, op. cit., p. 563.

weakened. In other words, in addition to tactical problems, the issue of personalities and their conducts played a part in dismantling of the coalition.[1]

Kennedy's presidency in the United States exerted further pressures on Iranian government to open up political space in Iran and to relax the regime's constraints on its opposition since early 1961. Under the conditions of open political space, opposition leaders (National Resistance Movement, Iran Party, Iranian Nation Party and Iranian People Party) came to the conclusion, following some studies, that it was possible under new circumstances to considerably mobilize forces, rise up against the regime and attain freedom, democracy and welfare by organizing all nationalist and religious forces, adopting a suitable strategy and tact given the country's sociopolitical conditions.

Finally, on July 13, 1960, 17 political figures agreed to create a political organization. The next day, it was name the Second National Front and the declaration of creation of the Second National Front was released widely.[2] However, once again lack of a coherent strategy on the one hand and domestic divisions on the other caused that the Front become unable to adopt a single position towards the period's events (such as the White Revolution referendum, the regime's reforms and the June 6, 1963 uprising).

After the June 6th uprising, disagreements among the Front's leaders over issuing a declaration on condemning the massacre escalated and set the ground for the dissolution of the Front. Indeed, religious and secular forces within the Front that looked at the reforms from two different liberal and Islamic perspectives, divided, thus secular forces were not ready to back Imām Khomeinī and condemn the June 6th massacre. Due to numerous division in the leadership, the National Movement became extremely weak and was unable to recognize its inherent structure, hence since mid-1964 with exchanges of letters between Dr. Muṣaddiq and the National Front's leaders concerning the Front's organizational structure, which had remained unresolved, led to the resignation of the leadership and declaration of the abolition of the Second National Front.[3]

The Front's internal problems on the one hand and the rise of religiosity wave that had begun gradually some years ago on the other gave hand to

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[1] 'Alī Karīmī Māleh, "The 40-Year History of the National Front," *The June 6 Quarterly*, no. 21, Spring 1996, p. 38.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

hand and led that faction of the Front that was, first, more religious and second was more inclined to adopt more radical oppositions and struggle against the regime to separate from the Front in 1961 and create a new group called the Liberation Movement of Iran.[1] Among its leaders were included Mahdī Bāzargān, Ṭāliqānī and Saḥābī (this group will be studied under the heading of the Islamic political groups).

Efforts continued for renewed coalition between liberal forces and other forces in the context of National Front in the next years (Third National Front in 1965), but it failed too. In the following years, liberal faction kept on its political life largely with silence, seclusion, cooperation with the government and residence in abroad, and in fact the Shāh's pseudo-modernist actions lad left them disarmed, too.

Iran's open political space took shape in 1977 with Carter's rise to power. This led this force to come together for revival and declare the fourth National Front in November 19, 1977. According to the declaration, Socialist Society of Iran's National Movement, Iran Party and Iranian Nation Party comprised the Fourth National Front. Hasibit was elected as the head of the Central Council, and Sanjābī, Bakhtiyār, Furūhar, Riḍā Shāygān and Mushīrī as the members of the Central Committee.[2]

Considering its political thinking and positions, leaders, forming elements and organizational structure, the Fourth National Front could be viewed as a moderate front rather than a radical one wishing to struggle in regime rather than against it. While criticizing the state operations in its inception, the Front still expected that the Shāh could manage necessary reforms. But in practice with unilateral positions, it led to dispute within liberals which can be best seen in dual stances taken by Bakhtiyār and Sanjābī.

The Shāh's appointment of Bakhtiyār as prime minister following Sanjābī's meeting with the Shāh encouraged ideological inconsistency and absence of common political positions towards the monarchy and how to fight the regime and caused ideological schism amongst its leaders.[3] The

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[1] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 245.

[2] ʿAlī Karīmī Māleh, op, cit., p. 52.

[3] See *Shāpūr Bakhtiyār's Memoirs*, Iran's Oral History Project, Harvard University's Middle East Studies Center, ed. Ḥabīb Lājevardī, Tehran: Zībā, 2001, p. 111.

Front's Central Council, understanding public opinion's sensitivity and social hatred of Bakhtiyār's decision called his action treacherous.[1]

In a nutshell, various forces affected by liberal nationalism continued their pacific political life despite they suffered from organizational weakness and lack of coherent positions toward show to battle the regime, limited number of members and advocates, inability to influence masses and a school of thought.

C) Islamists

Islam as a political culture and a set of cultural convictions has left its specific impact on Iran's political scene in a way that in Iran's contemporary history can always be viewed as a political school of thought affecting Iran's political developments. Islamists constitute a wide spectrum, but all share the necessity of acceptance of Islam's influence on sociopolitical orientations, though they disagree on the degree of such influence.

According to their specific reading of Islam, reference of true Islam from their viewpoint as well as a method of struggle, Islamists can be classified as different groups. In this relation, some researchers use such terms as fundamentalist, traditionalist, modernist, orthodox or conservative, moderate and radical.

Nonetheless, it is impossible to classify the political ideological forces found in Iran between 1941 and 1979 exactly according to above classification, because the priority of various Islamist groups opposing the Pahlavī regime involved mostly battle against despotism and colonialism. The circumstances of the time did not allow for addressing ideational affairs and transparency of theoretical positions. Thus we witnessed certain individuals having particular later deeds and positions were distant from the general positions of the political group to which they seemed to ascribe. Indeed the conditions of struggle and inattention to specialized theoretical discussions in a variety of sociopolitical and economic spheres led to their collaboration. So after the Revolution when there was need for adopting clearer stances towards different issues, we see divisions in those groups and defection of a number of their members. At any rate, considering their dominant mindset and specific ideological positions, the militant groups can be classified according to group and organization titles, in spite of emphasis upon Islam by all of them. On this basis, we will deal with the important

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Islamist groups and the degree of their influence in the country's dominant mindset on the eve of the Revolution and the early post-revolutionary years.

C-1) Fadā'iyān-e Islam

Principally, after Iran's occupation and fall of Riḍā Shāh, religious leaders and groups also found the chance to return to sociopolitical scene more freely. They became able to reconstruct religious communication networks and revitalize religious ceremonies like preachers, mourning and so on which were severely restricted under Riḍā Shāh. Moreover, they could seize the opportunity to confront ideological and doctrinal currents negating religious beliefs. From among the first political-ideational currents with which clergy and religious groups were faced in the post-occupation period included Kasrawī and his fellow thinkers. Kasrawī was one of the early constitutional era intellectuals who had revealed his opposition to clergy from the very beginning. He had found further chance to propagate his believes under the Riḍā Shāh's reign and published numerous works on history, literature, religious, mysticism, etc. in which he largely criticized and negated the existing religious beliefs. He was not a materialist and considered himself as a monotheist. He viewed religions as useful for the guidance of society, but he held that the existing religions particularly Islam, and more notably Shī'ism, suffered from deviation and intermingled with superstitions. In his view, he as aided by his followers, made attempts at purifying religion from deviations and making it compatible with reasons; an effort he called 'clean religiosity'.[1]

Religious leaders could not remain indifferent to such an ideational current, since Kasrawī's beliefs and those of he fellow thinkers were introduced hotly in religious circles and seminary schools day by day. In 1943, Āyatullāh Khomeinī in his *Disclosing of Secrets*, tried to respond to what was published by one of Kasrawī's colleagues, Ḥukmī-Zādeh, against the Shī'ī convictions. Āyatullāh Khomeinī resembled such beliefs with those of Ibn Taymiyyah.[2]

The most intensive reaction to Kasrawī's thoughts was shown by some seminary students and religious youngsters who later entered Iran's political struggles under the name of the Fadā'iyān Islam. This group was led by a

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[1] See Aḥmad Kasrawī, *Path to Salvation*, Tehran: Pāydār, 1977, pp. 20-142; Aḥmad Kasrawī, *Shī'ism. Ibid.*, p. 54.

[2] Rūḥullāh Khomeinī, *Disclosing of Secrets*, no date, pp. 4 and 56.

young seminary student, Nawwāb Ṣafawī, who was a student in a Tehran's technical school during Iran's occupation. In 1943, under the influence of Najaf's religious *'ulamā'* respecting Kasrawī's and his fellow thinker's activities, he decided to come back home and stop Kasrawī (that was excommunicated by certain religious authorities) from his work, and otherwise kill him.[1]

Feeling religious duty to defend the sanctity of religion, he returned to Iran and following lengthy debates with Kasrawī, he became fully convinced that Kasrawī had a deviated objective and was not ready to change his mind. For this reason, he attempted his murder, but he failed. Finally Kasrawī was murdered in 1946 by one of Nawwāb's colleagues.

Fadā'iyān Islam declared existence in 1948. They comprised of religious youngsters belonging to the middle and lower classes (mainly seminary students or religious youngsters working in the bazaar). On the other hand, they were concerned about the weakness of religious faith and spread of non-religious convictions and immorality in the society, and suffered from what they called foreign influence and the government of alien lackey on Muslim society on the other. An excerpt of their thoughts and opinions was published in a collection, 'A Guide to the Truth', written by Sayyid Mujtabā Nawwāb Ṣafawī, the leader of the group in 1950.[2] This work that was supposed to become a guideline for the group's followers and be implemented throughout Iran, if possible, was indeed pursuing a project of religious utopia written centuries after the end of the thoughts based upon utopias. A Guide to the Truth was organized in two distinct parts. Part one, Roots of Dreadful Corruptions in Iran and the World, deals, in 14 sections, with what has been the cause of corruption and human confusion at that time and more specifically respecting Iranian society. The second part, Way to Reform All Classes and Guideline for Various Aspects of the Government and Society, presented the group's ameliorative solutions or revolutionary agenda.

In a nutshell, the book summarizes the roots of the evil in the following items:[3] 1) Rupture of lightning roots of faith in the truth; 2) Failure to implement Islamic commandments and penal code; 3) Absence of knowledge

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[1] Mujtabā Nawwāb Ṣafawī, *Fadā'iyān Islam and History of the Thoughts' Conduct*, ed. Hādī Khosrowshāhī, Tehran: 1996.

[2] Mujtabā Nawwāb Ṣafawī, *A Guide to the Truth*, Tehran: 1950.

[3] *Ibid.*

and the culture of fostering lust; 4) Women's failure to veil; 5) Abuse of alcoholic drinks; 6) Abuse of narcotics; 7) Gambling; 8) Cinemas, theaters, novels, and illusionary, lustful and criminal-making poems; 9) Non-religious music; 10) Lies, flattering and evil compliments; 11) General poverty and unemployment; 12) vast bribery; and 13) Widespread distrust between the nation and the government in each other.

Of the first part of Fadā'iyān Islam's thinking I regarded as negative, the second art of the book is the positive one. The second part of the book is generally of a reformist approach and was designed as guidelines for various elements of the government and society whose commandments according to its writers, "have to be implemented item by item."

The first issue dealt with by Nawwāb in the second part is the question of clergy. Without defining who is clergy and what characteristics he has, the book calls upon religious authorities to introduce the unqualified persons wearing the clerical robe and dismiss them from the clerical rank, classify curriculum to specific disciplines, ensure the health of mosques, and religious forums, societies and institutions and so on.

We continued to read Nawwāb's reform plans in an idealist manner, speaking of 14 existing ministries as well as Shāh's role. He talks almost in detail about a number of ministries. Respecting the Education Ministry, he demands the removal of such courses as music that was not-religious, separating girls and boys in schools as well as their teachers based upon their sex, he presents scientific and moral guidelines for the country's high schools and universities, he wants radio, newspapers and advertisements to be in accordance with religious, Muslim interests, and compliance with Islamic decency, he negates cinema activities altogether due to their vulgarity. He suggests that if there is any need to the activity of such centers, they should be organized according to religious commandments by separating men and women dealing with issues like history of Islam and *ta'ziyah* (religious epic-tragic shows). Moreover, he offers relevant proposals for the other areas of the Ministry of Culture accordingly.

Concerning the Ministry of Justice, he calls for the strict implementation of all Islamic rulings especially the penal code. He regarded the Ministry of the Interior as responsible for holding official, public Friday prayers all around the country in which all strata had to take part under the leadership of clergy and their speeches had to be released in radio and newspapers. For implementing social rulings of Islam, the police was forced to close down all

bars and brothels, make Islamic veiling compulsory and realize separation of men and women in public places. He proposed some orders for other related organs including the proposal of temporary marriage.[1] For Islamization, he called for the transformation of interest-based banks that were major factors of general poverty and abuse of Muslim capitals at the hands of wealth-seekers into non-interest loan banks.

He declined to give an y special guidelines for the other ministries, but he advised for making them Islamic or in fact giving them an Islamic façade that Iran's flag be flown over all ministries and affiliated organs, call for prayers is released, public prayers be held and non-interest loan banks be created in order to financially assist the related organs.[2]

According to the book, the representatives were only entitled to consult for the grandeur of Muslim nation according to Islam, seek legitimate solutions for the promotion of Iranian nation in scientific, industrial and moral spheres as well as increasing the Muslim wealth. Furthermore, they had to follow the high-ranking clergy in doing their sacred duty in order to avoid trespassing the Sharī'ah limits.

The Fadā'iyān Islam in this book, although wishes Muslims to take over the authority and to implement Islamic commandments, they have failed to point to necessity of establishing a specific political system for implementation of Islamic rulings. Despite they frequently regarded the Shāh and other officials as usurper and traitor, they seemed not to oppose the very fundament of monarchy. To them, the ideal monarch was somebody who followed the Prophet's descendents, implement Islamic and Shī'ī rulings and pioneer in carrying out religious duties and symbols. They propose, inter alia, that royal houses be tormented with mosques and religious banners. They finally threaten statesmen that if they refuse to establish Islamic values and preclude the taboos they would revenge and destroy all of them.[3] In sum, what Fadā'iyān offered as their agenda was to torment the existing sociopolitical system with religious values and manifestations. Unlike such Islamists as Muslim Brotherhood, there is no sign in their discussions and writings signifying the introduction of a coherent ideological system and they mainly demanded the execution of a façade of Sharī'ah in the society. As a

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Mujtabā Nawwāb Ṣafawī, *Islamic Society and Government*, Office for Islamic Studies and Hijrat Publications, 1979, pp. 1-36.

scholar has put it, Fadā'iyān Islam lacked essentially some theoreticians (in its specific meaning).[1] Nonetheless, they were politically very pragmatist and this very character distinguished them from the mainstream clerical establishment and even made them confront each other. It is very likely that one of the reasons behind Qum's religious authorities including Āyatullāh Borūjerdī's decision on preventing seminary students and clergy from engaging in politics and imposing a penalty of losing clerical robe for violators was the authorities' concern over students' joining the Fadā'iyān Islam.[2]

This pragmatism turned them into an influential political force in the late 1940s when they constituted a small group. Their action in assassinating some statesmen like Hajir and Razmārā in 1949 and 1950 during the oil nationalization movement accelerated the movement significantly.

When Āyatullāh Kāshānī returned Tehran from exile in 1946, the Fadā'iyān Islam entered politics too. But from the beginning, there were disagreements over how to attain the cause between the Fadā'iyān and Āyatullāh Kāshānī, since the latter acted according to the constitution, and believed in step by step policy, while Nawwāb thought of Islamic state and government in which Islamic laws become effective. Nonetheless, the Fadā'iyān continued to support Āyatullāh Kāshānī by 1951. On the other side, Hajir's assassination and more importantly Razmārā's murder (March 1951) made Fadā'iyān atop of news and the nationalists took advantage of the wave emerging in their support. In a more general view, Nawwāb Ṣafawī and Fadā'iyān Islam group could be regarded as following Martyr Shaykh Faḍlullāh Nūrī who sought religious constitutionalism.[3]

With Muṣaddiq's rise to power, Fadā'iyān Islam expected him to meet their demands concerning implementation of Islamic commandments including prohibition of sale of alcohol, failure to observe veiling, and women's participation in social and administrative affairs. They, moreover, demanded Muṣaddiq's government to free one of their members (Khalīl Ṭahmāsebī) who was in jail for murdering Razmārā. But their expectations were not met and they soon turned against Muṣaddiq. This very matter along with the attempt by one of Fadā'iyān Islam's members to assassinate

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[1] Ḥamīd 'Ināyat, op. cit., p. 168.

[2] Shāhrokh Akhawī, *The Role of Clergy in Iran's Political Scene*, 1990, p. 150.

[3] 'Abdullāh Jāsbī, *A Comparative Grouping; A Review of the Islamic Republic's Party in a Decade*, Tehran: Islamic Āzād University's Scientific Publications, 2000, vol. 1, p. 303.

Muṣaddiq's foreign minister, Fāṭimī, led to the detention of Nawwāb Ṣafawī by the government. Fadā'iyān's relationship was not also apparently good with Āyatullāh Kāshānī at the time and anyway Fadā'iyān's dispute with Muṣaddiq continued until the August 1953 coup. After his release from jail, Nawwāb Ṣafawī traveled to some Muslim countries (Egypt, Jordan and Palestine) in 1953 and participated in the Islamic countries conference in Jerusalem.[1]

At the time when Nawwāb Ṣafawī returned home, then prime minister Ḥusayn 'Alā planned to travel to Baghdad in order to make Iran join the CENTO pact. Under the 8-article of the CENTO pact, Iran became formally U.S. military hub in the region so that it could defend American interests in the region under the name of confronting communism. For this reason, Fadā'iyān Islam issued a declaration objecting to Iran's accession to the CENTO pact and decided to assassinate him in order to prevent 'Alā from traveling to Baghdad and signing the agreement. On November 16, 1955 when Ḥusayn Ala was entering the Shāh's Mosque to attend the mourning ceremony of late Āyatullāh Kāshānī's son, he was injured by 'Alī Dhu'l-Qadr. The military governor immediately issued the arrest warrant for the leader and members of Fadā'iyān Islam. Hence Nawwāb Ṣafawī, Khalīl Ṭahmāsebī, Abudlhossein Wāḥidī and some other members were arrested.

The deputy of the Fadā'iyān Islam group, 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Wāḥidī was martyred by Taymūr Bakhtiyār, the military governor of Tehran while arguing with him. Sayyid Mujtabā Nawwāb Ṣafawī, Khalīl Ṭahmāsebī, Sayyid Muḥammad Mujtabā Wāḥidī and Muẓaffar Dhu'l-Qadr were executed on December 28, 1955. With their martyrdom the dossier of an important influential group in this period was closed,[2] though their political convictions and ideas attracted numerous advocates in following years and continued.

In a nutshell, Fadā'iyān Islam movement and more notably Nawwāb Ṣafawī himself largely influenced the revolutionary clergy in the 1960s and 1970s. Their almost primordial viewpoints concerning an ideal Islamic government that was introduced for the first time paved the way for the clergy's thinking on an alternative government and second, the group's guerrilla warfare could inspire armed groups after the 1960s.[3]

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[1] Mujtabā Nawwāb Ṣafawī, *Fadā'iyān Islam*, op. cit.

[2] 'Abdullāh Jāsbī, op. cit., p. 311.

[3] Farhād Shaykhfarshī, *An Analysis of the Role of Shī'ī Ulema in the Advent of the Islamic Revolution*, Tehran: Center for Islamic Revolution's Documentation, 2000, p. 227.

C-2) Islamic Nations Party

Islamic Nations Party (INP) was one of the other religious groups which emerged in Iran in the 1960s. This group tried to create secret organization and struggle against the regime with a multi-stage plan. In part of the plan, armed struggle against the regime was envisaged, but SAVAK became able to track it down at its inception in1965 and arrest all its members within weeks before they could launch any operations. The group's leader, Sayyid Kāẓim Borūjerdī, was sentenced to life imprisonment and the rest of leadership members including Muḥammad Mīr-Muḥammad Ṣādiqī, Abolqasem Sarhaddizadeh, Sayyid Maḥmūdī, and Hāshim Āyatullāhzadeh received heavy jail sentence. Among them was Ḥujjat al-Islām Shaykh Muḥammad Jawād Ḥujjatī Kermānī who was sentenced to ten years in jail. From among 80 detainees, 55 were sentenced and the rest were released. The members of the INP were devout Muslims mainly employed with a high school diploma. In addition, contrary to other groups, the members were largely young and lacked political experience.

The INP was mostly influenced by the idea of Muslim unity which was advanced at the time by Shaykh Muḥammad Taqī, Shaykh 'Abd al-Majīd Salīm, Shaykh Maḥmūd Shaltūt in Dār al-Taqrīb and a number of Shī'ī *'ulamā'*. Practically, some of Muslim Arab states' and Sunnī and Shī'ī political parties' actions played a part in the formation of the idea of united Islamic government.

The Party's political thinking was a combination of Shī'ī and Sunnī thoughts found among various existing Islamic currents in the Muslim Arab countries. Books, publications and declarations released by such groups as Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Da'wah Party, Islamic Taḥrīr Party, Young Muslims propagations and Iraq Jama's declarations were influential in the formation of the Party. In the INP's statute, except for one article, there is explicit or implicit thing denoting Shī'ī denomination in order to avoid divisive discussions between the Shī'ī and Sunnī Muslims in this way.[1]

The party provided for a highly complicated organization whose leader, at the top of the organizational echelon (without any emphasis upon his jurisprudence) enjoyed extensive powers with the authority to appoint and dismiss all party officials.[2] The INP decried the monarchical regime, while

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[1] Ismā'īl Ḥasan-Zādeh, "Considerations on the Emergence and Development of the Islamic Nations Party," *Matīn Quarterly*, no. 5-6, Winter 1999, p. 53.

[2] Islamic Nations Party, "Discipline is Key to Success," no. 2, p. 3.

criticizing the republican government, despite its essential difference from monarchy on other grounds; they accused republicanism of breaking their promise in granting freedom to people and dishonesty in their propaganda regarding protection of human rights. The ultimate goal of the INP included the creation of a transnational Islamic government in the entire Muslim World, but they had failed to clearly portray epistemological bases and prospect of their envisaged government.[1]

The Islamic government for the INP has two divine and popular dimensions, since it deduces laws from Islam and entrusts the masses the way of governing. The Party's leadership, in spite of their opposition to dictatorship and republicanism, did not offer new rules and framework for selection of leadership position in Islamic government. Qualifications of the Central Committee's members (as the supreme authority of their ideal Islamic government) and those of the leader were not stipulated at all. The appointment and dismissal of leader were the powers of Central Committee whose supreme presidency was with leader himself. The dual assemblies called People's Assembly and Assembly of the Great had not any task but to oversee all programs and articulating popular demands to the government. Even according to Article 11, "The parliament in Islamic government does not pass laws," but it has just supervisory function.[2]

According to the Statute to Article 8, women were given the right to vote and be elected. Even women's membership in Party's secret activities was recognized and it actually had started attracting women.[3] The Party's outlook on power is totalitarian and authoritarian, because due to its particular outlooks, it did not tolerate any party in a way that according to Article 12, activity of all parties was unauthorized.

Since the INP called for sovereignty over the entire Muslim World, it could not envisage any political and geographical boundaries for Islamic government. The contours of vast Islamic ideology were changing and even

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[1] Archive of the Center for Islamic Revolution Documentation, Pamphlet on Explaining the Regulatory Articles, Islamic Nations Party's Case, Case code, 3675, p. 1.

[2] For information on the statute of the Islamic Nations Party, see: *Message of Revolution Magazine*, 1982, pp. 54-56.

[3] Ismāʿīl Ḥasan-Zādeh, op. cit., cited in: Interview of the Center for Islamic Revolution Documentation with Muḥammad Kāẓim Bojnūrdī, Foundation for the Grand Islamic Encyclopedia, dated 13 May 2000.

in a utopian standpoint, it viewed its ultimate cause as "membership of all world masses in the INP."[1]

In a nutshell, the INP represented a kind of political-military movements of the urban lower and middle classes. Unlike some previous Islamic groups like Fadā'iyān Islam, the Party not only did no rely on traditional lower classes, but its main human source came from modern and traditional middle classes. Indeed the Party's leader endeavored to recruit talented people with religious tendency who did not object to new interpretation of Islam. The Party's inexperience, however, prevented them from successfully operating this complex organization and following the detention of one of the low-ranking members (tasked with the class), the whole organization was revealed its member were arrested and sentenced to jail from 3-4 years to life imprisonment.

C-3) Islamic Coalition Party

In the 1960s, Islamic Coalition Party (ICP) was in fact a group of a number of religious mourning societies in Tehran which worked together. The organizers of these societies tended to be from the bazaar with political inclinations and some had the record of collaborating with Fadā'iyān Islam, Āyatullāh Kāshānī and even the National Front.

These forces cooperated with Imām Khomeinī in the early 1960s and the start of his movement particularly during the Provincial Councils Amendment Bill. The early nucleus of the group consisted of three societies of Amīn al-Dawlah, Shaykh 'Alī and Iṣfahānīs Mosques, all were merchants in Tehran's bazaar.

In early 1963, three groups of these people came together including Ṣādiq Imāmī, Asadullāh Lājevardī, Ṣādiq Islāmī from Shaykh 'Alī Mosque, Habibullah Asgaroladi, Mahdī 'Arāqī, 'Alī Derakhshan, and Muḥammad Gachouni from Amīn al-Dawlah Mosque renowned as Free Muslims Front, and a group form the Isfahani residents in the capital city who had organizational linkage with one another, they were named Islamic Coalition Party on Mahdī 'Arāqī's suggestion.[2]

On this basis, the movement of Imām Khomeinī followers, especially those who were active in the June 1963 uprising, took an organizational form. Central Council playing liaison role between the societies and Imām

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[1] Archive of the Center for Islamic Revolution Documentation, op. cit.

[2] 'Abbās Shādlū, *Political Parties and Factions*, Tehran: Gostareh, 2000, p. 157.

Khomeinī in which Āyatullāh Beheshtī, Āyatullāh Anwarī, Ḥujjat al-Islām Bāhonar, and Āyatullāh Hāshimī Rafsanjānī were active. The release of Imām's declarations, organizing demonstrations, meetings and speeches for advocates of Imām's movement were among the other activities of the Party.[1]

In the affair of the Six-Point Referendum proposed by the Shāh better known as the White Revolution or the Shāh and nation revolution, this party played a crucial part in shaping public protests to the proposal. In this relation, following some meetings between the representatives of the Party and Imām, the Party members requested his opinion on Shāh's proposal to which Imām replied clearly on January 22, 1963 that the referendum was forceful and a preclude to the removal of legal provisions respecting religion. This announcement could be regarded as a beginning of the June 1963 uprising. During the 'Āshūrā events of 1963, the Islamic Coalition Party intensified public protests to the Shāh by organizing a number of demonstrations. Following Imām's speech in 'Āshūrā's afternoon, the members of the Party encouraged uprising in June 5, 1963 after being informed of Imām's detention in a way that some of its prominent members shouted Imām's detention among the people for informing them.[2]

The group created a covert grouping following Imām's exile, and initially called for armed struggle against the Shāh's regime as Fadā'iyān Islam did, but after their first armed action, that is assassination of Prime Minister Ḥasan 'Alī Manṣūr in February 1964, their organization was identified and destroyed. Hence, their main leaders and activities were arrested; some were sentenced to death and some to imprisonment. In this way, their activity was restricted and seemingly after that event, the Party left armed struggle methods through a number of them worked with political group advocating armed struggle like the Mujāhidīn Khalq later on. Nonetheless, the main current of the Party continued their political activity in a covert and limited style within the framework of political programs promoted by dissident clergy (notably Āyatullāh Khomeinī).[3]

After the prominent members of the Party were arrested in 1964, due to their long imprisonment (which for some lasted till 1978), the Party's activity decreased and continued sparsely in the form of cultural and economic activities (financial support for the militants).

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[1] 'Abdullāh Jāsbī, op. cit., p. 361.

[2] 'Abbās Shādlū, op. cit.

[3] See Mahdī 'Arāqī, *The Untold: Haj Mahdī 'Arāqī's Memoirs*, Tehran: Rasā, 1991.

Respecting the group's ideology and ideational bases, it should be suggested that the Islamic Coalition Party did less than their counterparts in Fadā'iyān Islam to revive religious precepts and codify a political-religious ideology. They were just religious communities active in the bazaar (comprising of businessmen and their assistants) who were engaged in religious activities (religious training through contacting clergy like Āyatullāh Beheshtī and Muṭahharī) and social and charity affairs. They began their political activity in the early 1960s under Imām Khomeinī's leadership and their political engagement reduced after Imām's exile. Indeed there is no book or work left from any of their members showing their intellectual endeavor to revive religious thoughts and or presenting a type of political Islam. Perhaps it was because of this shortcoming that some of the Coalition members were attracted to other groups including the Mujāhidīn Khalq at the heyday of guerrilla and armed struggles. The Coalition Party in fact represented in principle a closed organization comprised of forces wishing to foster particular Islamic values and they lacked independence and coherent conceptual bases.

C-4) Liberation Movement

In the early 1960s, a group of Muslim forces including Āyatullāh Sayyid Maḥmūd Ṭāliqānī, Engineer Mahdī Bāzargān, and Dr. Yadullāh Saḥābī who were members of the National Front with religious tendencies, separated from the National Resistance Movement (that was created by a group of nationalist-religious forces advocating the National Front after the August 1953 coup) and established a new political group entitled the Liberation Movement of Iran.

As a researcher argues, one of the main reasons behind the establishment of the Liberal Movement of Iran (LMI) was the rise of cultural difference between two currents within the National Resistance Movement that covered secular faction divided into national-secularist (like Khalīl Malikī, Muḥammad 'Alī Khānī, Engineer Ḥijāzī) and liberal nationalism (led by Sanjābī) and religious faction (including Āyatullāh Ṭāliqānī, Āyatullāh Zanjānī, Engineer Bāzargān, Yadullāh Saḥābī).[1]

Following this difference and suppression of National Resistance Movement, a number of nationalist religious forces who were members of

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[1] Jalāluddīn Fārsī, *Covert Corners*, Tehran: Rozaneh Publications; Interview with Jalāluddīn Fārsī with *Ya Letharat Weekly*, Wednesday, July 18, 2001, p. 7.

the National Resistance Movement decided to engage in public activity. Late Mahdī Bāzargān describes the logic behind the creation of the LMI:

"The National Front of Iran, as shown by its title, was a front, that is gathering and coalition of social units and schools and some prominent figures who shared a cause (the country's independence, the nation's freedom). But to share a cause will not mean to share a motive and it should not be expected as such. Some were motivated by nationalism, some by human emotions, racial prejudices and some by socialism, but for us and a number of fellow thinkers and perhaps for the majority of Iranian people, there could not be a motivation other than Islamic religious precepts and beliefs. I do not say that the others were not Muslims or were opposed to Islam, but for them Islam did not count as a sociopolitical ideology. To us, it constituted intellectual basis and a motivation for sociopolitical activity. Such a party to association happened not to be created in Iran, or if it had been created, it ceased to exist at that time."[1]

At any rate, in 1961, such factors as internal problems in the National Fronton the one hand and emergence of a wave of religiosity which had incrementally appeared in the universities on the other came together leading that faction of the National Front that was first more religious and secondly more included to adopt a more radical position toward the regime proceeded with the creation of a new organization called the LMI.[2]

This group consisted of a wide spectrum of religious forces. They issued a statement describing their beliefs and demarcating their boundaries with the secular liberal forces. Criticizing the White Revolution Referendum in 1962 and later supporting Imām Khomeinī, they condemned the suppression of the June 1963 uprising. By adopting hash stances against the regime, they in practice separated their line from those of secular liberal forces resulting in their leaders' detention and decline in the Movement's activities.

Although the LMI was an organization covering a spectrum of nationalist religious forces and under conditions of struggle, there was not a suitable ground for precise proposition of doctrinal subjects; these stances became more transparent in the following years. Different intellectual currents could be identified in the LMI and after the Revolution such demarcations became clearer causing the defection of certain elements.

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[1] 'Abbās Shādlū, op. cit., p. 208.

[2] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 245.

Principally, there were different intellectual currents in the LMI in a way that this movement could not be regarded as a single intellectual line or current. According to Saḥābī, the LMI did not represent a unified organization with a single attitude, but it contained a variety of intellectual tendencies.[1]

Some researchers have classified this trend as the current advocating Bāzargān and the current of those criticizing him.[2] Some others note that there were two currents within the LMI that had two different perceptions of Islam and religious conducts including the political current and doctrinal one.[3] Ḥasan Ḥabībī (one of the LMI members) holds that principality there were two essences and two currents from the beginning.[4]

He indicates that a group focused largely on an anti-despotism struggle and regarded despotism as the major factor of Iran's predicament in the past 2500 years and emphasized less colonialism. But the other group gave prominence to struggle against colonialism,[5] Bāzargān and some other members being in the middle of these two groups.[6]

The LMI's activity in Iran between 1963 and 1977 revolved around peaceful and consciousness-raising style and was limited to issuing some declarations, statements and papers and holding some speeches and meetings. The LMI's activity abroad was wider than its activity at home during this period and ranged from issuing statements in various occasions, publishing political analyses and monthly magazine entitled *Message of Mujahed* since 1972.[7] The LMI abroad, though part of the LMI at homes, acted more radically. Among its activities abroad were included Dr. Muṣṭafā Chamrān, Sharīʿatī and Yazdī who were in close contact with Imām Khomeinī in Najaf as a religious-political leader. Their anti-Marxist tendency distinguished them from the leftist Islamist groups like the Mujāhidīn Khalq.

The LMI abroad had an interlocking relationship with the Islamic Student Association abroad which was managed by religious students vis-à-vis secular organization of the Confederation. From among their elements

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[1] See Muḥammad Jawād Muẓaffar, *The First President*, Tehran: Kavīr, 1999, pp. 253-257, (Interview with ʿIzzatullāh Saḥābī).

[2] *Ibid*., p. 256.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 202, (Interview with Ḥasan Ḥabībī).

[4] *Ibid*.

[5] *Ibid*., pp. 203-204.

[6] *Ibid*., p. 203.

[7] Ghulām Riḍā Khwājah Sarvī, "Conflicts within the Political Factions in the First Term of the Islamic Consultative Assembly," *Imām Ṣādiq University's Research Quarterly*, No. 1, Fall 1995, p. 97.

were Quṭb-Zādeh and Banī Ṣadr who took up important positions after the Revolution.[1]

The LMI lacked necessary coherence and possibilities at the threshold of the Revolution and its members and adherents did some acts sparsely. Some of its members took a harsh position against Marxist tendencies advanced by certain forces of the Mujāhidīn Khalq that unfolded following the release of a statement indicating a shift in the Mujāhidīn's ideological positions in 1975.[2] Such forces in the form of a cover three-member were tasked with producing and publishing analyses as various declarations preclude an adverse effect of such deviations. These declarations signed by nicknames like "Conscious Muslim, University Students, Muslim Students, Committed Muslims" and so on were distributed in many universities between 1975 and 1977.[3]

Another clique of those forces launched secret nucleus in early 1977 in order to enlighten the young generation and students. The most important action carried out by this clique involved publication of a magazine entitled 'Muslim Movement of Iran' and a paper entitled 'Islamic Movement News' in 1978.[4]

With the escalation of Islamic Revolution, the LMI battled the regime by supporting Imām Khomeinī and heightened its efforts at realizing the Islamic Revolution by increasing its contacts and cooperation with the clergy. In days leading to the advent of the Revolution, Imām Khomeinī entrusted certain responsibilities to Engineer Bāzargān and Yadullāh Saḥābī. Ultimately some members of the group played a significant role in the Revolutionary Council and with Bāzargān's selection as the head of the provisional government, the role of the groups expanded significantly in the post-revolutionary government.

C-5) Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization and Islamist Socialist Groups

In the 1940s, a group of religious youngsters working with nationalist political groups had egalitarian tendency as influenced by socialist beliefs. They sought to adapt Islam's egalitarian teachings with socialism leading to the formation of 'Monotheist Socialists' group as an example of such

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[1] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 302.

[2] Contemporary History of Iran, *Liberation Movement of Iran's Documents*, pp. 1-5.

[3] ʿAbbās Shādlū, op. cit., p. 210.

[4] *Ibid*.

tendencies. Founded by such students and religious intellectuals as Jalāluddīn Āshtiyānī and Muḥammad Nakhshab, this group attempted, in their writing discussions, to establish that, first, Islam was not a back-warded religious belonging to the underdeveloped societies, rather a dynamic religious belonging to all times and places, of course this is the Muslim understanding of this religion that out to be dynamic, evolutionary and appropriate with the timed. Second, socialism was not the monopoly of Marxists and Islam also sought to create a just socialist society.[1]

Monotheist Socialists had worked with the Iran Party for a while but they defected the Party in 1952 and continued their activities under the name of 'Iranian People's Freedom Society'. They backed Muṣaddiq eagerly and played a significant role in formation of the National Resistance Movement after the August 1953 coup and then in the creation of Second National Front. Their base largely lied in religious youngsters.[2] They tended to armed struggles like most of the other political groups opposing the regime and recognized themselves as Revolutionary Movement of Iranian Muslim People (JAMA). Like the other similar political groups, they were rapidly identified by security apparatus in 1965 and abolished. Their leaders were imprisoned and some remaining elements joined the Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization after its formation. With the advent of the Revolution, JAMA resumed its activities and its leader, Dr. Sāmī, assumed the post of minister of health in the provisional government. After the abolition of JAMA, its activities continued on a limited scale along with similar fellow thinking groups like the Militant Muslims Movement led by Dr. Peymān (which was an offshoot of JAMA).

C-5-1) Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization (MKO)

Until 1975 MKO was the most publicized political group related to Islamic leftist current since the 1960s. The Organization was created in 1965 by a group of religious students who had worked with the LMI. Its original founders included three Tehran University students named Ḥanīf-Nejād, Sayyid Muḥsin and Badīzādegān. After the June 1963 uprising, they came to the conclusion that continued political struggles in peaceful, amateur and unorganized manner was of no use. They also saw weakness of religious political forces in lack of conceptual framework, a coherent ideology and

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[1] Maḥmūd Nikūrūḥ, *Monotheist Socialists Movement*, Tehran: Chāpakhsh, pp. 22-25.

[2] Ḥusayn Raḍī, "A Critique of the Article on Monotheist Socialists Movement," *Dialogue*, no. 18, Winter 1998, pp. 165-168.

specific suitable strategy for struggle.[1] On this basis, the founders of the MKO launched training courses (revolutionary-ideological) including discussions on economics, politics and organization and recruited talented youngsters with religious backgrounds.[2]

With such actions, the original nucleus spread from Tehran to other provinces gradually and formed cells in Iṣfahān, Shīrāz and Tabrīz. Besides, a number of members were dispatched to Jordan to learn guerrilla warfare techniques from the PLO.

The founders of MKO were on the one side influenced by modernist and scientific interpretations by the LMI leaders of Islamic teachings and were affected by experiences of Marxist revolutionary throughout the world. While rejecting philosophical materialism of Marxism, they viewed historical, social, economic and political teachings of this school as useful as a science of revolution. Particularly in pamphlets released by the MKO leaders in the early years of its creation, they accepted dialectical rules as advanced by Marxists as the methodology for recognizing social questions. The theory of social evolution was also embraced on the basis of accepting the principle of class conflict (as proposed in Marxist texts). According to the MKO leaders' writings, human society moved towards the creation of a monotheistic classless society from social class conflicts and struggles. This trend was followed by prophets until the last prophet, and since then it is pursued by the monotheist revolutionaries.[3] The first theoretical work of the MKO was *Ḥusayn's Movement* written by Aḥmad Riḍā'ī. The main thrust of the book indicated that the monotheist system envisioned by the prophet of Islam was a totally dependent commonwealth system, for it just worshiped God, it was a classless society that sought to reform public affairs. To Riḍā'ī, the Shī'ī Islam especially Imām Ḥusayn (Peace be upon him) rose up against the feudal landowners, exploitative wealthy merchants as well as usurper caliphs who had betrayed the true goal of monotheistic system. Riḍā'ī and Mujāhidīn were of the belief that it was every Muslim's duty to continued

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[1] Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization, *An Educational Analysis of the Statement Issued by the So-Called Left Opportunists*, No place: Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization.

[2] Muḥammad Ṣādiq 'Alawī, A Study of Guerrilla Method in Iran, p. 82; Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization, *Organization and Tactics,* No place: No date, p. 23.

[3] Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization, *Evolution,* No place: No publisher, 1979.

battle against any oppression particularly capitalist imperialism, despotism and conservative clergy in order to establish a classless society.[1]

In terms of strategy and method of struggle, the Mujāhidīn Khalq considered armed struggle as the only way to break the disappointment and fear barrier and to break the police space providing fertile ground for popularizing the struggle. Contrary to the early leaders of the Fadā'iyān Khalq, they regarded cities as more suitable for the start of such a struggle.[2]

MKO, like other guerrilla political groups were identified and raided by the security forces in their first operations. It made attempts in the 1971 to launch actions in order to disrupt the lavish celebration of Ian's 2500-year monarchy. For this purpose, they bombed Tehran's electricity facilities and attempted to hijack an Ian Air airliner. Following that incident, nine member of the Mujāhidīn were arrested, one of whom gave information to SAVAK under torture leading to detention of 66 members. Within next months, all members of the original leadership cadre were either arrested or executed and/or lost their lives in street battles.[3]

After these strikes, the remaining elements of the organization tried to reorganize it and its activities with the support of certain political and religious circles including some clergy opposing the regime ad a number of Bazaar merchants, and succeeded in recruiting young students. By organizing them, they could launch some other military operations against the government.

Mujāhidīn established intellectual and financial links with most of militant clergy, members of the LMI and Muslim merchants and recruited young elements of these very groups. Obviously because of their Islamic convictions, they had much attraction among the young Muslims who had political inclinations.

At this time, Mujāhidīn's fame as Muslim militants became widespread that overshadowed somehow other militant currents and many clergy and Muslim militants helped them enthusiastically. Particularly, their close relationship with Āyatullāh Ṭāliqānī and such forums as Hidāyat Mosque and

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[1] Aḥmad Riḍā'ī, Ḥusayn's Path, No place: No publisher, 1971.

[2] See Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization, *An Account of the Establishment and History of the Educational Analysis of the* Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization, no place: Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization, 1979.

[3] Ervand Abrahimian, op. cit., p. 606.

Ḥusaynīeh Ershad added to their attraction, thus making financial aids of the Bazaar merchants, clergy and other revolutionary Muslims available to them.[1] In spite of the support the MKO received from many revolutionary Muslims at that time, one of the exceptional encounters they had was with Imām Khomeinī. Despite Mujāhidīn's enormous efforts and those of some clergy that demanded Imām's confirmation of the organization in a written form, Imām never upheld the Mujāhidīn current either explicitly or implicitly.

Following the 1975 events, the logic behind such treatment by Imām and even his cold encounter with Mujāhidīn became known to everybody, particularly given that two of the organization's liaison agents with Imām Khomeinī (Ḥaqq-Shenās and Rawḥānī) were among the MKO's later most active Marxists.[2]

With the demise of the original MKO leadership in 1971, tendency to Marxism grew in the organization. Marxist works and texts constituted a considerable part of the MKO's training curriculum in the 1970s. Intellectual duality between Islam and Marxism, which penetrated the organization gradually, grew and ultimately this conflict was resolved with the removal of Islam from the organization.[3]

A precise study of theoretical works of Mujāhidīn involving the Pamphlet of Recognition, Economics Simplified, Interpretation of *Tawbah* Verse, Ḥusayn's Path, and Prophets' Path Human Path demonstrates that this current fostered severe theoretical problems and paradoxes within itself. With the rise of such theoretical shortcoming, the MKO reached the conclusion that it had to leave Islam and Marxism at the center of its agenda. This impaired seriously the organization and the whole revolutionary and Islamic movements of Iran. The early Mujāhidīn leaders' reliance on the Qur'an, *Nahj al-Balāghah*, History of Islam and Iran, was simply of a superficial nature and its quality and essence was totally different from Āyatullāh Ṭāliqānī and Bāzargān's works and alike whom they claimed to follow. According to Ḥamīd Enayat, Mujāhidīn's audacity in this ideological fusion is evident in their application of dialectical materialism in interpreting the Qur'an and some parts of the Prophet, Imām 'Alī and Imām Ḥusayn's

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[1] Mas'ūd Raḍawī, *Hāshimī and the Revolution*, Tehran: Hamshahrī Publications, p. 75.

[2] See Ḥamīd Rawḥānī, *Imām Khomeinī's Movement*, Tehran: Center for Islamic Revolution Documentation, 1995, vol. 3, p. 642; Mas'ūd Raḍawī, op. cit., p. 77.

[3] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 264.

lives. What they did was to use such secondary concepts and categories as analytical too, without mentioning it clearly. In this way, they used the conception of God's tradition somewhat as meaning the law of evolution that is one of the essential scientific laws of the world. They argued that any phenomenon that could not adapt to this tradition is doomed to annihilation. For instance, since capitalist system and imperialist world were not compatible with the vital realities of human society, they foster their enemy and antithesis namely the working class and tailors. Ultimately, with the revolution of the oppressed masses, the gigantic power of capitalism would wither away and the working class would inherit the power and means of production and would inherit the earth.[1] In October 1975, all of a sudden, a statement was issued by a group of Mujāhidīn indicating an ideological shift in the organization. Of course, the leadership and most of the MKO officials had embraced, in practice, Marxist outlook since early 1975, but in October 1975, the organization declared the adoption of Marxism-Leninism formally by issuing the statement on ideological positions.[2] The statement read:

"After four years of armed struggle and two years of ideological debates, we have come to the conclusion that Marxism is the only true philosophy of revolution.[3] Initially we supposed that we were able to amalgamate Marxism and Islam and accept the philosophy of historical materialism without materialism and dialectics. Now we have learnt that this idea is impossible to maintain… We have adopted Marxism, because it is the true path to emancipate the oppressed working class. Since Islam because of its belief in God, prophesy and the judgment day cannot be among the progress social forces of human being and pave the way for ultimate victory of toilers and the oppressed (worker-peasant) over exploitative class systems, and actually create classless, production society devoid of oppression. So, monotheistic society and negation of any kind of exploitation and oppression is not an objective conviction to attain in Islam."[4]

In this way, the MKO declared its ideological shift from Islam to Marxism. This shift was directed in the organization by two members named Taqī Shahrān and Bahrām Ārām. With the killing of Riḍā'ī in a clash with the police in 1973 and Taqī Shahran's escape from prison, the MKO's

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[1] Ḥamīd Enayat, op. cit., pp. 266-367.

[2] See Mujāhidīn Khalq Organization, *Statement on Declaring Ideological Positions of the Organization*, No place: No publishers, 1975, p. 16.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 241-246.

[4] *Ibid*.

leadership was left with him and Bahrām Ārām who had Marxist tendencies, thus directing the organization in that way.[1] Nonetheless, many of the MKO members and advocates did not yield to this trend which they believed was a dash on this back and a symbol of opportunism, thus insisting on their religious faith. The most famous elements that resisted the Marxist current included Majīd Sharīf and Murtaḍā Ṣamadiyah Labbāf.

On September 8, 1975, Ārām and Shahrān along with some fellow thinkers in the MKO abducted Sharīf Wāqifī and Ṣamadiyah Labbāf and attempted to kill them. Ṣamadiyah managed to escape while he was injured, but he soon arrested and executed in December 1975. Sharīf Wāqifī, however, was caught and killed, they in addition, burnt his corpse I a trash depot.[2] The arrested leaders of MKO declared in a TV broadcast explicitly in July 1975 that they themselves had been Marxist and had made the organization armed with Marxist ideology and beliefs. They described that they had become Marxist for years and had taught Marxist thoughts to the members as Marxism as a science for struggle or under the cloak of Islamic teachings. In surprise of viewers particularly hundreds of devout Muslims that had devoted their lives to the organization, the leaders confessed in their interview that they have murdered that group of MKO members that remained faithful to Islam and protested Marxist tendency of the leadership.[3]

One of the Marxist leaders of the MKO, Waḥīd Afrākhteh, collaborated with the SAVAK following his detention and made tremendous amount of information available to the SAVAK. Part of the consequences of this was detention of such figures as Āyatullāh Ṭāliqānī and Ḥujjat al-Islām Hāshimī Rafsanjānī.[4]

After these events, MKO's place among the religious forces was undermined severely, for they became able to penetrate beyond student and graduate strata among the bazaar merchants, clergy and businessmen. To many advocates who sacrificed their lives and properties to the organization, Mujāhidīn represented revolutionary Shī'ism, Islam and the true struggle. Obviously these were certain religious currents and personalities that regarded parts of these religious thoughts and perceptions as deviated from the early days that Mujāhidīn's opinions were developed. However, the

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[1] Muḥammad Ṣādiq 'Alawī, op. cit., p. 91.

[2] Mas'ūd Raḍawī, op. cit., p. 79.

[3] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 264.

[4] Mas'ūd Raḍawī, op. cit., p. 80.

situation seemed to dictate that the main objective was only to battle the Shāh's regime. Under such circumstances, to discuss ideological issues particularly over the Mujāhidīn who were preeminent in battle against the Shāh's American-backed regime appeared a deviated and even suspicious act inappropriate at the time.

But with the Mujāhidīn leaders' confessions in summer 1975 on their belief in Marxism, Mujāhidīn's sanctity was broken. What increased religious forces' rage was not just the fact that the leadership and organization had become Marxist years before and spent on dissemination of Marxism the possibilities and assets were handed to them in the name of Islam, but it was the declaration of sympathy of some elements with the organization with Marxists. They had left their religious convictions and had formally declared that they had become Marxist. Some of them had become Marxist before the leadership's declaration of their positions, and had not declared it upon expediency. Some of them believed in leadership's information to the degree that shift in leaders' stances obliged them to follow the suit. Forces that had objections to Mujāhidīn's opinions for a long time couldn't help reveal their objections any more.

The 1975 internal strike and developments were highly valuable for the SAVAK enabling it to arrest most of the MKO's members and by using the information gathered about the Islamic forces destroy it rapidly. The remnants of the MKO forces including Marxists and Muslims were caught by the SAVAK and there did not exist any organization in practice since mid-1976.[1]

At any rate, ideological crisis within the organization left significant impact on political culture of Islamist forces; this event intensified ideological-political sectarianism within the organization, created different divisions among Islamic egalitarian (leftist) forces intensifying polarization and antipathy among them. This polarization left is effects in the post-revolutionary period on Iran's political space.

C-5-2) New Alignment of Forces after the 1975 Developments

Following the 1975 developments, many religious forces called for the termination of strategic alliance with Marxists. Indeed, hatred of Marxist conducts became so widespread that even some of religious forces believed that struggle against Marxists was better than battle against the regime.

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[1] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 267.

Nonetheless, Mas'ūd Rajawī and his fellow thinkers who led the Mujāhidīn in the prison opposed separating from Marxists and still insisted upon strategic alliance and communal life with them. Furthermore, they hesitated in explicitly condemning the newly Marxists leaders of the organization. Rajawī only did not accept that the shift to Marxism in the organization displayed a deep-rooted intellectual presence in the organization, but also viewed this more simply the action of a number of opportunist elements who could take advantage of the organization's possibilities under particular conditions. Anything more than that was, for the Mujāhidīn leadership in the prison, a deviation from the main cause, which was struggle against the regime. They thought that to discuss doctrinal issues just served the enemy's interests. The fact, however, was that even in this scant reaction shown by the Mujāhidīn leadership in the prison towards the shift to Marxism in the organization traces of Marxism were seen.[1]

The Mujāhidīn's constant arguemtn that anything has to be overshadowed by the stuggle and their efforts at playing down what hapned prvoed infertile. For many religious forces frustrated with the Marxist actions, the Mujāhidīn leadership's justification was no longer convicinng. Finally the dispute was extended to the clergy in the prison most of whom demanded a clear demarcation with the Marxists.

Issuance of a *fatwā* requiring separation between Islamic forces and Marxists were simply part of the 1975 strike. Another outcome included the rise of numerous divisions among the religious forces in the prison. Some of more independent persons related to the Mujāhidīn like late Muḥammad 'Alī Rajā'ī, Engineer 'Izzatullāh Saḥābī and Behzād Nabawī separated from it completely. The most important even surrounding this case was the issuance of a statement on part of famous clergy. The content of this statement was a harsh strike on Marxist current and disclosure of their operation among the Muslim prisoners and even those outside the jail.[2]

This statement that in fact constituted a jurisprudential *fatwā* and by nature a religious obligation was not written according to Āyatullāh Ṭāliqānī in order to prevent the regime's exploitation, but others were tasked with informing the others of this *fatwā*.[3] The *fatwā* coincided with the a statement released in March 1976 by Āyatullāhs Ṭāliqānī, Rabbānī Shīrāzī, Mahdawī Kanī, Anwarī, Lāhūtī and Hāshimī Rafsanjānī[4] in which they demanded

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 270.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 271.

[3] Ḥamīd Rawḥānī, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 727.

[4] Quoted in Mas'ūd Raḍawī, op. cit., p. 124.

keeping the boundaries between the Muslims and Marxists within and outside the prison.[1]

The statement reads:

"In the name of God. Considering the harms arising from communal life of Muslims with Marxists and social prestige whereby they gain, by taking all religious and political dimensions into account, and given the absolute ruling concerning the untouchable nature of infidels including Marxists, separation of Muslims from Marxists in the prisons is necessary and lack of diligence in this respect will cause irreparable harms."[2]

The *fatwā* originated from a covert conflict between the religious elements and Communists in the 1970s referring to the questions of the past decades. Generally, the religious elements had particular moral and social allegiances.[3] Following the fatwa, alignments within the prison became more transparent and Islamic forces launched their activities with more concentration and unity. Under the conditions where much antipathy appeared regarding the collaboration of newly Marxist Mujāhidīn with the SAVAK, the clergy paid more attention to ideological issues. For instance, certain courses were offered respecting epistemology, fundamental philosophical questions, and Islamic theology (worldview) by such clergy as Āyatullāh Gerāmī and Hāshimī Rafsanjānī. Respecting compilation of some new religious books, other clerics like Dr. Beheshtī, Dr. Bāhonar and Muṭahharī outside the prison started a new wave of religious debates.[4] On the other hand, some of the former advocates of the MKO gathered around Luṭfullāh Miythamī, one of the MKO non-Marxists leaders who had become blind due to explosion of a bomb made by himself. Some smaller groups like Ṣalawātiyūn and 'Iteraziyūn (the protesters) separated from Mujāhidīn. The situation of Islamic forces was not better outside the prison.[5] A number of smaller groups including Manṣūrūn, Falaq, Hādīd, Fajr al-Islām, Muwaḥḥiddīn, Ṣaf, Abūdhar, al-Fallāḥ, and Mahdawiyyūn, which were sparsely formed in cities other Tehran and were related to the Mujāhidīn cut off their collaboration with the organization and continued their off-and-on contacts with the clergy and Imām Khomeinī. Refusing ideological shift in

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[1] *Ibid.*, quoted in: *7000 Days of Iran and the Islamic Revolution's History*, vol. 2, p. 660.

[2] See Ḥamīd Rawḥānī, op. cit., p. 723.

[3] Mas'ūd Raḍawī, op. cit., p. 123.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[5] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 270.

the Mujāhidīn, these groups insisted on their Islamic standpoint. Seven of them including Wāḥid, Tawḥīdī Badr, Tawḥīdī Safā, al-Fallāḥ, Falaq, Manṣūrūn, and Muwaḥḥiddīn founded the Islamic Revolutionary Mujāhidīn,[1] supporting Imām Khomeinī and revolutionary clergy's positions and influencing early post-revolutionary developments.

After these strikes, the MKO like Fadā'iyān Khalq was actually destroyed, what was remaining involved some members and advocates of the organization who were in jail. They were gradually released during November and December 1978, and the leadership was also freed one month prior to the revolution.

C-6) Militant Clergy

The presence of Āyatullāh Khomeinī after Āyatullāh's Bojnūrdī among the authorities of emulation became a turning point in relationship between the clergy and the state. He played a crucial role in organizing the authorities of emulation and their collective protest to state pseudo-modernist and authoritarian actions. The state efforts at implementing Kennedy Doctrine in Iran in the early 1960s create new confrontations between the clergy and the state. In this case, Āyatullāh Khomeinī played a pivotal role in organizing the religious authorities. Among such confrontations between the clergy and the state, the following are included: Amendment Act of the Provincial Councils Elections Law in 1962, the government's decision to hold a referendum on the Six-Pint White Revolution, invasion of the Qum Fayḍiyyah School, widespread June 1963 uprising and its suppression by the government, *'ulamā's* objection to the Granting of Immunity to American Military Advisors Act and finally protest to Āyatullāh Khomeinī's exile.

These actions led part of the clergy to rise up against despotism, dependence and anti-religious attitude of the regime and support Imām Khomeinī. They regarded the government as the other and mobilized themselves against it.[2] In this era, the wave of new thoughts derived from the pseudo-modernist actions of the proponents of modernization school in Iran on the one hand and the rise of Marxist and atheist outlooks created new conditions for the clergy. By advocating a kind of social engineering, proponents of modernization school in Iran called for the eradication of

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[1] *A History of the Groups Forming the Islamic Revolutionary Mujāhidīn*, vol. 1, Tehran: The Organization's Publications, 1980, (Preamble).

[2] See Mehrzād Borūjerdī, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West*, Trans. Jamshīd Shīrāzī, Tehran: Farzān Rūz, 1998.

traditional cultural values including religious vales as the major obstacle to rise of capitalism in Iran. By expanding modern education, use of state propaganda machinery and suppression of dissidents, they battled religion. On the other hand, socioeconomic developments and expansion of Western influence in Iran paved the way for the rise of leftist Marxist currents among the masses and educated people; in sum both currents threatened religion.

All the aforementioned factors led part of the young generation of clergy to demand a reform move as influenced by the wave of Islamic revival in the Muslim World in response to the country's social, economic, political and cultural conditions. This critical generation of clergy that incrementally appeared in the 1950s and 1960s managed to form a religious movement and present a revolutionary picture of Islam. While criticizing political, social, economic and cultural conditions dominating the society and criticizing heavy silence of some jurisprudents in the seminary schools towards such currents and their seclusion from political matters, this new generation of the clergy wanted an alternative Islamic political theory that could solve the society's problems. They soon, however, realized that if there were to create an Islamic revolution, it would be impossible without internal changes among religious *'ulamā'* and even though it would be possible that wouldn't bring about a brilliant outcome for the society. To them, the major problem refereed to the outlooks to Islam, because the Islam they talked about was a social and political Islam which they considered as authentic.

There were principally a variety of outlooks in the 1940s to 1960s among the clergy on how to deal with the political and social questions. Given the historical experience and prior disillusionment in the Constitutional era and the oil nationalization movement, some wanted Shī'ī authorities of emulation aloof from politics and believed that battle against powerful governing regimes was not to the benefit of the prophet's religion.[1] Some also viewed any government at the time of Hidden Imām's disappearance as illegitimate. On this basis, they declared that they would not engage in politics.[2] Such thoughts overall served a situation that nothing was done in order to change conditions and encouraged silence and inaction in

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[1] See 'Alī Bāqirī, "'Alī Ḥujjatī Kermānī's Memoirs," (Interview), *Collection of June 1963 Memoirs*, vol. 1, Tehran: Cultural Department of the Islamic Propagation Organization, 1995, p. 59.

[2] See 'Alī Bāqirī, "Āyatullāh Imāmī Kāshānī's Memoirs," (Interview), *Collection of June 1963 Memoirs*, vol. 1, Tehran: Cultural Department of the Islamic Propagation Organization, 1995, p. 25.

part of the religious people. Under such circumstances, the new critical generation of clergy, while protesting the status quo, considered such opinions as dominance of leisure attitude of those claiming to be religious leaders and wished a serious move on part of the clergy. The clergy advocating the revolutionary movement soon learnt that they had to engage in an internal change, criticize non-political perceptions of Islam, and remove internal and cultural barriers found in the clerical community. Criticizing some myopic outlooks in the seminary schools and non-sociopolitical perceptions of religion, clergy's populism, training situation and curriculum in the schools which were inconsistent with the time requirements, they called for a serous change in the schools. This group of clergy gradually extrapolated the political theory of Islamic government, having both negative and positive aspects and portrayed it as a theory different from rival schools like Marxism and liberalism.

Stressing that all prophets had appeared in order to form government without which Islamic commandments would not be implemented, they explained social ideals of Islam as a school of thought. They introduced Islam as an independent school and ideology which has an independent framework, though it has certain commonalities with rival schools including Marxism and liberalism. They saw political moves and revolution as a liturgical act (like prayer) and by supporting such ideals as human freedom (as the suitable ground for development of human potentials in the Muslim society), equality, and battle against oppression, they offered an ideal image of the Muslim society. As some Shī'ī *'ulamā'* put it, they sought to "introduce Islam as it is."[1] Such a demand could be met just with full-fledged change of the existing political system. Only in such a case, it could be claimed beyond the Islamic system's borders that "We have such a great foods and such progressive laws; we don't need to refer to any other one's laws."[2]

Thus, within the Islamic government's borders, the catastrophe of dual personality of Muslim human as imposed on by paradoxical governments will be terminated.[3] They learnt that a social change led by the clergy is impossible to bring without refinement of the clerical community and

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[1] Imām's *Ṣaḥīfeh*, vol. 2, p. 32.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[3] Sayyid Muḥammad Bāqir Ṣadr, "The Origins of Power in Islamic Government," Trans. Nabovat, *Collection on Towards the Change in Ijtihād*, Tehran: Rūzbeh Publications, 1980, p. 30.

making reforms in the seminary schools and existing religious culture. Hence, to reform the internal structure of the clergy was considered as a priority for this group.

Immediately after the demise of Āyatullāh Borūjerdī, there arose a wave of debates and new theories about the religious authority and its political role on part of some *'ulamā'* and new modernist clergy and religious intellectuals. Emphasis was mainly put on the necessity of reforming educational, administrative and financial system of religious schools, on making Shī'ī jurisprudence more dynamic, ensuring economic autonomy of religious apparatus adapting the religious authority system with scientific, social and political developments and requirements, active engagement of religious authorities in sociopolitical activities and making efforts at attracting the people particularly the youth.[1] This group of critical clergy played a major role in later developments as largely influenced by Imām Khomeinī's positions who viewed the provision of Islamic government's preparation as 'necessary condition' meaning that the provision of that preparation would become necessary. Indeed he saw the reform in the seminary schools as prelude to the society's reform movement.[2]

Analyzing the Islamic movement's causes of success and failure, they believed in such factors as distance between the Muslim clergy and the current issues of society, the tricks of colonialists, despotism, rupture of the links between the clergy and their failure to be active in sociopolitical turning points, disorders in the activities of a limited number of clerics active in political scene and their misuse of this disorder that was salient in the house and office of high-ranking *'ulamā'*. Along with such factors the alien powers and their planning for creating schisms accounted for failures.[3] In order to remove the problem, the first political-military organization emerging from the Qum seminary school was the Secret Association for Reforming the Seminary School. Among its members were included Mr. Khāmene'ī, Hāshimī Rafsanjānī, Muntaẓirī, Meshkīnī, Rabbānī Shīrāzī, Quddusī, Miṣbāḥ Yazdī and Amīnī. The Association's main cause involved the study of reforming society. Its first session was held in April 1964. The Association had a detailed written statute and published covert papers entitled Prophesy

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[1] See Group of Writers, *Discussions on Religious Authority and Leadership*, Tehran: Publication Company, p. 341.

[2] Farhād Shaykh Farshī, op. cit., p. 70.

[3] 'Abdullāh Jāsbī, op. cit., p. 358.

and Revenge. The Association was discovered in May 1966.[1] A review of Imām Khomeinī's speeches in this period and of a book, Religious Authority and the Clergy, reflected such reformist outlooks. For instance, a number of the clergy in their contributions to this work, Religious Authority and the Clergy, criticized the existing conditions in the seminary schools and institution of religious authority and proposed some reform initiatives. This book was written by authors like Āyatullāh Muḥammad Beheshtī, Sayyid Murtaḍā Jazāyirī, Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Sayyid Maḥmūd Ṭāliqānī, and Sayyid Abū al-Faḍl Mūsawī Zanjānī in 1962. It represented the fist move by the new generation of clergy for brining about internal reforms on part of the clergy and empowering the clergy to deal with political and social affairs.[2] Along with this internal move in the seminary school, many clerics learnt that to engage in an ideological campaign was the only way to save Islam from the rival schools of thought. One aspect of this campaign was publication of scholarly works, for example 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī wrote Principles of Realist Philosophy and Method in response to secular persons, representing the most sophisticated book by the clergy against materialist philosophy.

Moreover, Āyatullāh Muntaẓirī responded to that group of Iranian nationalists who negated Islam's services to Iran's culture in another book called Mutual Services of Islam and Iran. Āyatullāh Nāṣir Makārim Shīrāzī published a book entitled *Secrets of the Oriental Backwardness* in 1969 in which he attached Western culture, sciences and politics, defending an Islamic-oriental alternative. Āyatullāh Ṭāliqānī wrote Islam and Ownership, speaking of Islamic ideas respecting such important economic issues as types of ownership, private and public ownership, banking and interest rate.

Such works, which dealt with secularism, Marxism, Western civilization, West-East dichotomy, Iranian nationalism as well as Islamic ideas regarding economics and politics, are just a sample of vast writings published by the clergy. What attracts attention in selection of such topics is their modern form and relevance. Islam's political feature was expanding and more importantly it was becoming an ideology.[3] The clerical intellectual presence was spread to popular publications, too. In 1958, the first issue of the monthly Lessons from the Islamic School was published in Qum by the

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 359.

[2] Group of Writers, *Discussions on Religious Authority and Leadership.*

[3] Mehrzad Borūjerdī, op. cit., p. 132.

Islamic Propagation Institute Publications headed by Āyatullāh Sayyid Muḥammad Kāẓim Sharī‘atmadārī. The preface of the first issue introduced the Monthly as an alternative to the catastrophic flood of immorality, atheism and materialism that dominated the Iranian society particularly its youngsters. This publication soon found it deserved place in Iran's intellectual scene in such a way that according to a researcher, in the late 1970s, around 50,000 copies of the Monthly were sold.[1] Following the Lessons from the Islamic School, another publication called the Shī‘ī School was published in Qum by a group of critical clerics advocating Imām Khomeinī. While it pursued the same objectives as the previous publication did, the new magazine was politically more radical. It began its work in April 1959 with 10,000 copies and was reprinted one month later with 5,000 more copies.[2] The clergy and their allies also took part publication firms for disseminating their opinions. According to a research conducted in 1976 as quoted by Said Amīr Arjomand, there were 48 publishers of religious books only in Tehran 26 of whom launched their activities in the 1960s by publishing religious books.[3] In general, cultural means and sources and desirable cultural space acted to the benefit of religious forces. Hence, it can be concluded that ideological campaign made the clergy convert oral discourse to written discourse so that their communication capability become stronger.[4]

From 1944 to 1961 when Āyatullāh Borūjerdī was the head of the Qum Seminary School, distance between the schools and universities became narrower. Āyatullāh Borūjerdī was well aware of the importance of propagation both at home and the international level. Hence he sent representatives to Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan, Sudan and Lebanon and founded an Islamic center in Hamburg, Germany. Moreover, he allowed many of seminary graduates to enter the universities so that they both can learn new sciences and disseminate Islam. His idea was materialized, since such scholars as Sayyid Jalāluddīn Āshtiyānī, Muḥammad Taqī Dāneshpajūh, Mahdī Ḥā'irī Yazdī, Muḥammad Jawād Ḥujjatī Kermānī, Aḥmad Mahdawī Dāmghānī, Yaḥyā Mahdawī, Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, Mūsā Ṣadr, and Sayyid

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[1] Majīd Tehranian, *Communication and Revolution in Iran: The Times*, London: Sage, 1982.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 140.

[3] Sayyid Amīr Arjomand, Traditionalism in Twentieth-Century Iran, New York: State University Press, 1987.

[4] Mehrzād Borūjerdī, op. cit., p. 144.

Ja'far Shahīdī began an academic life.[1] These scholars most of who were prolific writes helped change the space dominant in the universities. The work of these writers and their interpretations of various Islamic texts led to the prominence of such works. Furthermore, they held events and anniversaries for great scholars, organized private study groups, held collective prayers ceremonies, engaged in philosophical or political debates or written arguments, and ultimately they fostered a new generation of students and teachers. These pioneers paved the way for many seminar students who studied theology in Iran's new universities later on. The cities' clerical elites gave consent that their children enter new environment and let them follow a new lifestyle. After graduation, most of these individuals were employed by ministers of education and justice and were sent to cities as teachers, preachers, registrars, and judges. Hence, the clergy continued to earn an influential position in Iran's changing cultural life.[2]

The clergy's holy educational endeavor went beyond the universities. The other important objective was to make efforts at elementary and high schools since the early 1950s, industrious clergy like Muḥammad Jawād Bāhonar, Muḥammad Beheshtī, Muḥammad Mufattiḥ and Muṭahharī joined the community of teachers that used to ten to be secular so that they pursued their common cause in flight against the state and leftist faction, i.e. communism. The clergy managed to establish a series of private schools for boys and girls called 'Alawī and Refāh schools.

The clergy could also infiltrate ordinary high schools, too, because they were recruited there as teachers of theology, composition, Arabic language, and Persian literature. They encouraged their pupils to create Islamic Associations in order to engage in various activities including holding courses on interpretation of the Qur'an, forming discussion groups on philosophical and moral questions, participating in extracurricular activities and establishing libraries. These activities attracted many students.[3]

Anyway, all these actions by a new generation of clergy were underway, leading to the spread of new, more reasonable outlooks towards Shī'ism among the youngsters, intelligentsia and various social strata. Thus Islamic thinking was drawn as a liberating dominant discourse for the population.

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

By proposing Imām Khomeinī's anti-colonial and anti-despotic ideas in political terms and emphasizing the necessity of battle against the regime. This group of clergy made the moderate clergy to rupture any connection with the government against their will.

One of the major actions of Āyatullāh Khomeinī in this period involved devising Islamic government theory in exile. These discussions were later published as a book under titled like Islamic Government and Guardianship of the Jurisprudent. The book first notes the lack of recognition of true Islam even among the *'ulamā'* and seminary students and citizens' inattention of jurisprudents and authorities of emulation to social, economic and political discussions found in Islamic sources. Then it portrays the existing political system in Iran (monarchy) as anti-Islamic and finally proves the necessity of establishing a government based on Islamic commandments, drawing upon Qur'anic verses, Prophet's words as well as the early Islamic history (the Prophet's era). It rejects the viewpoint that Islamic commandments are insufficient for today's society as a colonial plot.[1] However, the main thrust of Āyatullāh Khomeinī's discussions in the book involves, first an emphasis on the necessity of battle against existing corrupt government and preparation for revolution for establishment of an Islamic government and second, stress on the fact that such a government enjoyed the same guardianship (tutelage) that the Prophet did in the society's affairs, thus all people were obliged to obey it.[2]

A number of researchers hold that the clergy after Āyatullāh Borūjerdī could be classified as cautious non-political clergy, moderate dissident clergy and hard-line dissident clergy.[3] The first and largest group believed that clergy had to refrain from politics, deal with spiritual issues, propagate God's words, study in the seminary schools and educate *'ulamā'* and next generation. These nonpolitical clergy, despite seclusion from politics in1975-77, were driven into politics due to government's adoption of policies unfavorable to bazaar and religious institutions. They wanted to leave the regime alone, but it did not mean that the regime would not deal with them.

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[1] Rūḥullāh Khomeinī, *Islamic Government (Guardianship of Jurisprudent)*, Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1979, pp. 8-63.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] Ervan Abrahimian, op. cit., p. 583.

They were also upset about the government's inability of unwillingness to prevent what they considered as growing decay of public morality.[1]

On this group, Sayyid Aḥmad Khomeinī suggests that most of the clergy were apolitical by the 1970s, they neither opposed the Shāh nor supported him publicly. But they suddenly joined the revolution, because the regime had failed to battle immorality and eradicate promiscuity from the streets.[2]

Despite their objection to women's right to vote, land reforms and the Shāh's pseudo-modernist policies, the second group, namely dissident clergy preferred to keep their ties with the Shāh in order to adjust his policies I this way and protect the vital interests of religious establishments by lobbying. The other aspect of their moderation related to the fact that they did not want the overthrow of monarchy, but hey just wished for the full implementation of the Constitution. By invoking the Constitution, they hoped that one day they form, for the first time, the Supreme Committee composed of five *'ulamā'*; a committee which was provided for by the Constitution to adapt the parliament's bills with Islamic Sharī'ah. In 1975-77, when the Shāh closed this door of hope, intensified attacks on the bazaar and seminary schools, and tried to gain full control of religious institutions through the Resurrection Party, the moderate clergy's semi-passive position was unjustifiable.

The third group consisting of hard-line dissident clerics called for the abolition of monarchy and creation of Islamic government. Āyatullāh Khomeinī represented the group's leader backed by a covert network of clergy in Iran.[3]

In explaining his viewpoint, Āyatullāh Khomeinī reminds the apolitical clergy and moderate dissident clergy. He accuses the first group of leaving their religious duties, taking refuge in the seminary schools, and embracing the theory of separation of political and religion, which was a colonial plot. He acts with caution in criticizing the moderate dissident clergy. He indicates that the only way to eliminate oppression, corruption and treason is an Islamic political revolution.[4] It is noteworthy that in the first stages of the movement, the demand of this group of clergy and even Shāh's most salient

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Iṭṭilāʻāt Newspaper*, September 22, 1979.

[3] See Imām Khomeinī, *Guardianship of Jurisprudent)*, p. 115 onwards.

[4] Ervand Abrahimian, op. cit, p. 589.

dissident, namely Imām Khomeinī, did not want a harsh radical treatment of the regime in a way that Imām himself advised the Shāh in 1962:

"I advise the country's Shāh not to lose this power (that is the clergy)."[1]

Nonetheless, Shāh's despotic and insulting treatment of the clergy and his bare violence in invading religious beliefs ultimately made radical action against him inevitable, thus leading the third group of clergy to believe that 'Islamic political revolution' was the only solution.

Although other religious authorities had certain disagreements with Imām Khomeinī on how to establish the Islamic government, with the government's intensified constraints in the threshold of the revolution, they made public their protest to despotism, dependence and anti-religiosity. Such protests had been reflected in their declarations issued in the 1960s and 1970s. In those years, the spread of secular culture and predispositions or what religious leaders and preachers called the expansion of immorality and prostitution that were normally ascribed to the regime's policies. Moreover, the state efforts at controlling religious issues by creating Religious Corps, changing the country's formal calendar to a monarchical from the Islamic one were among the issues that unfolded particularly in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the reaction of large part of religious establishment (authorities of emulation and religious preachers) to such issues was not political and revolutionary campaign, rather a cultural protest and resistance which were mostly manifested in condemnation of vestiges of atheism and immorality hand inviting people to attach to religion. This protest discourse can be clearly seen in active religious establishment that provided the grounds indirectly for the acceptance of revolutionary ideologies among part of these groups' audience.

The strong point of the dissident militant clergy involved their full obedience from Imām, in addition to a number of clergy who supported Imām. Although they were not in strict terms Āyatullāh, they belonged to seminary school lecturers and to higher echelon of the clergy. These two factors, i.e. total allegiance to Imām and the fact that some of Imām's advocates were among high-ranking seminary lecturers, had the result that although the revolutionary leadership apparently lacked an organized party and grouping in practice and at the national level, a network of Imām's

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[1] *Imām's Ṣaḥīfeh*, vol. 1, p. 121.

followers launched the revolutionary process like a strong organization.[1] This group of clergy played a crucial role in revolutionary developments as well as post-revolutionary events by creating a new organization called the Militant Clergy Society.

Individuals like Āyatullāh Muṭahharī, Āyatullāh Khāmeneʾī, Dr. Beheshtī, Dr. Bāhonar, Āyatullāh Mūsawī Ardabīlī, Āyatullāh Jannati, Āyatullāh Rabbānī, Āyatullāh Imāmī Kashānī, Āyatullāh Malikī, Dr. Muḥammad Mufattiḥ, Ḥujjat al-Islām Ṭāhirī Khorram Ābādī, Wāʿiẓ Ṭabasī, Ḥujjatī Kermānī, Hāshiminejād, Āyatullāh Khoeynīhā, Āyatullāh Meshkīnī, and Muwaḥḥidī Kermānī began their activities in this organization and took significant steps to organize mass campaign against the state, including by holding meetings and keeping contacts.

The Militant Clergy Society played a crucial part in the consolidation of clergy's leadership in the course of revolution's expansion. Having consistent contact with Imām Khomeinī, this organization assumed the role of executive arm of the revolution in addition to consulting with him. That was particularly because of the fact that numerous mosques of Tehran covered all neighborhoods like small commanding headquarters, providing possibility of mobility for Muslim militants and forces related to the clergy.[2] This organization led the clergy advocating Imām Khomeinī to become organized for the spread of the movement. The Militant Clergy Society was divided into eight zones in Tehran, designating a mosque as their base in every zone in order to organize the militants in the respective zone. There two liaison agents in each zone who attended the central council of the organization and took up directing the struggle in Tehran collectively. Āyatullāh Muṭahharī, Āyatullāh Beheshtī, Dr. Bāhonar and Dr. Mufattiḥ comprised the members of the Supreme Council of the Society's Central Council.

Iranian clergy's organization took real shape in 1977. The leaders of this current reacted to Muṣṭafā Khomeinī's demise by sending a telegram to Imām Khomeinī and releasing a statement on October 26, 1977. The reasons

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[1] Ṣādiq Zībākalām, *An Introduction to the Islamic Revolution of Iran*, Tehran: Rozaneh, 1996, p. 287.

[2] Masʿūd Raḍawī, op. cit., p. 135.

constituted as declaration of existence of this pioneer clergy current in political struggles and political moves of the seminary schools.[1]

From this very time onwards, sophisticated and detailed statements and writings did come out of the clergy containing precise guidelines for the people. A study of the contents of such letters reveals clearly that a sophisticated current which were partly of propagation and educational nature and disseminated selected slogans aimed at political mainstreaming in public opinion. Certainly numerous arguments were found behind these statements and announcements.

Open letters addressed to religious authorities and grand Āyatullāhs were one of the other methods used by militant intellectuals of this current. A number of parallel goals were pursued behind this current including: first, these letters addressed central clerical establishment and seminary schools thus adding to their credibility; in other words, this accounted for the incredibility of monarchical regime's state apparatus and officials. In addition, the great influential clergy were informed of the events and responded accordingly. Among this group, even the most conservative clerical men were forced to highlight their positions towards the political circumstances. Apart from such issues, an excuse for enlightenment among the people and propagating against the regime's policies was created, for this reason people could learn the leadership organization among the clergy with the signatures found beneath the statements, telegrams and letters.[2]

During the revolution, the Militant Clergy paled a crucial part in mobilizing and arranging demonstrations in a way that the bulk of planning for demonstrations and speeches in the mosques, preparing the slogans and overall organizing the movement were largely conducted by the Militant Clergy. In other words, while most of opposition forces were faced with such problems as absence of leadership, organizational deficiency, intellectual inconsistency, schism and divisions, the Militant Clergy enjoyed an important advantage with Imām's presence and possession of networks of clergy throughout the country.

Moreover, the Militant Clergy notably Muṭahharī and Beheshtī acted as the links between Imām in Najaf and then in Paris with the population in

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[1] ‘Alī Dārābī, *Tehran' Militant Clergy Society and Its Role in the Developments of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Political System*, M.A. Thesis in Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Tehran University, 1996, p. 103.

[2] *Ibid.*

Iran. The main nucleus of all demonstrations and marches between 1977 and 1978 especially the huge march of ʿĀshūrā was directed by using the network of mosques and their clergy. A glance at the calendar of the Islamic Revolution will essentially display the role of militant clergy in holding martyrs' memorial ceremonies, proclamation of national mourning, public holiday, panning strikes and demonstrations (notably in the sacred month of Ramaḍān and in month of Muḥarram) and invitation for meetings and marches (particularly holding the glorious *ʿĪd al-Fiṭr* in Tehran's Qeyṭariyyah hills as led by Āyatullāh Mufattiḥ and speeches by him and Dr. Bāhonar and the salient role this event played in intensified anti-regime struggles).[1] In 1979, the Militant clergy launched the committee for arranging strikes, committee for holding marches, committee for welcoming Imām that included a large group of militant clergy and revolutionaries. The Militant Clergy Society also played a critical role in the Revolutionary Council in a way that most of its early members consisted of this group.[2] ✍

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Iṭṭilāʿāt Newspaper*, September 22, 1980, An Interview with Dr. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Beheshtī.

Chapter 3

Determining Factors of the Advent of Revolution in Iran

Having examined the alignment of political-ideological groups in the decade leading to the Revolution in Iran, now we can deal with explanation of factors causing the advent of the revolution in a better way. Basically, there are two grand theories on the phenomenon of revolution. One theory analyzes the phenomenon of revolution as a game played by actors who are present in the scene and make the revolution, seeing the role and will of free agents essential in making a revolution. From this point of view, revolution is displayed as a transitive verb and as such a contingent phenomenon, emphasizing that its occurrence is not necessary and inevitable. The other theory regards revolution as a necessary process apart from the will and choice of existing free actors, analyzing it as an intransitive verb. It sees revolution as a process that occurs necessarily willy-nilly and in fact grand structures and history give rise to revolution. Thus, they believe that revolution occurs and is not made; that is to say hat the revolutionary leader leads the revolution knowing the existing structures. Although, such one-sided outlooks are found in studies of revolution, in new approaches to revolution, emphasis is usually put on mixed outlooks combining structuralist and voluntarist outlooks in which revolution is considered as a result of a set of structural and non-structural conditions. They have a multi-layered and multi-dimensional outlook on revolution and maintain that one-dimensional outlooks will fail to explain the revolution at all. Indeed, a set of structural and voluntary conditions in previous years and decades before the revolution gave hand to hand and paved the way for the advent of something called revolution. Hence, given the strength of such mixed outlooks in the

study of revolution, we continue to review structural and voluntary factors influencing the Islamic Revolution of Iran so that a more suitable explanation of the causes of the advent of this revolution can be offered.

A) Structural Causes of the Advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran

As described above, the causes of the revolution in Iran can be classified as structural and voluntary. From among structural cases, long-term and mid-term factors and from among the voluntary causes, short-term and precipitating factors can be mentioned. It fact, causes of revolution should be looked at as multidimensional and multi-layered and one-dimensional outlooks fail to extrapolate the revolution. In the section on structural causes of the revolution, we will address political, economic, cultural and social structure influencing the formation of revolution. We will also study the type and place of this structure in the international system as well as the type of international linkage that gave this structure the power to survive in the international system. The vulnerabilities and crises of this structure which gave rise to revolution will be analyzed.

Nonetheless, the study of structures cannot be enough, hence the role of free agents in creating the grounds for revolution should be considered as well. That is to say that voluntary causes leading to revolution including the role of leadership, ideology and mass mobilization have to be extrapolated.

Long-term causes of the Islamic Revolution in Iran are mainly rooted in structural factors which are manifested in the problems of political, economic, cultural and social structures in Iranian society. Those structural problems, which were formed during a long time and were deep-rooted, provided the ground for a fundamental change (i.e. revolution) and indeed voluntary causes were integrated into the paths of such structural causes and gave rise to the crisis.

Principally, search for the main cause of revolution in structuralist theories like some Marxist, functionalist and Durkheim's theories attracts the attention of thinkers to the rise of a kind of imbalance in pre-revolutionary society. This imbalance may be seen either in economic realm as a result of inconsistency between production forces and production relations, or in socio-cultural sphere, namely imbalance between subsystems of social system or between beliefs and uneven cultural situation nor in political domain derived from imbalance in elite composition and ruling clique.

The general conception of these theories involved that in the situation of balance, converging forces dominate diverging ones, but with structural changes and gradual spread of forces disrupting the balance, balance is lost, providing the conditions for the change and finally for the advent of revolution.[1]

Therefore, structuralist theories on revolution begin the causation discussion from the inception of inconsistency and imbalance. According to this conception, sociology of imbalanced societies tends to logically precede sociology of revolution. In other words, understanding how social order is collapsed requires at the first place recognizing roots of structural imbalance in those societies.[2]

On this ground, structural causes as long-term factors will create fundamental disorders and imbalance in social system. These disorders, as described above, are deep and complex and indeed like paths in which voluntary causes as short-term causes move in a way that short-term causes cannot lead to revolution without structural parameters.

In this research, vulnerabilities and crises of political, economic, cultural and social structure as paving the way for final crisis leading to the revolution will be examined.

A-1) Rigid Political Structure

Iran's political structure has persistently been a closed despotic and authoritarian structure in most of historical periods including the Qājār and Pahlavī eras. For this reason, many researchers have used such terms as oriental despotism and patrimonialism for Iran's old governments and terms like Sultanism, Neo-partimonialism and Bonapartism for theoretical explanation of the nature of the Pahlavī state, analyzing reasons for such despotism. Obviously, political system under the Pahlavīs was a continuity of authoritarian and elitist system of the Qājār era with the only difference that the nature of forces had changed according to new internal conditions.[3]

Under the first Pahlavī regime, despite the fact that fundamental actions were done towards industrial, administrative and military development, in the

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[1] Ḥusayn Bashīriyyah, *Revolution and Political Mobilization*, Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1995, p. 22.

[2] C. Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System*, Dandorf: 1964, p. 126.

[3] See 'Alī Riḍā Azghandī, *Inadequacy of Iranian Political Elites between the Two Revolutions*, Tehran: Qūmes, 1997.

political development area, they not only suppressed their opposition but also they dismissed those who played a crucial role in bringing to power in various ways (execution, exile or house arrest) and concentrated all governmental powers in their own hands. The dismissal of Riḍā Shāh from power in 1941 and the rise of second Pahlavī monarch created prospects for change in the existing conditions; but Muḥammad Riḍā Shāh like his father failed to show any flexibility for change in his closed power structure encouraging participation and acceptance of criticism.[1]

Particularly following the August 1953 coup with the suppression of political forces (nationalist, religious and leftist), the state moved incrementally to wards the expansion of the military and security apparatus as his most important power base with U.S. financial support, and later with the increase in oil revenues it intensified its autonomy from social groups. This enabled the Shāh to consolidate his control over the government. Democratic institutions and procedures like elections, the parliament and the Judiciary survived superficially and legally, yet absence of an opposition front enabled the Shāh to make those legal institutions and procedures through which the society could limit the government, ineffective.[2] The government's policy-making moved increasingly towards further concentration and personalization and legal methods for social groups' exerting influence on government disappeared gradually.

Instead of modernizing the political system, the Shāh based his power upon three pillars including armed and security forces, the Court's supportive network and vast state bureaucracy, thereby increasing his distance and autonomy from social groups.[3] In this direction, priority was given to increase in number of armed and security forces like the SAVAK, Royal Oversight and the Army's Column 2 as the main pillars for the maintenance of the political system. The Shāh enjoyed huge U.S. assistance and engaged in persecuting political groups and suppressing social groups' demand by using those forces.

In this period, decisions were generally made by the Shāh himself with consultation of a limited number of reliable advisors that failed to represent

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-116.

[2] Marc Gasiorowski, *U.S. Diplomacy and the Shāh*, Trans. Jamshīd Zangeneh, Tehran: Rasā Publications, 1994, p. 326.

[3] Ervand Abrahimian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, Trans. Aḥmad Golmuḥammadī, Tehran: Nay Publications, 1998, p. 535.

specific social groups' interests. Among them were included Asadollāh 'Alam, Iqbāl, Sharīf Imāmī, Huweydā, Āmūzegār, Fardūst, Naṣīrī, Uwaysī and Ṭūfāniyān. On the other hand, due to Shāh's unquestionable role in decision-making, government departments possessed little independent powers. The prime ministers were solely selected by the Shāh and the shadow cabinets including his close advisors, obeyed him absolutely and were formed gradually.[1] These actions granted the Shāh extensive control on governmental authorities and further overshadowed their individual autonomy. Moreover, the provinces' powers were reduced and centralism was enhanced. Two houses of legislation (the Senate and the Consultative Assembly) became leverage at the hands of the government. Since half of the Senators were appointees, this house actually served as an instrument at the hands of the Shāh and never found any legitimacy. The Consultative Assembly used to enjoy special importance before the coup, was controlled by the security forces after the coup and only a very limited number of popular candidates could make their way into the parliament. In the following years, even this limited number were faced with the government's heightened pressures and could not enter the parliament, indeed the parliament (in particular after the 21ˢᵗ term) did not act as anything other than upholding Shāh's decisions.[2]

Political parties were banned after the coup, but the Shāh decided to establish two formal parties, the Nationalists (Milliyūn) and the People (Mardom) in 1957 in order to create a façade of competitive political system, organizing social forces of the new middle class. These two parties were led by two of Shāh's advisors, Manūchehr Iqbāl and Asadullāh 'Alam. For security forces, these two parties turned into sole legal mechanisms for participating in political affairs. However, the parties failed to recruit members other than just some thousands ones. Elections frauds and riggings for the 20ᵗʰ legislative term became a turning point leading to the disrepute of these parties and to some changes in them.[3]

Democrats' and Kennedy's rise to power in the United States in 1961 and his reform plans exerted more pressures on Shāh's regime for creating an open political space and implementing reforms in Iran causing mobility

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[1] See Students Following the Imām's Path, *Documents of the Espionage Nest*, Tehran: No publisher, No date, vol. 7, pp. 103-127.

[2] Marc Gasiorowski, op. cit., p. 326.

[3] Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*, Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962, pp. 221-226.

among opposing social forces namely the Nationalist-Religious ones and the Tūdeh Party. These relative political freedoms which were restricted with the suppression of popular uprising against Shāh's illegal referendum on June 6, 1963, generating a new era of concentration and despotism interpreted as oil despotism by some researchers.[1]

In 1963, New Iran Party (advocate of nation) replaced the Nationalists Party. The party was created by a small group of young technocrats led by Ḥasan-'Alī Manṣūr who presented himself as an advocate of the White Revolution reforms. The party as a governmental party received financial aid from SAVAK and Prime Minister's office.[2]

This party acted as an advanced network for inclusion of institutions till 1974 and controlled approximately 90% of labor unions and rural cooperatives, having links with most of bazaar guilds and health, literacy and development organizations generated out of the White Revolution.

This party published 67 newspapers and magazines, operated a network of youth clubs throughout the country and even proceeded with the establishment of a college for training political managers, but in spite of these actions, it never enjoyed general legitimacy and did not constitute as a popular institution.[3]

In 1974, the Shāh was disappointed with the failure of the New Iran Party and inability of People's Party in attracting support for his policies and even he did not wish to tolerate scant criticism found inevitably in a two-party system. He suddenly abolished both parties and installed a new single party system with the Resurrection (Rastākhīz) Party in which Amīr 'Abbās Huweydā, a Bahā'ī technocrat, as secretary general. He hoped that his party would serve as an impetus for controlled mass mobilization. But despite Shāh's warnings that everybody who declined to become a party member, had to leave Iran, this party failed to enjoy much general legitimacy, too.

The Party's main goal was to direct the demand of political participation by new social forces with participation being party's motto.[4] The party's

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[1] Muḥammad 'Alī Homāyūn Kātūziyān, *Political Economy of Iran*, Trans. Muḥammad Riḍā Nafīsī and 'Azīzī, Tehran: Markaz Publications, 1995, p. 279.

[2] Marc Gasiorowski, op. cit., p. 331.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] 'Abd al-Riḍā Hūshang Mahdawī, *Iranian Revolution according to the BBC*, Tehran: New Design, 1993, p. 162.

theoreticians tended to be young political science experts trained in American universities. They were largely affected by Samuel Huntington, a professor political science, and believed that the only way to attain political stability in developing countries involved the creation of a disciplined state party. To them, such a party would turn to the systemic link between the state and society and would empower the state with people's mobilization; hence this party would eliminate perils arising from destructive social elements. Of course, the group ignored this theory of Huntington that in the modern age there was no place for monarchy. They also did not pay attention to his warning that the party was not only an instrument for government supervise the masses, but it had to act as a connecting link transmitting the society's pressures to the state and state orders to the society.[1]

On this basis, the party pursued a principal goal that was transforming the outdated military dictatorship to a monolithic single party state. The party managed to provide the state with control and influence on the middle class government employees, urban labor class, rural masses, and to a lesser degree on the affluent middle class especially the bazaar.[2]

The party was eventually dissolved in 1977 as a result of intensified popular political struggles. In the meantime violence and suppression constituted major instrument used against political dissidents, political leaders of nationalist and leftist groups were suppressed intensely and chose to keep silent, and religious leaders were isolated in exile or prison. Although opening up political space arising from Carter's pressures with Democrats' rise to power in the United States in 1977 provided the grounds for the activities of certain political groups in Iran. This ad hoc action failed to bring about a serious change.

Overall, the main characteristics of political realm in this period included low level of political institutionalization, highly personalized nature of political power, political monopoly, spread of informal relationships in the country's political scene and patronage, and signifying the political sphere being excluded from any transformation and reform. This exacerbated the regime's vulnerability and accelerated the grounds for the advent of revolution.

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[1] Ervan Abrahimian, op. cit., p. 542.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 544.

A-2) Uneven Economic Structure

Iran's economic structure transformed gradually from self-sufficient economy to a dependent one since the Ṣafawīds to the Qājār era.[1] The factors accounting for such transformation can be attributed to the influence of colonialism in Iran, Iran's conflicts with Russia and Great Britain, economic and political agreements with those powers on the one hand and weakness and inefficiency of the political system, as well as despotism and corruption of central government in Iran on the other. This resulted in the backwardness and inefficiency of economic structure in Iran.

Under Riḍā Shāh, efforts were made with British support, which wanted a strong central government in Iran leading to economic and industrial change in the country and providing the grounds for formation of a pseudo-capitalist economy in Iran. However, the most important period in economic transformation in contemporary Iran can be seen in post-1953 coup period. In this era, U.S. support and Iran's oil revenues made rapid leaps in Iranian economic structure possible.

After the end of oil nationalization conflict and the 1953 coup that resulted in vast U.S. influence in Iran attention to economic, social and cultural reforms in allied countries in particular in Ian which were exposed to Communist propaganda, became a priority in U.S. foreign policy intended to maintain these countries' links with the Western bloc. On this ground, a year after the coup in 1954, management of change in Iran's economic structure was launched as aided by American advisors. So the country's second 5-Year Development Plan (1956-1961) was designed with the sponsorship of U.S. and World Bank's finance and oil revenues.[2] As a result of implementing this plan which was intended to expand Iranian economic infrastructure, economic infrastructural projects were launched, paving the way for adopting next plans.

The Third Development Plan began in a period (1962-66) when Iran's foreign policy underwent significant changes. Kennedy's coming to power in 1961 in the United States and his emphasis upon reforms in the Third World countries exerted further pressures on the Shāh to deepen U.S. envisioned reforms in Iran. Based on U.S. strategy interests, Kennedy believed: "Only military pacts cannot help the countries where social injustice and economic

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[1] See John Furan, *History of Iran's Social Developments*, Trans. Aḥmad Tadayyun, Tehran: Institute for Cultural Services, p. 29.

[2] The First Development Plan was designed and implemented in the years before the coup.

disorder have opened the way for the [Communist] sabotage. The United States cannot pay attention to the problems of the least developed countries merely in military terms. No quantity of armaments and troops can bring stability to regimes that decline or tail to launch social reforms."[1] Hence, he stressed on the necessity of accelerating full-fledged reforms in those countries in order to uproot social grounds for mass tendency to egalitarian slogans of Communists. In this relation, Iran enjoyed special prominence. Once in office at the White House, Kennedy soon created a special task force for studying Iran's conditions headed by U.S. assistant to State Secretary, Philip Talbot. In May 1961, the Task Force recommended that reforms had to be espoused in Iran and Amīnī be supported to become prime minister.[2] It is impossible to asses the cope of U.S. pressure on the Shāh for implementing reforms, but involved American authorities believe that U.S. pressures played a crucial part in instigating reforms in that period.[3]

On the other hand, American theorists in those years made new recommendations for the Third World countries by formulating new theories in order to bring about political stability to those countries by encouraging certain economic changes. In this direction in 1960, American economist Rostow presented his development theory in this work, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto,[4] leaving huge impact on development theorists in Iran and technocrats working for the Planning and Budgeting Organization (who tended to be graduates of American colleges).

A study of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Development Plans that were designed and implemented between 1962 and 1978 as well as the land reforms in the early 1960s will reveal clearly the effect of the said model and Rostow's theory on such plans in Iran.

Affected by the aforementioned approaches, the Third Development Plan (19652-66) was focused on rapid industrialization and preparation for adopting imports substitution strategy. This plan, which was designed in the

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Marc Gasiorowski, op. cit., p. 223.

[3] See Students Following Imām's Path, op. cit., Vols. 20-22.

[4] W. Rostow, *the Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Planning and Budgeting Organization with American advisors' help, was more comprehensive than the previous plans.[1]

Along with the Third Plan, land reforms were implemented with American Democrats' pressure, transforming the country's socioeconomic structure. The land reforms plan involved a preface to a more comprehensive plan for reforms entitled the White Revolution propagated by the Shāh.

Since the majority of population lived in villages in counties like Iran and were engaged in agriculture, the question of lands and land reforms continued to attract the attention of development theorists. American statesmen regarded inattention to such an important issue as causing expanded Communists influence among the peasants and political instability of their allies. Therefore, Truman's Point 4 was from the beginning focused on reforming the agricultural structure and land issues of transitional countries.

In a nutshell, land reforms plan in Iran was implemented stage by stage in three phases between 1960 and 1964 granted finally some land to half of the farmers and crashed some big landowners. Nonetheless, the land reforms did little to eradicate poverty and at least 75% of landless farmers were forced to leave their lands due to smallness of their lands and inability to subsistence. Generally, the budgets allocated to promotion of land reforms by the state were not spent on the right place and were rather financed the implementation of large irrigation projects.[2] Furthermore, there reforms had to be completed with corollary plans such as creation of strong cooperative firms, launching agricultural industries in villages, and securing the needs of farmers.[3] Yet lack of such plans caused a decline in production of agricultural crops in later years and farmers were employed as simple workers in services or industrial sectors in cities. Overall, the land reforms transformed the rural structure leading to fundamental change in urban structure because of immigration of villagers to cities.

Between 1966 and 1978, the Fourth and Fifth Development Plans were implemented whose formal goals were to speed up economic growth. The rise in oil prices in the early 1970s was a major event with tremendous

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[1] Raḍawī and Wakīl, *the Political Environment of Economic Planning in Iran 1971-1983*, Boulder: Westview, 1984, pp. 23-25.

[2] Marc Gasiorowski, op. cit., p. 283.

[3] 'Abbās Sālvar, "Former Head of the Land Reforms Organization," (Interview), *Iran's Contemporary History Quarterly*, vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 1995.

impact on Iran's economic developments. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) succeeded for the first time to determine the price of crude oil, elevating its price to 5 US dollars per barrel with a 70% rise. Some time later, it managed to increase its price, during the Tehran Conference, to 11.56 US dollars per barrel. After that, the oil exporting countries increased the price of crude oil in several stages, leading to significant rise in the countries' income levels.[1]

With the rise in oil revenues in 1973-4 resulting in quadrupling of Iran's foreign currency income the Shāh ordered the director of the Planning Organization to substantially revise the Fifth Plan.[2] An examination of the effects of such changes on Iran's various economic sectors demonstrates that the agricultural section moved to decline following the implementation of this plan. Light industries were encouraged and the services section was enhanced in the country to which the following table attests.[3]

Share of Various Sectors in GNP Production between 1961 and 1978

Year	Agriculture	Industries & Mines	Oil	Services	Total
1961	20	8.48	42.98	27.62	100
1978	8.34	15.07	34.72	41.85	100

According to the table, (which highlights the share of various sectors in GNP production between 1961 and 1978) the share of agriculture in those years had decreased remarkably. The rapid industrialization strategy and execution of land reforms policy constituted two major factors causing the decline in share of agriculture in GNP production.[4] There were some other factors which exacerbated the intense decline of this sector including increased import of agricultural products, recruitment of villages to urban industries, scant returns coming from the small lands divided among the peasants, spread of villagers' contact with cities and expansion of consumer culture.

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[1] Muḥammad Sarīr and Murtaḍā Hātifī, *OPEC and Future Outlooks*, Tehran: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press, 1989, p. 19

[2] Planning and Budgeting Organization, *The Fifth Development Plan of the Country* (Revised), August 1974, p. 1.

[3] Sohrāb Razzāqī, op. cit., p. 206.

[4] Ḥusayn 'Aẓīmī, *Circuits of Underdevelopment in Iran's Economy*, Tehran: Ney Publications, 1992, p. 273.

In the industry sector, a relative mobility was seen because of huge oil revenues in this period, and some industries like oil, gas, petrochemical and industrial plants were created in certain parts of the country with state investment. However, in spite of their capital-intensive character, these industries failed to create many jobs. For example, in 1962 around one million people were employed in the industry sector that had attracted 66 billion Rials of investment. This number rose to around 1.68 million workers in 1978 while the country's industrial investment had reached 1005 billion Rials.[1]

The private sector also proceeded to invest in industries, but his was mainly directed to the light industries. One of the reasons behind inclination to light industries included the country's economic dependence on oil prices and elasticity of world market that led investors to rapidly profitable industrial activities and light industries. Even the multinational companies and foreign investors were inclined to production of consumer goods with low depth and technology transfer speed.

Although investment in industry section increased in this period, no linkage was created between the traditional and modern industries, between industries and agriculture, and industries and Iran's mines. Even interrelation between parts of heavy and consumer industries was not considered.[2]

Despite such moves, the country's industrialization generally did not attain a desirable result. Lack of industrial exports clearly displays the weakness of the country's industry in a way that almost 4.7% of all products of industrial sector were exported in 1963, but it reduced to 2.3% in 1971.[3] A look at the composition of non-oil exports in this period reveals a non-industrial traditional economy.[4]

The services sector is one of the other sectors that experienced significant expansion in this time, increasing its share from around 28% to 42% from 1961 to 1978.[5] Considering the small share of industry and agriculture, this would indicate non-productive nature of economy and its

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[1] See *The First Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran; 1983-1987*, vol. 2, pp. 6-12, Table 1.

[2] Sohrāb Razzāqī, op. cit., p. 364.

[3] Soheila Parvīn, *Economic Ground of Poverty in Iran*, Ph.D. Dissertation in Economics, 1992, p. 20.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 604.

[5] Sohrāb Razzāqī, op. cit., p. 206.

further reliance upon useless activities in the country's development. Economic infrastructure growth in condition of lack of growth in domestic production will in practice accelerate facilities for foreign producers and expansion of services sector. In this period, employment in services saw a significant rise in way that increased from 23.6% in 1956 to 31.8% in 1976, whereas employment in agricultural sector reduced from 56.3% to 34% in those years.[1]

On the other hand, we see the rise in imports in this period due to decrease in production of agricultural products and shift in consumption pattern. This gave serous mobility to the services sector in such a way that between 1961 and 1979, such imports experienced a 37-fold increase. While Iran's non-oil exports rose 7-fold, Iran's main exports revenues, namely oil, witnessed a 71-fold increase.

Thus, in this period certain needs gradually unfolded in Iran that had to be met by foreign goods. On the other hand, the country's economy did not possess necessary capacity for production and exportation appropriate to such imports. That is because imports totally relied on oil revenues in a way that with its rise or fall, we would see rise or fall of imports. This had serious impacts on the country's economic structure and the expansion of services sector.

One of the other indicators of economy also involved increase in unemployment. Despite hefty infrastructural investment, expansion of armed forces, establishment of new industries and growth of construction works, unemployment grows in this era. Due to the importee and capital-intensive nature of these activities, bulk of their job-creating effect was transited to the abroad, consequently despite heave expenditures, unemployment became widespread and the number of unemployed people rose from 158,000 in 1965 to 996,000 in 1976.[2] Private sector investment in services sector and exogenous pattern of development account for failure to create enough jobs. Most of the unemployed were rural emigrants to cities and this along with disguised unemployment constituted one of the features of this period.

Another characteristic of that era was inflation and expensive price for commodities particularly since the early 1970s. This situation can be attributed to rapid growth of non-productive expenditures in annual budge

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

without appropriate growth in tax revenues. While expenditures skyrocketed in those years, the share of tax income is only 17.4% of total budge.[1] This shows the inflationary nature of state income structure accompanied by its non-productive expenditures, resulting in rise of prices and expensive commodities.

In an overall evaluation, it should be noted that Iranian economic program in the second Pahlavī era was devised with foreign pressures especially those of the United States and was carried out with their financial, technical and intellectual assistance. Thus its grand objectives and orientation was directed at the goals and benefits of world capitalism proportion to U.S. envisaged model for the post-Second World War Third World countries (in order to keep West's allies vis-à-vis the Communists). Assisted by this pattern of economic growth and development, Iran's economy was integrated to world capitalism and the private sector with deepened character turned into part of world capitalism or in fact acted as the agent of multinationals inside the country.

Consequently, the consequences of economic developments in this period led to phenomenon of unevenness between various economic sectors in the country having serious social implications. The phenomenon of unevenness as the salient economic, social and political characteristic of Iran at that time resulted from imbalanced development and side-effects of dependence manifested by fragmentation, deformation and inequality.[2] Fragmentation meant that various elements of a system (economic, political, technological and cultural sectors) had a non-organic link with one another. This type of development is mainly characterized by the fact in economic aspect, economic evolution instead of serving coordination among various sectors within the society and as such remove the most salient trait of underdevelopment, namely structural multiplicity of social formation, it is conducted in an instant and imbalanced way as a direct hasty response to crises and impasse through external trade with receiving highly advanced technology from central capitalist states. This lead caused the second uneven trait, i.e. deformation meaning the growth of some sectors of parts within a sector along with the shrinking of contiguous sectors and parts. On the other side, inequality is among the other manifestations of imbalance whereby economic surplus from the most remote parts of the periphery is sucked into

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[2] Saʿīd Ḥajjāriyān, "Unevenness of the Process of Political Development in Periphery Countries," *Rahbord Quarterly*, No. 2, Winter 1993, p. 63.

the headquarters of metropolis. This would result in slowness and weakness of development dynamics in the dependent country. Because of this dependence, such nations would lose gradually their dynamic economic elements and become an appendix of the world capitalist economy[1] whose main function is to provide capital and wealth for capitalist metropolis.

Considering what was suggested above, these writers believe that Iran's increasing dependence on the world system and rise in oil prices particularly in the 1963-79 period played a major part in this unevenness. This, in turn, provided the grounds for inefficiency of economic system and ultimate rise of dissatisfaction to the status quo, leaving its impact on the advent of revolution in Iran.

A-3) Cultural Structure and Its Transformation

Iranian culture is influenced by Iranian epistemology, which in turn is affected by oriental epistemology and clairvoyance. This epistemology results in belief in metaphysics, Ahūrā Mazdā, the God and the evil forces, and the other world life. Muḥammad 'Alī Islāmī Nadūshan has dealt with difference in Iranian and Greek epistemology and worldview in a paper, Iranians and the Greek as Evidenced by History, and he observes that from the beginning Iranians were basically theist and the Greek materialist.[2] Iranian cultural norms and customs are in principle a manifestation of this type of epistemology, worldview, anthropology, and type of outlook to the political system that have been reflected in Persian language and literature as well national fiesta and ceremonies.

With the entry of Islam to Iran, doctrinal bases of Islam, given internal unity of monotheistic religious, had huge synergy with oriental intellectual foundations including among Iranians, and perhaps this synergy accounted for extensive acceptance of Islam in Iran. Islam influenced public culture, literature and language relatively and a kind of mixed identity comprising of Islam and Iran has formed. As noted above, Iranian metaphysic and clairvoyance was emphasized in Islam and Islam envisioned a world comprising of material and intellectual spheres that was not unfamiliar to Iranians.

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[1] These discussions are mainly put forth by the dependency theory theoreticians.

[2] Muḥammad 'Alī Islāmī Nadūshan, *What Does Iran Have to Say?* Tehran: Publications Company, 2000, p. 49.

The Muslim Iranian tried, after embracing Islam, to interpret various aspects of his/her life according to this new framework. He/she also sought to see how compatible or incompatible native customs were with Islam in a way that numerous stories are found in historical books about Iranians' treatment of their previous belief. In such stories, it is seen that priority is given to Islamic conviction over native customs.

The Islam that came to Iran was affected by two different readings of Islam including the reading of the victors that was the Sunnī version and another reading that constituted the minority that is the 'Alawī and Ahl al-Bayt reading followed in some parts of Iran. As a matter of fact, Sunnī reading of Islam was basically affected by Arab ethnocentrism that inspired some reactions during the Sunnī political sovereignty over Iran.[1] But Shī'ism, because of its rationalist essence recognized, respected and gave shape to authentic Iranian traits. Out of such a combination, affinity and kinship linkage, the new Iranian human being found his/her identity.[2]

Some scholars hold that Iran's encounter with the Western civilization entered a third factor into Iranian cultural identity beginning with the Turkmenchai agreement in 1828. Since then, Iran became a neighboring country of two colonial powers, namely Tsarist Russia and British Empire in India and as such Iran enters the international scene. Since that time, Iran with a load of its ancient identity, almost a rural lifestyle, and an entirely traditional attitude, opens its eyes at another world.

Expanded modernity in Ian brought about fundamental changes to Iranian's lives and imposed its impact increasingly through communications, economy, lifestyle and technology on Iranians' lives. As a result of modernity, Iranians demanded constitutionalism, political participation, industrial progress and social welfare and these demands made their way in Iranian identity. Incrementally, a triple circuit was formed before Iranians including Iran, Islam and modernity leading Iranian identity to take anew form based on these three circuits.[3]

If we agree with such arguments, we have to say that national culture in Iran, which represents one of the key elements constructing Iranian identity is largely affected by three subcultures, i.e. Iran, Islam and the West. These

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[1] Maḥmūd Riḍā Iftekhārī, *Islam and Iran*, Tehran: Resalat Qalam Publications, 1998, p. 116.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 120.

[3] Muḥammad 'Alī Islāmī Nadūshan, op. cit., p. 50.

three subcultures share some aspects and a mixed nucleus; a nucleus that though influenced by cultural foundations of ancient Iran, Islam and the West, possesses a unique essence. That is to say that logically its relationship with the three subcultures is partial inclusiveness with Iranian cultural nucleus including spirituality, rationalism and progressiveness being its traits.

Under the Pahlavīs, the country's cultural structure tended to bipolarity gradually rather than emphasizing that culture. This trend was worsened with emphasis upon peculiar readings of modernity and pseudo-modernism. In this peculiar reading of modernity that was the ruling reading under the Pahlavīs, the modernists gave priority to the elimination of native cultures as a traditional culture and replacing it with the modern Western culture. Drawing upon Western experience, they believed that unless culture undergoes change and modern man emerges, it would be impossible to launch necessary economic reforms in the society. Influenced by the modernization school[1] in Europe and the United States, they continued to battle native and religious culture that was viewed as the most formidable obstacle to the country's development and made their utmost efforts at eradicating and replacing it with the modern culture.

According to this outlook, the main factor of change in traditional societies involves change in values and beliefs in traditional society and replacing them with modern values. For this reason, the maintained that these modern Western values had to be spread through cultural and educational ties, modern educational institutions, publications and mass media. At the same time, traditional and religious culture found in those societies had to be eliminated or ignored. In this direction, the new middle class had to serve as the main carriers of this new culture in the society. These cultural changes, due to their one-dimensional nature – emphasis upon Western culture and pre-Islamic Iranian culture on the one hand and isolation of and battle against Islamic culture on the other- led to a kind of cultural imbalance followed by such consequences as cultural crisis and inability and identity crisis.

Anyway, Iran's cultural structure hat was of a mixed nature faced imbalance under the Pahlavīs leading to a crisis in Tehran's cultural structure. Emphasis upon on-linear policy-making as well as upon some

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[1] For more information on modernization school, see the following sources:

- Alvin, *Social Change and Development*, London: Sage Publications Inc., 1990.

- Andrew Webster, *Introduction to the Sociology of Development*, London: Macmillan, 1990.

elements of native culture at the expense of the other elements caused cultural imbalance in the country whose consequences were included in important factors in occurrence of revolution in Iran in 1979.

In this period, with increased state autonomy and power, cultural actions directed at instigating change in societal values were undertaken persistently. The state attempted to disseminate Western values in the society and to undermine traditional, native and religious vales by propagating such values as promiscuity under the name of women's emancipation, fostering Western style clothes, giving prominent to Western or Westernized music and arts, shifting the consumption pattern, meeting the new needs of the modern middle class and promotion of symbols that were viewed as immorality in traditional society.[1] This trend was exacerbated by actions like removal of condition of Islam from the Provinces and Counties act, putting aside Islamic calendar and installing ancient Persian calendar, and stressing upon pre-Islamic heritage like the Persepolis,[2] and constraints on the *'ulamā'* and religious people continued. Moreover, recruitment of Bahai, Jewish and secular persons in positions of power made the *'ulamā'* more sensitive to the society's cultural alienation.

These moves gradually created a large cultural gap between the social values and norms of the modern section and those of the traditional section of the society, causing alienation and conflict between two social forces in the society. It was evident that there was a particular consumption pattern found among the modern classes totally different from that of traditional classes. These new groups had constituted a separate stratum in the country with their recurrent rips abroad, knowledge of some Western languages, education in European and American universities, different leisure and lifestyles, unconventional behavior in Iran's traditional society (like free relations between men and women, promiscuity, alcohol abuse, tendency to Western music and arts, inattention to religious values). The government also strengthened them in a way that traditional strata regarded the government as the factor of formation of this group and fostering their behavior.[3]

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[1] Fereydūn Huweydā, *the Fall of the Shāh*, New York: Wyngham, 1979, pp. 31-32, 95-97, 142; Marvin Zonis, *the Political Elite of Iran*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 177-181.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*.

Extended cultural exchanges with Western countries particularly the United States had found an important place and exchange of students and artists and media links between the two nations grew rapidly year by year. Based on these cultural exchanges, thousands of Americans entered Iran, which in turn played a major role in cultural transformation in this period.[1]

Under these conditions, negation of native and religious traditions, values and institutions as backward values that caused national inferiority were targeted by advocates of modernization school. The Shāh attacked the religious people calling them reactionary or Islamic Marxists, and conversely religious people accused the Shāh of undermining Islamic convictions, anti-Islamism and replacement of a kind of Westernism with an amalgamation of ancient chauvinism.

The course of attacks on religious was intensified with the establishment of the Resurrection Party. While attacking the *'ulamā'*s as medieval reactionaries, the Party's theoreticians tried to promote the state reading of Islam and replace religious culture with ancient ideology. They replaced the Islamic calendar with an imperial calendar and forced women not to wear Chador in universities. They sent special inspectors for examining religious donations and declared that only the Donations Department was authorized to publish books. They encouraged Tehran University's Faculty of Theology to establish a new corps called Religious Corps declared by the Shāh for educating the true Islam to peasants and send them to rural areas in place of clergy. Other legal and judicial endeavors accelerated this process.[2] The Resurrection Party made efforts at deepening this cultural transformation by controlling the donations, empowering the Court's clergy, monopolizing the publication of religious books, and sending the Religious Corps to villages in order to make peasants suspicious of religious authorities and undermining their traditional religious values.[3]

The government attempted to increase its control over clergy and restrict their activities by putting ban on the activities of many Islamic scholars, mosques and Islamic cultural centers. Overall, one of the top principles of the government consisted of promotion of Western customs and norms and some

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[1] Aliyā Pāshā Ṣāliḥ, *Cultural Ties between Iran and the United States*, Tehran: N.P. 1979, p. 135.

[2] Nikki R. Keddie, *Roots of Iranian Revolution*, Trans. 'Abd al-Raḥīm Gavāhī, Tehran: Office for Publication of Islamic Culture, 1996, p. 310.

[3] Ervand Abrahimian, op. cit., p. 546.

Iranian customs and traditions and ignoring the role of Islam in Iran.[1] They saw modernization of the Third World countries in entire rejection of traditional values and replacing them with Western values as a preface to any move toward progress in those countries.

In a nutshell, as a result of these socio-cultural developments, Iranian society like many other Third World nations underwent unevenness in socio-cultural structure, which in turn worsened identity crisis given the country's cultural structure. This gave rise to numerous conflicts and paradoxes in social and cultural spheres. These conflicts ultimately paved the way for voluntary factors and agents of revolution to play a part and revolutionary leaders managed to disseminate revolutionary ideology and mobilize opponents of the status quo.

B) Voluntary Causes of the Advent of the Islamic Revolution

As suggested above, the role of voluntary factors, i.e. the will of agents has to be considered along with structural factors in creating revolution. Indeed, although structural problems in existing structures played the role of morbid situation in pre-revolutionary Iran paving the way for change, organizing and mobilizing opposition forces, emergence of revolutionary leadership and formation of mental grounds needed for the rise of revolutionary ideology are among the voluntary factors that are enhanced by exploiting the structural diseases providing the grounds for revolution in gaps caused by the structures. Thus, inattention to voluntary factors and more emphasis upon structure factors leads to a tautological statement unable to provide a suitable explanation of revolution.

Hence, we continue to discuss significant voluntary factors leading to the Iranian Revolution including the role played by Imām Khomeinī as the revolutionary leader, formation of the revolutionary ideology, factors influencing mass mobilization in the Islamic Revolution and the role played by political groups and parties in the occurrence of the revolution.

B-1) Emergence of Imām Khomeinī as the Revolutionary Leader

The Islamic Revolution, with all its grandeur owes to the personality of its great leader, Imām Khomeinī. That why and how such a totally revolutionary personality appears from within the conventional apparatus of Shī'ī jurisprudence and clergy how overthrew the 2500-year monarchical

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[1] Marc Gasiorowski, op. cit., p. 404.

system is an amazing phenomenon that should be analyzed well in theoretical terms. Generally, sociologists views three factors as influential in the rise of a leader in various societies and peoples following him. These three can be classified as proposing new claims on part of the leader, leader's marginalization in relation to the formal apparatus of the society as well as particularly social conditions that make acceptance of new claims made by the leader possible.[1]

In this relation, it can be suggested that Imām Khomeinī's stances, views and ideals involving his criticisms of the status quo and his alternative pattern for the desirable situation were among the factors that could attract the masses around him and made them declare their acceptance of his leadership. These stances and views were proposed in particularly social and cultural conditions provided a suitable ground for the acceptance of Imām Khomeinī's discourse. Highlighting the existence of a closed despotic political system, unjust nature of the economic system and cultural contradictions in the society that threatened national identity, Imām Khomeinī managed to attract masses who suffered from existing disorders, entangled in identity crisis and sought for a savior under those particular sociopolitical and cultural circumstances. On the other side, along with criticizing the status quo Imām Khomeinī's description of Islamic government as the desirable pattern enhanced his popularity as the revolutionary leader. The Islamic government pattern was proposed by him in conditions where the dominant atmosphere of seminary schools opposed such discussions and indeed Imām with a small number of his fellow thinkers proposed their stances in peripheral conditions. Imām consistently criticized non-political space dominating the schools as a reactionary outlook. He called for refinement of existing religious values and understanding of true Islam.

To more precisely study the subject and to explain causes of Imām Khomeinī's rise as the revolutionary leader in Iran, we proceed with historical examination of his life span and standpoints as well as Iranian society's particular conditions between 1941 and 1979.

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[1] See:

- Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Trans. and Ed. Guenthor Roth, Berkley: California University Press, p. 254.

- Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1978, p. 203.

- H. Desroche, *The Sociology of Hope*, Trans. from French by Carol Martin-Sperry, London: Routledge, 1979, p.87.

Imām Khomeinī was born in 1902 to a sophisticated militant family. From his childhood, Imām saw his father's clashes with regional rulers that finally led to his martyrdom. His adolescent years coincided with political and social crises in Iran. Imām Khomeinī studied rapidly various disciplines of Islamic knowledge like jurisprudence and theology, philosophy and mysticism. Following Āyatullāh Ḥā'irī's emigration to Qum and formation of seminary school's centrality, Imām Khomeinī immigrated to Qum too.

The wave of anti-Islamism in the early 1940s that was propagated by the government agents and a number of secular intellectuals led to his reaction in a way that he wrote *Disclosing of Secrets* in 1943 (two years after Riḍā Shāh's abdication) in rejection of the accusations made by opponents of religion in which he attacked Riḍā Shāh's anti-Islamic actions vigorously.

Since its inception, Imām Khomeinī considered the Second Pahlavī as an imposed government (that was installed by the Allied Forces in Iran) and as illegal (whose legitimacy relied neither on religion nor upon the Constitution).[1] Since he felt that the country's political-administrative structure had not undergone any change to Riḍā' Shāh's era, he was always worried about the continued Riḍā Shāh's despotism and continuity in Westernized pseudo-modernists, ideological like in the country who paved, to him, the way for entry of colonialism to the country and agents of destruction of national and religious identity.[2] So, he warned about the continued government of Riḍā Shāh's dictatorship agents and called for fundamental change in the past political, economic and cultural structure and relations.[3] He demanded that vast dismissal of all agents of the ancient regime, changing the past cruel laws, refinement of state cultural tools and channels, and reform in the army. He stated that "All things in the country have to be changed so that it sees happy days; otherwise it will be doomed to unhappy periods."[4]

In his first militant declaration dated May 6, 1944, he invites Muslims to 'uprising for God'. He predicted that I the case of failure to rise up and continued schism among Muslims, they would experience some time more

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[1] See *In Search of Path through Imām's Speech*, Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, pp. 180-194; Imām's Ṣaḥīfeh, vol. 4, p. 74.

[2] Rūḥullāh Mūsawī Khomeinī, *Disclosing of Secrets*, Tehran: Message of Islam Publications, p.235.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Ibid*., pp. 286-287.

bitter than Riḍā Shāh's period. These statements reveal that from the beginning Imām sought for chances for struggle against a regime he viewed as a continuity of the past illegitimate, illegal and dependent regime.

Under Āyatullāh Borūjerdī, Imām Khomeinī took part in his courses in Qum and Āyatullāh Borūjerdī made him one of his close advisors, asking for his view on important political issues.[1] He was also tasked with restructuring the affairs of the seminary schools as a member of 'Reformers Mission'.[2] Imām continued to have connections with Āyatullāh Kāshānī in those years in a way that Āyatullāh Kāshānī's close relatives suggest that Imām sent his son, late Haj Muṣṭafā, to him and conveyed his oral or written messages.[3]

Nonetheless, Imām kept silent on the oil nationalization affair to follow Āyatullāh Borūjerdī.[4] After the 1953 coup, to prevent the execution of Fadā'iyān-e Islām, Imām himself met with Āyatullāh Borūjerdī and asked him to preclude their execution. But after Āyatullāh Borūjerdī said that he would not interview in that case, Imām personally wrote to three prominent power-holders (Qā'im Maqām Rafī'ī, Behbahānī and Ṣadr al-Ashraf) and demanded them to prevent this from happening.[5] According to some analysts, Imām felt that the execution of Nawwāb Ṣafawī would mean taking revenge from political and militant clergy and his execution might herald other similar acts.[6]

In 1953, while discussing concealment (*taqiyyah*) in his jurisprudence courses, he compiled a short essay on this subject in which he referred to the original meaning of concealment bit contrary to its conventional meaning among the public and the scholars. He stressed that concealment is intended to preserve the religion rather to eradicate it and accordingly he called for avoiding of concealment.[7]

On October 7, 1962, the Provincial and Counties' Councils Act was put forward and adopted in the cabinet. Formation of such councils were

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[1] "Interview with Āyatullāh Sulṭānī," *Seminary School's Quarterly*, Nos. 43-44; "Ḥujjat al-Islām Abā'ī's Memoirs," *Yaad Quarterly*, vol. 1, Winter 1985, p. 128.

[2] "Interview with Āyatullāh Soltani," op. cit., No. 44.

[3] Muḥammad Ḥasan Rajabī, *Political Biography of Imām Khomeinī*, Tehran: Center for Islamic Revolution Documentation Publication, 1998, p. 217.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 219.

[5] Ja'far Subḥānī, Interview with *Cultural Kayhān*, vol. 6, June 1989.

[6] Muḥammad Ḥasan Rajabī, op. cit., p. 237.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

stipulated in Articles 91 and 92 of the Amendment to the Constitution, but in Articles 7 and 9 of the Statute of these councils as ratified by the first parliament, some qualifications were provided for the electors and electives. According to the Statue, some of the qualifications included belief in Islam, lack of corruption, swearing in on the Qur'an, and being male.[1] The 'Alam government tried to engage in certain activities, by proposing a new act, in order to include women in these councils (by omitting the condition of being male) and non-Muslims (by omitting the condition of being Muslim and swearing in on the Qur'an).

Imām Khomeinī reacted harshly to such a proposal and described it was a preface to Shāh's intensified anti-Islamic plans. Immediately Imām invited Qum's high-ranking *'ulamā'* to consult and make a decision in this regard. A precise examination of Imām Khomeinī's stances reveal that since Imām regarded sovereignty in the Second Pahlavī regime as a continuity of pseudo-modernist, anti-Islamic and dependent intellectual current like the first Pahlavī regime, he belied that these actions represented efforts at continuing the same doctrine and expanding the influence of the colonialist agents (the Zionists and the Bahā'ī) in the country's decision-making organs and spreading immorality and prostitution in the country.

In this period, the question of Bahā'ī infiltration in the country's political apparatus in the 1940s and 1950s provoked special attention. The presence of a Bahā'ī physician named Ayādī in the Court as the Shāh's special doctor and his efforts at extending Bahā'ī influence in the country's political approaches[2] as well as the Court's support for this endeavor were faced with negative reactions by the *'ulamā'*. What worsened this issue involved the recognition of Israel by the Iranian government and support for Zionist leverage in Iran in a way that the majority of *'ulamā'* thought the Zionists and Bahā'īs as major agents of the United States and Great Britain attempted to take the control of political apparatus and eliminate Islam and the clergy.[3]

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[1] Jalāluddīn Madanī, *Political History of Contemporary Iran*, vol. 1, Tehran: Office for Islamic Publications, 1982, p. 375.

[2] Ḥusayn Fardūst, *the Rise and Fall of the Pahlavī Monarchy*, Tehran: Iṭṭilāʿāt Publications, 1992, p. 203.

[3] *Ḥujjat al-Islām Falsafī's Memoirs and Struggles*, Tehran: Center for Islamic Revolution Documentation Publications, 1997, p. 187.

This same issue, under Āyatullāh Borūjerdī made him who less often interfered in political matters react and express to the Shāh his concerns over their extended influence.[1] At least, religious preachers against thee groups led the Muslim people to attack the Bahā'ī propagation centers in Tehran (Hazirat al-Quds) and made the Shāh order the closing down of these centers.[2] Nonetheless, the Court's support for this group provoked Āyatullāh Borūjerdī's concern until he was alive.[3]

On this ground, the *'ulamā'* were the belief that the government intended, with the Councils' Act after the demise of Āyatullāh Borūjerdī under U.S. pressures, to bring the Jews and Bahais into power in Iran. In this way, the misguided Bahā'ī sect would take office legally and after that gradually launch its formal activities for taking the control of all political social, economic and cultural leverage.[4]

Given his particular mentality, Imām who saw the regime as dependent and anti-Islamic came to the conclusion that international necessities made the government do so, for this reason he sent a message to the Shāh to the effect that "Resort to international requirements for suppressing the Holy Qur'an, Islam, the Constitution, and the nation is a big crimes and unforgivable sin."[5] In reply to a letter by the people of Qum, he stated that the Statute adopted by the Jewish and Zionist spies for exterminating independence was till in force.[6] He continued to say that the country's independence and economy were controlled by the Zionists who appeared as the Bahā'ī group in Iran.[7]

Moreover, Imām described the government's intention in bringing women to political scene as preparation for the expansion of immorality and accused the government of trying to spread promiscuity and prostitution in the society rather than expanding women's political participation. Finally, as a result of Imām and other *'ulamā's* firm treatment, the government was forced to retreat and took back the Provincial and Counties' Councils proposal from the parliament, thus defusing temporarily the first challenge

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

[5] *Imām's Ṣaḥīfeh*, vol. 1, p. 89.

[6] *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 109.

[7] *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 110.

between the Court and the clergy. But some time later on January 9, 1962, the Shāh declared formally that he intended to hold a referendum on six points that were called the White Revolution later on. The decision to declare these points followed the Shāh's return from the United States and his agreement with Kennedy. Indeed, the Shāh dismissed Amīnī and he himself took the initiative by declaring six-point Shāh and nation revolution.

In response to declaration of these points, Imām invited Qum's *'ulamā'* for exchanging views. In this meeting, Imām described the issue in detail, revealed U.S. and Shāh's goals in pursuing the White Revolution and called for taking appropriate stance on part of the *'ulamā'*. But no result was achieved in early meetings, so the meeting went on and finally they decided to ask the government to send an envoy to Qum in order to extrapolate Shāh's objectives in proposing these points as well as the convey the Qum *'ulamā's* opinions to the Shāh.[1]

Following this decision, one of the government authorities named Behboudi was sent to Qum and met with the *'ulamā'*. Despite holding several meetings, ambiguities still existed. Behboudi traveled between Qum and Tehran several times and conveyed the *'ulamā'* and the Court's viewpoints and suggestions, but no definite result was achieved and the Court's imprecise answers were increased *'ulamā's* ambiguities.[2] Such ambiguities were not removed even with the meeting between the head of the Court's protocol section and director of the SAVAK on one side and the *'ulamā'* on the other.[3] Finally, the government decided to hold the referendum for approving the six points followed by Imām Khomeinī's declaration that referendum for adopting the White Revolution points was invalid. Referring to legal faults in holding the referendum, he wrote that first, referendum was not provided in Iran's laws, and law had to determine the competent authority for holding referendum. Second, in countries where referendum is held chance is given to the nation to discuss all articles and points in its mass media and the press reflect freely the opinions expressed by proponents and opponents and people vote for them consciously. Furthermore, the voters enjoy necessary knowledge for making their choices, whereas these cannot be found in Iran and the knowledgeable elements of the society oppose the referendum. Then emphasizing the presence of an

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[1] Ḥamīd Rawḥānī, *Imām Khomeinī's Movement*, Tehran: Center for Islamic Revolution Documentation, 1995, p. 223.

[2] Muḥammad Ḥasan Rajabī, op. cit., p. 263; *'Arāqī's Untold Things*, p. 153.

[3] *Ibid*.

atmosphere of intimidation, constrains and strangling in the society, he observed that if there were not intimidation and cooptation and the nation understand what it did, the referendum would reflect people' and *'ulamā's* opinions adequately. Third, Imām viewed use of referendum too, when the parliament was not working under the conditions of intimidate and lack of freedom, as an interlude to remove the articles pertaining religion and warns in this respect.[1]

Apart from the nature of Shāh's actions, Imām seemed to direct his important attack abuse of referendum too by the Shāh for justifying and promoting his own actions. He believed that use of this superficial tool in Iran's non-free society could lay a precedent for pursuing other anti-Islamic and anti-national actions by the Shāh. Thus to battle the referendum constituted the most important goal pursued by Imām Khomeinī. In the meantime, he stressed that if this tool were used properly, people's votes would certainly display objection to the Shāh's reforms as imposed by American.

Ḥujjat al-Islām Falsafī writes in his memoirs in this regard that since it was inferred that referendum was a cloak for performing a series of unreligious works, Imām and other *'ulamā'* protested the holding of referendum by issuing a declaration.[2] Anyway, after this declaration, people and students in Tehran and seminar students in Qum engaged in demonstrations with such slogans as "The forged referendum contravenes Islam" and "Reforms yes, dictatorship never." They also clashed with the police while other *'ulamā'* backed Imām Khomeinī, opposing the referendum.[3] Grand Āyatullāhs Golpāyegānī, Khū'ī, Khwānsārī, Muḥammad Behbahānī and Sharī'atmadārī boycotted the referendum at the same day by issuing similar declarations.[4] Under such circumstances, the referendum was held on January 27 in an atmosphere of suppression, intimidation and police pressure.

Following the referendum, the Qum's *'ulamā'* continued their meetings with Imām Khomeinī being the axis. Indeed *'ulamā's* struggle was derived

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 230-231.

[2] *Falsafī's Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 246.

[3] Muḥammad Ḥasan Rajabī, op. cit., p. 265.

[4] *Islamic Revolution Documents (Announcements, Declarations, Statements, Messages, Telegrams, and Letters of the Grand Āyatullāhs and Authorities of Emulation)*, vol. 1, Tehran: Center for Islamic Revolution Documentation, 1995, p. 57.

from mistrust in the government and concerns for empowering a specific ideological line, which could perpetuate the de-Islamification process as was the case under Riḍā Shāh. For this reason, *'ulamā'* gave priority to efforts at preventing the government going beyond the constitution (as the least possible ideal) and preventing the regime from using illegal means for legitimization of its actions like the referendum itself.

On March 23, 1963, while the *'ulamā'* declared that year's Nowruz public mourning, armed forces raided the Fayḍiyyah School in Qum and beat the seminary students, injuring many of them. These incidents grew in scale with beating seminary students in Tabrīz and savage attack on students at Tehran University. Qum's commander of police who represented the government threatened the *'ulamā'* with murdering, raping their female relatives, and destroying their houses,[1] and ordered that seminary students be dispatched to military service. These actions worsened the existing tension and made the *'ulamā'* totally encounter the government in a way that they condemned the regime's actions and took a more explicit stance against its acts by issuing statements and declarations.[2]

Telegrams, protests and strikes went on till the 40th day after the Fayḍiyyah incident and opened a new chapter in clergy-government demarcation. The *'ulamā'* considered the government as illegitimate, dependent, lackey of Zionists, and traitor to Islam that tried to destroy national and Islamic culture and the government, in turn, viewed the *'ulamā'* as reactionary and opponent to reforms and believed that they had to be suppressed so that way could be paved for reforms.

Following these developments that helped clarify both sides' positions, Āyatullāh Khomeinī referred to the regime's suppressive acts, saying: "We won; we wanted God to reveal the nature of this regime to disrepute itself."[3]

Noting the raid of the Fayḍiyyah School by commandos and disciplinary officers, Imām issues an important statement, viewing concealment as taboo and expressing the truth as indispensable. In the statement, he construed love for the Shāh as pillage, harming the body of Islam, burning vestiges of Islam

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[1] Ḥamīd Rawḥānī, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 399.

[2] Ulema's numerous announcements in this period have been compiled in three volumes in a book entitled *Islamic Revolution Documents* and can be referred to. *Islamic Revolution Documents*, Tehran: Center for Islamic Revolution Documentation, 1995.

[3] Ḥamīd Rawḥānī, op. cit., p. 358; *Imām's Ṣaḥīfeh*, vol. 1, p. 166.

and so on and added that he would disclose acts contrary to the country's interests as long as he had a pen in hand to write.[1]

These events were intensified in 'Āshūrā day in the mass movement of mourners who canted political slogans in favor of Imām Khomeinī in Tehran and Qum as followed by Imām Khomeinī's speech in Qum in the evening of 'Āshūrā whose main attack directed at the Shāh and his dependence. Following these speeches, Imām Khomeinī was arrested at night of Muḥarram 12 (June 6, 1963) and was sent to prison. This brought about massive popular reactions, shaping the June 6 uprising that left around 15,000 dead or injured in such cities as Tehran, Qum and Varāmīn and led to detention of a number of *'ulamā'* and religious authorities.[2]

The June 6 massacre intensified *'ulamā'*'s position and the regime, in turn, increased its propaganda against the *'ulamā'*. The Shāh and mass media, at SAVAK's guideline, tried to introduce landowners as provoking the *'ulamā'* and presenting *'ulamā'*'s impetus in objection to land reforms and Shāh's social reforms that could be summarized as opposition to progress and development led by the Shāh, and defense of feudalism and reactionary outlooks.[3]

Imām Khomeinī's stances in post-1963 era are clearly reflected in his messages and speeches. In *Ṣaḥīfeh Nūr* book series, around 45 speeches and messages from Imām during 1964-77 period are recorded whose content analysis disclose that Imām on the one had tried to introduce the nature of regime's pseudo-modernist reforms as non-native and non-national in line with colonialist ends, and rejects the claim that clergy opposed the country's progress and advancement on the other. He also emphasizes that colonialism regarded Islamic and Qur'anic culture as well as the clergy (as carriers of this culture) as one of the major obstacles to its domination thus seeking to eradicate them.

Mentioning the country's economic problems including unemployment, poverty, material and health conditions of south Iran's people as well as embezzlement of the country's budget, he negates the regime's claim to progress and believes: "The government's policy line is not to reform such

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 372; *Imām's Ṣaḥīfeh*, Vol.1, p. 178.

[2] See *Islamic Revolution Documents*, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 128.

[3] Muḥammad Riḍā Pahlavī, *Answer to History*, Trans. Ḥasan Abūturābiyān, Tehran: Translator, 1992, p. 177.

affairs, but to follow a pattern that will underpin the colonial influence in the country rather than solving the country's problems."[1]

In a harsh speech dated 10/25/1964 against capitulation leading to his ultimate exile, Imām Khomeinī criticizes Shāh's modernist slogans once again. Referring to granting capitulation (judicial immunity) to American advisors and employees in Iran that he calls Iran's colonization, he says: "Today when colonized countries dare to put aside colonialism and tear off the captivity chains, Iran's progressive parliament, which claims to have a 2500-year history votes for the most insulting and tainted wrong law proposed by disrepute governments introducing Iranian nation as the most backward and mean nation to the world."[2]

During the exile years, Imām Khomeinī continues to criticize the government. In response to the government's efforts at separating religion form politics, he believes that to propagate and an Islam that has no bearing on politics would cause the continued domination of colonialism in the country. He was non-involvement of religion in politics as the source of all evils (including the country's dependence, colonialism, strangling, lack of freedom, poverty, plunder of the nation's wealth, etc.) and calls upon youngsters and intellectuals to make efforts at giving religion its deserved status in politics and social justice.[3]

On the other hand, along with criticizing the status quo, Imām Khomeinī presented is utopian mode in 1969. He offered an account of Islamic government as an ideal governmental model in his jurisprudence courses in Najaf, later published under the title of 'Guardianship of Jurisprudent'.

In a nutshell, Imām Khomeinī's leadership can be classified as ideologue, mobilizer, and director and architect in years before 1977. Emphasizing such principles as inseparability of religion and politics, necessity of making efforts at establishing an Islamic government, removing taints of seclusion from Islam, freedom-seeking search for independence, and egalitarianism as foundations of Islamic government, he sought to portray Islam as a religious, progressive and complete religion in battle against the regime's pseudo-modernism.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 391.

With popular uprising of Qum's people on January 9, 1978, grounds were provided for Imām Khomeinī's re-emergence in the political scene. In this period, Imām's declarations play a mobilizing role in which he gives hope for victory to people, calling them to unity and solidarity, and regards any silence and apathy as contrary to supreme expedience of Islam.[1] On the one hand, in this period, he takes advantage of cultural space of the society that became increasingly religious in the 1960s and 1970s and on the other described adverse social, economic and cultural consequences of the Pahlavī regime's modernization plans. In this way, he became successful at gaining acceptance of various social groups as an ideal personality who was able to lead the movement to the ideal condition and to organize the masses around him in struggle against the regime. In his declarations during the struggle, while being intransigent and resolute in struggle against the regime, he addressed all strata of the nation and stressed on his main mobilization strategy that is populism. Imām's major communication instrument was declaration and tapes of his speeches. Using all these tools, he focused upon communicating with the people and making them conscious. While being resolute, he emphasized civil disobedience and non-violence, calling for peaceful demonstrations, strikes, mass protests and non-compliance with the regime's laws, thus displaying the oppression of revolutionary forces.

Taking advantage of mosques, ceremonies, religious calendar, preaching tribunes, clergy and young revolutionary academics, efforts at separating the ordinary military personnel from the commanders, creating space of non-collaboration with the regime among all strata of people, emphasis upon non-compromise, rejections of the Shāh's certain reformist actions, and stress on the necessity of removal of the regime all were conducted in direction of Imām Khomeinī's mobilizing leadership, which continued till the end of the struggle and removal of the Pahlavī regime.[2]

The third trait of Imām, namely management and architecture of the new system was quite apparent from the very victory and emphasized holding a referendum for determining the type of the new political system, pointing to the necessity of formation of legal bodies and popular legitimacy for the new system. Then he oversaw seriously the compilation and adoption of new constitution and finally supported the establishment of new legal

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] On social and cultural grounds of Imām Khomeinī's re-emergence in political scene, see: Ḥusayn Ḥusaynī, *Leadership and the Revolution: Imām Khomeinī's Role in the Islamic Revolution*, Tehran: Imām Khomeinī and Islamic Revolution Research Institute, 1992, pp. 197-227.

bodies in the country, resolving legal bottlenecks and theoretical problems with his specific revolutionary vision.

B-2) Formation of Revolutionary Ideology in Iran

B-2-1) Shī'ism as a Revolutionary Ideology

Ideology represents one of the main aspects in the process of revolutionary mobilization. To sociologists, ideology serves three main functions as follows: The first function of ideology is to simplify complicated reality. Second, ideology tries to structure a mental plan and offer a rational justification of worldview and value system. The third function of ideology involves encouragement of human being to act, enabling people to engage in political act by presenting goals and instruments.[1] Obviously, every ideology needs some experienced ideologues in order to justify and interpret fundaments, functions and popularity. At the same time, good speech, sophisticated writing and health of prominent personalities play a crucial role in the consolidation of an ideology. The further an ideology conforms to basic material and spiritual needs of societies, the more lasting, efficient and dynamic it will be.[2]

According to existing reality, Shī'ī Islam managed to carry out desirably regulate multiple functions of ideology in the process of political mobilization. Success of Shī'ism as the revolution's ideology has to be assessed considering the decline of other ideologies and thought currents that were potentially or actually its competitors.

Under conditions where such ideologies as socialism and liberal nationalism as major ideological rivals of Shī'ī Islam in Iran were faced with conceptual impasse and failure, Shī'ī Islam in its new guise entered the competition arena with the imported thoughts while it claimed to have innovative and authentic solutions, given the society's problems of the day. It ultimately could win in the arena and directed the mass mobilization leading to the Iranian Islamic Revolution.[3]

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[1] Jean Bechler, *What Is Ideology?* Trans. 'Alī Asadī, Tehran: Intishār, 1991, pp. 8-10.

[2] Muḥammad Ārāsteh-Khū, *Critique of and Glance at the Scientific and Social Terminologies*, Tehran: Gostar, 1991, pp. 175-180.

[3] 'Alī Muḥammad Ḥādirī, *"Process of Formation of Islamic Revolution's Ideology,"* Matīn Quarterly, no. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 113-114.

In this respect, Nāṣir Kātūziyān writes: "Shī'ī Islam was a message, which influenced people's lives for centuries; a message that with radical revolutionary themes promised a government by the oppressed, a message, known to all who saw it as a manifestation of their lost personality and identity. Moreover, in the unequal war between the people and the government the revolutionaries needed a weapon that could also penetrate the heart of enemy and make soldiers morally suspicious and hesitant. Which ideal could attract ordinary people with the power of love and make martyrdom their motto? There was no response other than Shī'ī Islam … and the public belief became more solid that Shī'ī Islam provided the only way to victory and salvation. For this reason, in the huge 'Āshūrā and Tāsū'ā demonstrations, all moves were of Islamic character, mottos were passed to the people from the mosques… and glorified the revolution with Islamic quality."[1]

He adds:

"How was it possible to alienate people from religion? People whose parents' marriage was conducted according to Islamic formalities, Azan was said upon their birth and 'God is great' was murmured in their ears, and have heard religious anthems in the event of celebration and mourning, people who greet each other in Islamic ways and listen to the voice of Azan several times a day? To them, 'God is great' and 'There is no God but Allah' is a familiar message penetrating their heart and souls, so they had better rise up against oppression with this very motto… Additionally, since Iranian people's revolution is not an armed uprising, it needs immerse sacrifice and standing in front of bullets normally needs people who believe in the other world and consider themselves as alive after martyrdom. Therefore, in terms of way of struggle, Islam presented the best ideals too."[2]

Another researcher writes on supporting this argument:

"In Iran, agreed elements that can create collective personality of group feeling are largely religious including prayer, pilgrimage, payment of alms and so on all reinforce the unity of individual and society, hence the intensity of feelings in collective liturgical ceremonies exceed the aggregate of individual feelings. The sacrifice Eid ceremonies and giving meals to people create a kind

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[1] Nāṣir Kātūziyān, *A Glance at Iran's Revolution*, Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1981, pp. 6-7.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 54-55.

of collective feelings. Funerals are accompanied by a type of symbolism that shows continuity of society and raises the memory of Imām Ḥusayn. Tāsūʿā and ʿĀshūrā ceremonies refer to a sense of big victory. What matters is the recognition of social elements that prescribe such events and make them look important. The Shīʿī liturgical ceremonies are based upon masses and address masses. This very reality along with Shīʿī ability to reinterpret sacred symbols in a way that these could be used for explaining current issues, extrapolate the Shīʿification of Iran's Revolution."[1]

On the other hand, determining events during the Iranian Revolution occurred in particularly days which are important in Shīʿī historical culture. The September 1978 events happened in Tehran in month of Ramaḍān an *ʿĪd al-Fiṭr*. Millions-strong demonstrations in Tehran and other cities occurred in Tāsūʿā and ʿĀshūrā as inspired by the month of Muḥarram among the Shīʿah. Therefore, the revolution was of Shīʿī nature, attracting large number of people from all walks of life. "Revolution broke out from the house of religion, namely the mosque and seminary school and religious orientation in the revolution grew day by day. The role of religion and spiritual values became so strong that attracted some kinds of people to the scene of revolution who normally do not enter the scene in any revolution."[2]

Furthermore, the mottos of revolutionary period shows that the revolution was ideologically based upon Shīʿī Islam, that is because Shīʿism played a significant part in forming revolutionary mottos and ideals, making people chant such mottos.[3] This is notable that people's mottos in various demonstrations in provinces and cities had religious tone derived from Shīʿī culture in a way that a type of homogeneity was felt among these mottos.[4] John Furan writes on this subject:

"During the revolution, religious terms were of utmost importance. One of the ways to better understand the revolution's political culture involved study of numerous mottos voiced during the

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[1] A. Shaykh al-Islāmī, *"From Religious Accomodation to Religious Revolution: The Transformation of Shīʿism in Iran,"* in A. Banū ʿAzīzī and M. Weiner (eds.), *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986, pp. 247-248.

[2] ʿAlī Khāmeneʾī, *"Iran's Islamic Revolution Was an Exceptional One,"* Quds Newspaper, 13/2/1996, p. 3.

[3] Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, *On Islamic Revolution*, Tehran: Ṣadrā, 1980, pp. 25-116.

[4] *Ibid*.

revolution. Most of the mottos looked liked rhythmical Persian poems. Among the Islamic mottos were included: "Our movement is Qur'anic, our country Islamic," "The silence of any Muslim is betrayal to the Qur'an," and "This government is filthier than the Yazīd's one." Imām Khomeinī was also praised in Islamic mottos in this way: "Party only the party of God (Ḥizbullāh), leader only Rūḥullāh (spirit of God)," and "This is the national motto: God, the Qur'an, Khomeinī." Hence, the themes over which popular coalition was formed included: "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic," "Long time Khomeinī," and "Islam, Democracy and Equality,"[1]

One of the methods used for expressing discontent involved a particular type of demonstration that was called "Nightly *Takbīr* (saying 'God is great') never seen in previous revolutions. All nights when lamps got off and the city became dark, the voices of 'God is great' was heard throughout the city. The voice of *takbīr* was merged with roars of shootings whereas the roars of bullets were always subdued.[2] Algar is also of the belief that with a glance at the process of political mobilization and people's mottos, Islamic nature of the revolution in terms of ideology, organization and leadership could be acknowledged:

"If the foundation of previous movements in Iran consisted of a coalition of salient Islamic forces and figures with secular and nationalist groups that were combined to different degrees, in contrast the 1978-79 revolution was of totally Islamic substance in which the participation of secular elements was quite peripheral. The mottos voiced in widespread popular demonstrations were largely Islamic and the revolutionaries' weapon to the last phase involved collective prayers and martyrdom. Important religious days particularly the month of Muḥarram highlighted the revolution move forward. Attention to the role of mosques is important, for the provided the organizational unit of the revolution.[3]

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[1] John Furan, *Fragile Resistance*, Trans. Aḥmad Tadayyun, Tehran: Rasā, 1998, pp. 575-576.

[2] Ghulām-Ḥusayn Khayyir, *Revolution in Theory and Practice*, Tehran: Institute for Iranian Studies, 1979, pp. 74-75.

[3] "Religious Forces in 20th Century Iran," in *Pahlavī Dynasty and Religious Forces as Cited by the Cambridge History*, Trans. 'Abbās Mukhbir, Tehran: New Design, 1996, pp. 321-322.

In his visit to Tehran in September 1977, French thinker Foucault observed the revolutionary process closely and by stressing that Shī'ism acted as an ideology in Iran's revolution, wrote: "Islamic governance as a political demand ahs impressed me, because it is an effort at bringing a spiritual aspect ton politics. Iran ahs extracted a religion from this Islam that has provided this nation with infinite springs for resisting state power."[1]

In sum, Shī'ī Islam succeeded in playing its role in the advent of the revolution as an acceptable, legitimate and accessible ideology while other ideologies like liberalism, Marxism and nationalism met dead-end. Assuming the functions of an ideology, it criticized the status quo and portrayed the desirable ideal, preparing millions of Muslim people for sacrifice and patience that led them in the way of revolutionary upheaval.[2]

Given what was outlined above and the fact that the semiotic system forming the Iranian society at the time of revolution was Shī'ī ideology and this helped people redefine their conditions and articulate their ideals and demands in a new form, a question is raised: Were the key concepts of Shī'ī ideology as the ideology of Iran's Islamic Revolution reinterpreted (in a way suitable for mass mobilization)? There are two outlooks in response to this question; some Western and non-Western scholars maintain that key Shī'ī concepts which are pacific had undergone reinterpretation in Iranian revolution in a way that they became dynamic concepts suitable for mass mobilization. Thus, according to this outlook, some religious beliefs were selected, reinterpreted, constructed and displayed within an ideological framework.[3]

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[1] Muḥammad Bāqir Khurramshāhī, "Foucault and Iran's Islamic Revolution; Spiritualism in Politics," *Matin Quarterly*, No. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 213-217.

[2] See Ḥamīd Riḍā Akhawān Mufrad, *Iranian Revolution's Ideology*, Tehran: Imām Khomeinī and Islamic Revolution Research Institute, 2002, p. 209.

[3] See for example opinions expressed by Enayat, Hegland, Bayat and Fischer in the following work:

- Ḥamīd Enayat, *Contemporary Islamic Political Thought*, Trans. Bahaoddin Khorramshahi, Tehran: Kharazmi, 1993, pp. 280-281.

- Mary Hegland, "Two Images of Hussain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," in N. R. Keddie (ed.), *Religion and Politics in Iran: Shī'ism from Quietism to Revolution*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, p. 235.

- M. Bayat Phillipp, "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79: Fundamentalist or Modern?" *The Middle East Journal*, No. 37, Winter 1983, p. 33.

- Michael Fischer, *From Religious Dispute to Revolution*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 20.

In reply to these scholars, the second outlook holds that in religion all concepts including dynamic and peaceful concepts (like Jihad, peace, emigration, martyrdom, attention to the Muslim affairs, mercy and affection) do exist. These concepts are constant and unchangeable concepts in terms of meaning and are absolute in terms of time and place; hence it is not the case that certain concepts are unique to a specific time and place (for instance the concept of martyrdom is not peculiar to the early Islamic era) and it is not true that the meaning of concepts change over time (for instance martyrdom in pre-revolutionary period does not mean something and it is reinterpreted and finds another meaning in post-revolutionary era). According to this outlook, in the societal area in the stable period, that group of ideological and religious concepts that contributed to order, stability and tranquility are prevalent, but in the formative period (e.g. revolutionary era) that set of concepts that call for revolution are revived, mobilizing the masses to engage in revolution.[1]

According to the first outlook, these are ideologues that reinterpret passive concepts, turning them into dynamic and mobilizing concepts, but the second outlooks holds that ideological concepts (here that set of concepts that called fro uprising and revolution like martyrdom has never had passive meaning) and the ideologue's tasks in this outlook is not to reinterpret these concepts, but to adapt these constant concepts with external extensions. In other words, he enters these concepts into lingual community and makes them accessible to the people if conditions are ripe for uprising and revolution.

The second outlook does not see key Shī'ī concepts in the early centuries of Shī'ism as passive and pacifying, but they have always been a factor of movement and uprising.[2] For instance, in the first, second and third centuries (A.H.), many Shī'ī uprisings occurred that were of revolutionary content as supported by the Infallible Imams, too.[3] Uprisings such as Hājar

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[1] Nikki R. Keddie, "Shī'ism and Revolution," in Bruce Linkin (ed.), *Religion, Rebellion and Revolution*, Minnesota: Macmillan, 1985, p. 22 and 160.

[2] 'Abbās Keshāvarz Shukrī, "Ideology of the Iranian Islamic Revolution: Shī'ī Ideology and Its Redefinition," *Matin Quarterly*, No. 8, Fall 2000, pp. 171-190.

[3] See

- Ṣādiq Āyīneh-Vand, *Shī'ī Uprisings in Islamic History*, Tehran: Raja, 1988.

- Muḥammad Ḥusayn Zayn 'Āmilī, *Shī'ah in History*, Trans. Muḥammad Riḍā 'Aṭā'ī, Qum: Foundation for Islamic Research, 1991.

bin 'Uday (51 A.H.), Zayd bin 'Alī (122 A.H.), Yaḥyā bin Zayd (251 A.H.), Ḥusayn bin 'Alī (169 A.H.), and Yaḥyā bin 'Umar bin al-Ḥusayn (249 A.H.) can be mentioned in this regard. The uprisings (51-260 A.H.) were directly connected to Imamate and there is no doubt that these uprisings could not happen without an ideology driving them.

Therefore, in early centuries, 12-Imām Shī'ah, Zaydiyyah and Ismā'iliyyah all engaged in civil disobedience and/or armed struggle against Muslim rulers who they regarded as oppressor and usurper and the Imamieh Shia even in some cases (like the time of Būyeh dynasty, some time under Mongol Ilkhans and the Ṣafawīd era) succeeded in forming a government indicating Shī'ah struggle throughout history in various cultural, doctrinal and political forms.[1]

Therefore, key concepts of Shī'ī Islam have constant truth and if they were not used some time, the original meanings of these concepts would not be harmed, so these key Shī'ī concepts have always been dynamic and mobilizing concepts.

In a nutshell, revolutionary ideology is a manifestation of features of Islam and Shī'ism that though rooted in people's thought tradition, have been revived and re-understood in a particularly way. The revival of such an outlook to Shī'ī teachings was manifested mainly in Imām Khomeinī's speech and guidelines, gathered various opposition groups behind him and run the engine of revolution.

This reading of Islam, which was also accepted by new generation of clergy, Muslim intellectuals and a large part of academic graduates, was the same victorious ideology that could overtake other ideologies. Because of its adaptation to the culture of Muslim people and the credibility of its leadership before the people, it could appear and create popular epics with mass presence in 1977-78.

Principally, Muslim thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s like 'Alī Sharī'atī, Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, Mahdī Bāzargān and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Beheshtī attempted to present a rational true image of Islam capable of managing contemporary world by criticizing rival ideologies. Rejecting conflict between science and religion, the stressed upon compatibility of reason and

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- 'Alī Aṣghar Ḥalabī, *History of Contemporary Religious-Political Movements*, Tehran: Behbahānī, 1992.

[1] *Ibid*.

revelation, and science and faith in order to present Islamic ideology as the superior ideology. Moreover, emphasizing proof of inadequacy of empirical, philosophical and materialist knowledge in responding to all human needs, they defended religion vis-à-vis social and political charges like the criticism of religion as being opium expounded by Marxists. By rejecting fatalist theories and criticizing tradition and traditional values on the one hand and criticizing modernism and modern values on the other, they tried to enter Islam as the superior ideology vis-à-vis rival ideologies into the scene. Although such discussion attracted a large number intellectuals and academics what spread it among the masses was the support of a young generation of clergy as well as Imām Khomeinī's presence as a religious leader. Indeed, Imām was the nucleus of complementing revolutionary ideology around him a variety of forces gathered. Although the characteristics of Islam, revolution and the struggle that was initiated by some Muslim intellectuals were partly different from Imām's perception of Islam, his sophistication and credibility created a situation that the bulk of Muslim educated people who owed their tendency to Islam to attractive efforts by Muslim intellectuals, gradually adapted themselves with Imām Khomeinī's understanding.[1]

It is noteworthy that as revolutionary movement proceeded and Imām found a better change to present his stances and outlooks, distinction between his understanding and those of traditional preachers of Islam became more apparent and Muslim intellectuals found what they lost in his presence, thus areas of possible differences were removed on his behalf.

If we want to discern essential features of Imām's Islam as revolutionary ideology and speak of an Islam that could prove its truth in the 1970s at the time of intense competition among the ideologies whose rival ideologies possessed very strong propagation possibilities, we have to talk about an Islam that had all strong pints of rival ideologies in itself and beyond all of them drew up a future system in which freedom and justice in light of Islamic teachings were seen as two wings for attaining mysticism and realization of spirituality.[2]

Islam with aforementioned traits could overtake its competitors and that how this was spread as the dominant discourse throughout the country owed to the efforts made by various forces including a new generation of clergy

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[1] 'Alī Muḥammad Ḥāḍirī, op. cit., p. 138.

[2] *Ibid.*

who influenced the country's political space since the mid-1950s. Portraying Islam as a comprehensive ideology that had specific patters in various social, political, economic and cultural spheres they attempted to present an appropriate alternative to two rival ideologies, i.e. Marxism and liberalism and they managed to direct and organize revolutionary mobilization in Iran according to this ideology.

B-3) Popular Move and Social Mobilization in Iran's Islamic Revolution

The Islamic Revolution in Iran is largely characterized by million-strong mass mobilization of people who went to the streets to show their support for the revolution. There are different theories on how such mobilization took place in Iran's revolution.[1] Some theorists see the advent of the revolution a product of appearance of mass society as a result of the collapse of traditional cohesion and lack of new cohesion. They regard revolutionary mobilization, rise of revolutionary ideologies and emergence of revolutionary leaders as possible only in a society where mass society is present. Hannah Arndt and William Kornhauser are the most famous theorists who share this view.[2]

In contrast, another group of theorists consider revolution as an outcome of conflicts under way within civil society, and between civil society and the state. Hence, the existence of groupings, solidarities, social coalitions, and the clash of these groups and organizations in social communication networks, and patterns of collective action are viewed as the necessary conditions for revolutionary mobilization. Barrington Moore, Theda Scocpol and Tilly are among the theorists who believe in this viewpoint.[3]

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[1] See the following sources:

- Lewis Coser, Life and Thinking of the Great Sociologists, Trans. Muḥsin Salāsī, Tehran: 'Ilmī, 1990, pp. 187, 190 and 196.

- Talcott Parsons, Emile Durkheim in *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, New York: Macmillan, 1985, vol. 4, p. 313.

- Raymond Aron, *Essential Stages of Thinking in Sociology*, Trans. Bāqir Parhām, Tehran: Islamic Revolution Education, 1983, pp. 15, 16, 19 and 82.

[2] See

- Hannah Arndt, *Totalitarianism*, Trans. Muḥsin Salāsī, Tehran: Jāvīdān, pp. 42-43.

- W. Kornhauser, *Politics in Mass Society*, New York: 1959, pp. 22-54.

[3] Barrington Moore, *Social Roots of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Trans. Ḥusayn Bashīriyyah, Tehran: Center for Academic Publications, 1990, pp. 57-62.

There is a third outlook vis-à-vis these two groups that explains social conditions for the advent of revolution with intermediary traits (between mass society and civil society).

Joseph Gasfield has devised this intermediary outlook.[1] To him, such a social structure will crate a ripe ground for intensified social conflicts and rise of revolutionary and mass movements.[2]

In a combination of the aforementioned theories regarding the Islamic Revolution in Iran, it might be suggested that Iranian society underwent rapid transformation in some decades before the revolution particularly since the 1960s onwards. These changes cause disruption of traditional society cohesion paving the way for appearance of mass society. Such changes affected highly urban community the most important of which included land reforms, rapid expansion of urban population, vast immigration of villagers to cities (in particular big cities), extension of public education at the tertiary and higher levels, the appearance of new urban economic sectors (trade, services, industries) and rapid enlargement of bureaucracy and the army.

Each of these changes was accompanied by rapid mobility the status of individuals, social strata and classes. These movements included social environment, place of inhabitation, occupation, income, social status and political position. Rapid change in these conditions in every society may potentially cause certain social disorders and disruptions. Social dislocation and disruption in values and social orientations among individuals and social groups are among the most important dysfunctions.[3]

On the other hand, in Iran's urban society certain elements and traits of a civil society were expanding in the years before the revolution leading to the appearance of lasting guild and political organizations, succeeding in creating a sense of belonging to a social stratum and class. In the meantime, among certain urban strata and classes, particularly among the traditional and modern urban class-guild solidarities among the bazaar merchants as well as the rise of certain guild and political forums and associations among the intelligentsia, students and urban graduates were among such organizations. More important and clearer than all involved the existence of a relatively autonomous religious apparatus formed around religious institutions (Shī'ī

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[1] See Ḥusayn Bashīriyyah, op. cit., p. 100.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] See Sayyid Amīr Arjomand, "Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective," *World Politics*, vol. 38, April 1989, pp. 383-384.

religious authority, seminary schools, mosques, etc.) and influenced a large part of urban population.

Although religious beliefs were weakened among segments of urban population, these not only were not undermined among large parts of urban middle and lower classes, but also were enhanced in different forms. The enhancement of religion among the traditional middle classes and urban masses was seen in their willingness to maintain and strengthen certain religious ceremonies and events. The efforts made by this segment of urban society were expanded in later years of the Shāh's government, focusing on building mosques and other religious centers, forming or boosting religious forums and delegations (especially religious mourning missions).

Among segments of educated urban intelligentsia, religious convictions and cohesions were being boosted in another way. The tendency of these strata to political aspects and interpretations of Islam and perception of religion (Shī'ism) as a revolutionary ideology and an alternative to secular ideologies (either secularism and nationalism envisioned by the Shāh or Marxism) comprised manifestations of enhanced religion among urban strata and groups. This position, apart from its causes, indicated the strengthening of sociopolitical solidarities in this part of urban society which could also provide the grounds for social (and political) connection and linkage of this segment of urban society with the traditional middle and lower urban classes. Moreover, a group of clergy following Imām Khomeinī's political beliefs had proceeded to organize themselves in later years of the Shāh's reign.

These social solidarities and political organizations paved the way for the organization of opposition to the government in a way that in later years of the Shāh's rule, pressures on the ruling regime – arising from exacerbated domestic crises and international pressures – gave the chance to those organizations to express themselves, intensify their activities, and organize certain protest moves against the ruling regime. These very limited protest moves resulting in mass revolutionary mobilization in response to the events occurring in the last year of the Shāh's reign.

Therefore, it can be said that with use of such organizations and aforementioned social conditions revolutionary mobilization took place in Iran. The presence of such social conditions along with specific political situation as well as inadequacy of political decision-makers in general created suitable grounds for the opposition's mobilization. The opposition, because of taking advantage of a competent Islamic ideology, Imām

Khomeinī's strong leadership, and adoption of diligent tactics could succeed in overcoming the existing political system and materialize the revolutionary conditions in the country. ✍

Chapter 4

Precipitating Factors and the Process of the Islamic Revolution in Iran

The vents and process of the revolution support the idea that the January 9 uprising of the Qum people in protest to publication of an insulting article in Iṭṭilāʿāt newspaper of January 7, 1977 must be noted as the starting point for the revolution[1] and the following events were indeed main links of this event. The nature of organizations, location of organizing demonstrations, slogans and interval between protests all attest to the issue.

The said article published after Carter's visit to Iran and his support for the Shāh and display of deep friendship with him[2] was intended with SAVAK's order to alienate Imām Khomeinī who continued to struggle the regime in Najaf. Thus the article, entitled 'Iran and Red and Black Colonialism' referred to Āyatullāh Khomeinī with humiliating titles such a 'symbol of black reactionary thinking, agent of colonialism, non-Iranian, and an Indian Sayyid connected to the Great Britain.[3]

On reasons for publishing such an article, we have to look back a bit and review the previous years' developments. From late 1976, the Shāh relaxed

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[1] Some political groups have described other events as the first flames of the revolution including sending a letter by three leaders of the National Front to the Shāh in June 1997, workers' strikes in June 1977, and clashes between the inhabitants of the suburb dwellers with the municipality in summer 1997. See Ṣādiq Zībākalām, op. cit., p. 158; Ervand Abrahimian, op. cit., pp. 614-620.

[2] Iṭṭilāʿāt Newspaper, 1/1/1978.

[3] Iṭṭilāʿāt Newspaper, 7/1/1978.

the intensity of strangling and suppression and opened the political space in response to the pressures of world public opinion on his noncompliance with human rights in Iran. Of course apart from international developments (like Carter's victory in U.S. presidential elections), internal sociopolitical developments in initiating the open political space.[1]

The further the Shāh proceeded in continuing his new policy regarding the observation of open political space the regime's political dissidents including religious, nationalist and leftist forces found more extended arena for their activity. Circles, mosques, religious centers and party nucleus turned into apparent centers for regime's political opposition among that certain clergy and intellectuals were included. In the heyday of popular struggles against the Shāh's regime, a number of incidents helped deepen the struggles. Dr. 'Alī Sharī'atī's suspicious death, open letters written by some political leaders opposed to the Shāh, *'ulamā's* declarations in objection to the Shāh's acts, Iranian students' demonstrations in the United States during the Shāh's visits to the country, and most important suspicious death of Āyatullāh Muṣṭafā Khomeinī in October 20, 1977 were among the factors that created suitable mental conditions in the society. However, suspicious death of Imām Khomeinī's son instigated intensive antipathy toward the regime among Imām's Muslim followers, because at least they saw the Shāh and SAVAK as mainly responsible for his murder. Obviously such an analysis was founded upon SAVAK's wrongdoings in suspicious murders of opposition figures in the past. Such a mentality was created among the people with Dr. Sharī'atī's suspected death in June 1977 and was intensified with Ḥāj Muṣṭafā's death.

His mourning events in various cities of Iran particularly in Tehran and Qum became a forum for praising Imām Khomeinī and public opposition to the regime. Such mourning events were held not only by the clergy but also by dissident intellectuals.[2] In fact, these events turned into a unifying factor for the opposition forces throughout the country and taught political dissidents a lesson that traditional forums and measures over which the regime has little domination could be better help them attain their goals rather than political and legal would do. Due to ineffectiveness of formal measures and legal and political institutions for expressing opposition, some

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[1] Ghulām Riḍā Nijātī, *Iran's 25-Year Political History (from the Coup to the Revolution)*, Tehran: Rasā, vol. 2, pp. 18-19.

[2] 'Imāduddīn Bāqī, *Iranian Revolution's Oral History as Cited by the BBC*, Qum: Thinking Publications, 1994, pp. 261-262.

traditional institutions undertook this task. This resulted in the spread of influence of such institutions' organizations. In a mourning ceremony for Muṣṭafā Khomeinī in Tehran, the title of Imām was accorded to the leader of the movement in exile by the preacher, Ḥasan Rūḥānī.[1] This title a bit later became the most apparent feature of Imām Khomeinī's leadership. Āyatullāh Muṣṭafā Khomeinī's death revealed once again political and social influence of *'ulamā'* and did not allow for delay in battling the clergy for the Shāh. Iḥsān Narāqī cites a SAVAK official as saying that pursuant to those events, the Shāh ordered the publication of that article against Khomeinī.[2]

Some months after the death of Imām's son, the regime made its historical political mistake in publishing that article which became a turning point in deepened Islamic movement. The article entitled 'Iran and Red and Black Colonialism' written by Rashīdī Muṭlaq was published in Iṭṭilā'āt newspaper on January 7, 1978 on the occasion of Unveiling Day and close to the anniversary of the White Revolution.[3]

There is no consensus among the scholars on who wrote the article, but everybody knew that Aḥmad Rashīdī Muṭlaq was a nickname from the early days. In the list of possible authors in SAVAK, the following names are seen: Dāriush Homāyūn, Minister of Information and Tourism in Jamshid Āmūzegār's cabinet, Farhād Nikkhah, Parvīz Nikkhah,[4] and Amīr 'Abbās Huweydā.[5] It should be noted that in this period, SAVAK controlled the press entirely and no important material could be published without its approval.

With the release of Iṭṭilā'āt Newspaper in Qum, the news of insult to Imām and clergy was disseminated in scientific and religious circles of seminary school and seminary students informed their teachers about the news. At January 8 morning, the seminary classes were closed down uniformly and around 200 students as guided by the organizers of the event

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[1] 'Alī Shīrkhānī, *Qum's January 10 1978 Epic (Abdulkarim Abedini's Memoirs)*, Tehran: Center for Islamic Revolution Documentation, 1998, p. 141.

[2] 'Imāduddīn Bāqī, op. cit., pp. 263 and 294.

[3] For more information on the content of the article, see: *Iṭṭilā'āt Newspaper*, 7/1/1978; 'Imāduddīn Bāqī, *A Study of Iranian Revolution*, Qum: Office for Islamic Propagation, 1998, appendix no. 1; 'Alī Shīrkhānī, appendices, pp. 233-236.

[4] Nikkhah was one of the leaders of the Tūdeh Party who went to Europe following the August 1953 coup and joined the monarchists.

[5] For more information, see: Ghulām Riḍā Nijātī, op. cit., pp. 63-64; Anthony Parsons, op. cit., p. 99.

marched from the Khān school to houses of grand Āyatullāhs.[1] The demonstrations turned violent at evening and a number were killed or injured. Apparently sporadic clashes and air shooting continued till the midnight, but the regime recaptured control of the city quite hastily. In sum, in the January 9th incident, seven were martyred and around 13-16 were also injured.[2]

This event was the beginning of demonstrations that were held every forty days as a Shī'ī ceremony for remembering the martyrs of the previous demonstrations and every time with the killing of another number of demonstrators, their mourning ceremony 40 days later gave rise to new incidents.[3] Following the Qum incident, whose news reached Najaf the same day; Āyatullāh Khomeinī in his strongest message in exile warned the regime and challenged it explicitly.

The January 9 uprising and its aftermath played a crucial part in radicalizing and popularizing the process of mobilization and in speeding up people's and clergy's presence in political campaign. In the 40th day after people's killing on February 20, 1978, main bazaars and universities were closed down, the clergy held remembrance ceremonies in big cities and peaceful demonstrations were held in 12 cities, but in Tabrīz demonstrations turned violent following the shooting of an adolescent by a police officer.[4] In Tabrīz, thousands marched in the streets, chanted slogans against the regime in favor of Āyatullāh Khomeinī, raided cinemas and bars, attacked banks and state buildings damaging them. The Resurrection Party's premise was also raided, leaving some people dead and injured in clashed between the people and police forces.[5]

On March 30, 1978, the 40the day ceremony for the Tabrīz uprising's martyrs was held in 15 cities and some more were killed in a number of cities including Yazd. The next 40th day event on May 11, 1978 led to violent demonstration in 24 cities and to cancellation of the Shāh's visit to East Europe.

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[1] 'Alī Shīrkhānī, op. cit., p. 50.

[2] See *Ibid*., Appendices.

[3] Barry Rubin, *War of Powers in Iran*, Trans. Maḥmūd Mashriqī, Tehran: Āshtiyānī, 1984, p. 149.

[4] Ervand Abrahimian, op. cit., p. 625.

[5] *Ibid*.

The common slogan in all demonstrations included 'Death to the Shāh', 'Long live Khomeinī', and 'Long live the Martyrs of Qum and Tabrīz'.[1]

U.S. ambassador, Sullivan writes in this respect: "The 40th day events for martyrs and demonstrations held every 40 days on this occasion were initially of solely religious character and dissident political groups including liberals, socialists and democrats or Communists did no play a part in it. Some of these groups were under SAVAK control to the extent that their public activities were impossible. For this reason, considering the anti-regime's demonstrations were of religious character, most of observers did not consider them a serious threat to the regime. Generally, nobody saw the Shāh's regime exposed to a serious threat from inside or outside.[2]

The Shāh attempted to attract the attention of the religious elements by doing some actions including sending a huge number of pictures depicting the Shāh in the Ihram clothes (worn by those who engaged in Ḥajj pilgrimage) to ministries and government departments. In June 1978, he went to Mashhad to visit Imām Riḍā's Shrine as it was televised.[3] To defuse the unrest and increasing demonstrations, the Shāh dismissed Marshal Naṣīrī, director of the SAVAK on July 19, 1978, but his appointment as Iran's ambassador to Pakistan was seen as a cheating maneuver.

At this stage that can be called the first phase of the revolution, demonstrations expanded and an informal coalition took shape among the clergy, intelligentsia and the bazaar. Revolutionary activities spread to various cities, the number of anti-governmental activities tripled and the number of active dissidents quadrupled.[4]

The second phage of the revolution, called mass demonstrations stage, began since August 5 with the start of Ramaḍān month. In this month, seminary schools were closed down and the seminary students were dispatched to various regions even remote villages for propagation. Most of the clergy particularly the young students were carriers of revolutionary message. The Shāh's regime knew more or less their possible actions and their role in political mobilization and organization of people, but he was

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 625-626.

[2] William Sullivan, op. cit., p. 100.

[3] Mīnū Ṣamīmī, *Behind the Peacock Throne*, Trans. Ḥusayn Abūturābiyān, Tehran: Iṭṭilāʿāt, 1993, pp. 221-222.

[4] *Book of Fridays*, vol. 4, No. 3, Spring 1988, p. 158.

unable to react necessarily given the vast number of propagating seminary students and their geographical sparseness.[1]

On August 5, simultaneously with the Ramaḍān religious month, opposing moves found new impetus and the clergy created an orderly, extensive move throughout the country with use of religious gatherings. On August 10, Iṣfahān witnessed unprecedented demonstrations and clashes leading to a curfew in the city.[2]

On August 20, a formidable fire occurred in the Rex Cinema of Abadan resulting in death of hundreds of people for which people regarded the SAVAK as responsible.[3]

On August 22, Āmūzegār decided to resign under mounting pressures and Sharīf Imāmī was appointed prime minister. He declared his government's agenda as national reconciliation, respect for religious sanctities and articles of the Constitution and battle against corruption. At his first step, he abolished the royal calendar that replaced the Hijrī one three years ago and declared the Hijrī calendar as the formal national calendar. He ordered the closing down of casinos and brothels, declared formation of legal parties free, and abolished in practice the single party system in Iran by dissolving the Resurrection Party. He released some prisoners including Āyatullāh Ṭāliqānī and Muntaẓirī, but all these actions were construed as the government's retreat vis-à-vis people's demands. His most important step that accelerated opposition moves was the freedom of the press which happened to publish reports on Imām Khomeinī's actions and statements along with large photos of his. In the second weak of Sharīf Imāmī's government, the 'Īd Fiṭr prayer ceremonies were held in Tehran's Qeyṭariyyah hills with participation of a huge number of people who after the prayer marched to the city. This march continued on a larger scale on September 7 in that harsh slogans were chanted against the regime. At the end of that march, people were asked to appear tomorrow morning, Friday, in Zhāleh Square in order to continue the move. Concerned about the spread of demonstrations, the Shāh wanted the government to contain such moves and government declared curfew in Tehran and eleven more cities. But this

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[1] *Events from the History of the Islamic Revolution as Narrated by the SAVAK and American Documents*, Tehran: Ministry of Intelligence.

[2] Office of the Islamic Revolution's Literature, *Calendar of the Islamic Revolution*, Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1997.

[3] *Ibid*.

decision was proclaimed at morning, September 8, when bulk of people did not learn about the declaration of curfew. The military opened fire at people's gathering when confronting them at Zhāleh Square (in east Tehran) and hundreds were killed or injured during two hours of clashes.[1] This catastrophe was one of the significant events during the revolution that was followed by a wave of strikes and wider demonstrations whose reflection at the world level weakened the regime's international status. After September 8, a new chapter began in the struggle accompanied by general strikes and the struggle found further depth with the spread of demonstrations.

The first big strikes started two days after the Zhāleh Square's catastrophe (that was renamed the Martyrs Square since then) at Tehran's oil refinery plant and incrementally spread to other production and industrial units and state institutions particularly the south oil industries.[2] Until that time, signs of full-fledged revolutionary situation were not seen in the society. In spite of increase in dissatisfaction signs, expanded objections and growth in number of dissidents, there was not yet a force in the opposition front capable of fundamentally threaten the regime. The dissidents and dissatisfied elements were sparse, lacking a unified leadership and there was no sign of weakness in the armed forces.[3]

In October 1978, Imām Khomeinī immigrated from Najaf to Paris, opening a new chapter in the leadership of revolutionary movement and mass mobilization. Contrary to Sharīf Imāmī's prediction that Āyatullāh would be totally forgotten in Paris, he gained the attention no of the world media and political circles, establishing daily contacts with world radio and televisions. The unusual figure of this clergy sitting below a tree in a Paris suburb and leading a revolution with his charming speech against the Shāh from thousands of kilometers afar had attracted world attention.[4] This made him an international figure at once whose followers in Iran learned his daily opinions and instructions not only through telephone and liaison agents frequently between Tehran and Paris but also by means of international radios, press and news agencies.[5] During November, Āyatullāh mounted his insistence on the subversion of the regime, further weakening the voice of moderate forces

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Maḥmūd Ṭulūʻī, *History of the Revolution*, Tehran: ʻIlm, 1991, pp. 313-321.

[3] Anthony Parsons, *Pride and Fall*, Trans. M. Ṭulūʻī, Tehran: ʻIlm, 1993, p. 48.

[4] William Sullivan, op. cit., p. 183.

[5] Barry Rubin, op. cit., p.p. 154-155.

in Iran when his louder voice was heard all around the world. In the meantime, Sharīf Imāmī attempted in vain to make him renounce his struggle against the Shāh.[1] On November 4, Tehran University witnessed the most extensive student demonstrations in that martial government's agents opened fire. Since the university doors were already closed, there was no way to escape for students and consequently a large number of them were beaten, severely injured and a few were killed.[2]

As noted earlier, this phase was mainly characterized by use of non-violent resistance and resort to strikes that brought government employees as well as private sector ones into the revolution. With the start of educational year, students of schools and colleges as well as professors joined the strikes. The demands put forth by employees on strike quickly elevated from professional demands and rise in salaries to political demand for doing reforms. In late October, strike was spread to the critical economic sectors of the country, i.e. oil industries and disrupted the foundation of economic affairs.[3]

Sharīf Imāmī's 70-day cabinet was terminated on November 6 with a fiasco in accomplishing a mission entrusted to it and with his dismissal, the Shāh continued his fluctuating policies with appointing General Ghulām Riḍā Azhārī, the Commander of Imperial Guards', as prime minister. Declaring the formation of a military government, the Shāh made a compromising speech broadcast by radio and TV: "I also heard the message of revolution by you the nation of Iran, and I guarantee what you have given victims for in order to achieve."[4]

Pursuant to the formation of this military government, Āyatullāh Khomeinī urged the people to continue their struggle until the regime is overthrown. Initially, Azhārī formed an all-out military cabinet and intimidated the dissidents, but his panic was scattered by his lenient ruling style and his government turned into a non-military government gradually, Āyatullāh Khomeinī ridiculed the military government's prime minister from

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[1] William Sullivan and Anthony Parsons, *Memoirs of Two Ambassadors; Secrets from the Shāh's Downfall and the Secret Role of the United States and Great Britain in Iran*, Trans. Maḥmūd Ṭulūʿī, Tehran: ʿIlm, 1994, p. 366.

[2] Bāqir ʿĀqilī, *Calendar of Iran's History since the Constitutional Era to the Islamic Revolution*, vol. 2, Tehran: Goftār, 1993, p. 372.

[3] Kayhān Newspaper, October 1978, pp. 27-28.

[4] Maḥmūd Ṭulūʿī, op. cit., pp. 344-346.

its very inception. Azhārī's government detained some prominent former officials of the regime like Huweydā and Naṣīrī in order to appease the people, on the other hand.

To intimidate the dissidents, some of the National Front's leaders such as Sanjābī and Furūhar were arrested.

In addition to the Shāh's shaking policy, the military government suffered from an internal weakness, too. This concerned the morale of the armed forces. In lower levels, discontent was prevented and in encounter with their own country's people, they could not shoot their compatriots, just obeying rigid military orders. With Āyatullāh Khomeinī's order, since early December, defection and absence from service in military barracks started and those who refused to defect lost their morale and ability to resist as a result of growing wave of opposition demonstrations.[1]

During the month of Muḥarram (December), violent demonstrations found wider dimensions. Āyatullāh wanted the agents of the military government to stand firmly and react harshly and conversely Āyatullāh Khomeinī urged the people to continue the movement until blood wins the sword. In an interview with the BBC, he suggested that he would not accept any solution but the overthrow of the Pahlavī regime and after that he would establish the government of Islamic republic in Iran.[2]

At the first night of Muḥarram month, people from Tehran and other cities mounted to the roof of their houses and by chanting 'God is great' and political slogans showed their protest in a novel way. In Tehran, thousands of population ignored the curfew and demonstrated in streets. The agents, after air shooting, fired at people and killed many of them. With approaching of Tāsū'ā and 'Āshūrā (anniversary of the Third Imām's martyrdom), nightly clashes decreased so the military government ascribed decline in demonstrations to itself. It relaxed its violence and to show good will, released Sanjābī, Furūhar and 470 other political prisoners, deciding to make demonstrations in Tāsū'ā and 'Āshūrā free to prevent bloody clashes. Tāsū'ā and 'Āshūrā marches were unprecedented in terms of grandeur, discipline and solidarity of participants. They had immediate outcomes the most important of which was the failure of military government in coping with the country's affairs, integration of political groups including the nationalist and

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[1] Barry Rubin, op. cit., pp. 163-165. Maḥmūd Ṭulū'ī, op. cit., pp.

[2] Maḥmūd Ṭulū'ī, op. cit., p. 374.

the religious and confirmation of Āyatullāh Khomeinī's leadership.[1] With Azhārī in power, censorship of the press was reinstated and with threatening the strikers, the strikes of oil industries employees and those of the bazaar were broken. At the end of this phase, the leadership of the movement became unified and nationalist and religious groups (like the National Front and the Liberation Movement of Iran) had accepted Imām Khomeinī's leadership.[2] Thus, the medium way between the Islamic government and the monarchical regime withered away. In January 1979, with Azhārī's resignation and Bakhtiyār's coming to power, a new phase began in the country that could be called dual sovereignty.

The iron fist policy backed by a faction of U.S. leadership in the early stages of the crisis seemed not to be working at that phase. Intensified action against the opposite could possibly lead to a civil war and would provide a ground for Soviet interference. U.S. military intervention to preserve the Shāh's regime appeared impossible too. At this dangerous stage, the United States focused on seeking a medium way and formation of a national coalition government consisting of elements from among the National Front and moderate opponents of the regime.[3]

Perceiving that the formation of a non-military seemingly nationalist government could control the situation, the Shāh replaced Ghulām Riḍā Azhārī – violent military figure – with Shāpūr Bakhtiyār, a member of the National Front. Prime minister, Bakhtiyār initiated a series of reformist actions to attract the trust of the government's opponents. While sitting in front of a Dr. Muṣaddiq's picture, Bakhtiyār spoke of his activities in the National Front and promised the nation that the Shāh would leave for a European country for spending vacation and he would cancel curfew in cities particularly in Tehran that had made people upset. He promised that a number of political figures of the Pahlavī era whom people disliked would be imprisoned and many of political prisoners who were largely religious and nationalist elements, in turn would be set free. He suggested that the Shāh's intelligence agency (SAVAK) that acted as a torture and assassination tool would be dissolved, all assets belonging to the Pahlavī Foundation that served as a strong sponsor for the Shāh and his relatives under the guise of a charity institution, would be seized and most importantly he declared that

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[1] Calendar of the Islamic Revolution, op. cit.

[2] Nikki Keddie, op. cit., p. 371.

[3] Barry Rubin, op. cit., p. 167.

Imām Khomeinī could return home as a high-ranking cleric. On foreign policy, the new prime minister also canceled a 7-billion dollar arms deal, banned selling oil to two racist states of South Africa and Israel and stated that Iran would withdraw from the CENTO pact, no longer acting as a regional gendarme.

Nonetheless, religious leaders including Imām Khomeinī paid little attention to the promises made by the Shāh's prime minister and insisted upon principled and definite struggle until the government is fully overthrown. In response, Bakhtiyār managed the affairs and warned that everybody or group who intends to encroach on the government would face iron fist. Moreover, he suggested that he intended to create a constitutional government, observing the rights of the nation, but despite such statements, religious leaders notably Imām Khomeinī insisted severely on battle against the Shāh and Bakhtiyār's government. It is noteworthy that the positions taken by the National Front's leaders to which Bakhtiyār was a member mattered a lot. Sanjābī, the Front's leader, along with some other leaders of the Front ousted Bakhtiyār from the party and the Front declared that only through the formation of a revolutionary government, it could be said that the nation had attained its rights, thus the national reconciliation government was out of question.[1]

In this stage, in his frequent messages, Imām Khomeinī called upon the nation to follow their struggle against the regime and following his call, vast strikes that had begun months ago continue more intensively. It resulted in the paralysis of all country's apparatus due to lack of fuel and human force. The army, a strong point for Bakhtiyār's government, remained passive, though it had lost its will and ability in light of strikes and street demonstrations. Everyday it saw defection of soldiers and offices from the barracks, the middle-rank commanders also lost their impetus for preserving the regime; only a number of high-ranking officers and commanders still dreamed about preserving the government. All Iranian cities and streets saw the presence of people in defense of Islamic government. Cyrus Brawm, the famous Western journalist that observed the conditions described popular enthusiasm as follows:

"I don know in which country and in what period, a nation has become so happy and jubilant, but I know that for centuries Iranians have not been so hearty, happy and pleasant. I have never seen Iranians so jubilant… I had

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[1] Ervand Abrahimian, op. cit., p. 648.

never seen a man or woman from this endless sorrow genealogy that laughed in public all day long... I had never seen so much joyful crying."[1]

Bakhtiyār formed his cabinet and undertook certain actions in order to gain popularity and to calm down the situation without waiting for the Shāh's departure. He detained a number of former authorities and dismissed some of them. He attempted to convince the people that he had put aside the Shāh's policies and sought to change the country fundamentally. Finally on January 16, 1979, the Shāh left Iran for Egypt while keeping a small box full of Iran's soil. Having made several mistakes in the first stages of Iran's revolution in assessing the seriousness of the crisis, Washington made another mistake in its assessment of Bakhtiyār's ability and his government's persistence. Carter and his advisors at he White House thought that they could dominate the situation by supporting Bakhtiyār's government and keeping the army's power and unity,[2] thus sent General Huyser to Tehran after the Guadalupe summit.

Huyser's mission in Tehran in later days of the ancient regime remains one of the enigmas of Iran's revolution and despite the publication of his memoirs and other involved individuals, this affair has not been clearly explained yet. However, it is implied from his writings as well as those of other U.S. officials that his mission focused on preventing the disintegration of the army following the Shāh's departure and on ensuring support for Bakhtiyār's government. At the same time, he had to preclude any military action for preventing the Shāh's departure.[3]

Bakhtiyār's 37-day government was the last stage in the course of events that led to the fall of the 37-year Muḥammad Riḍā Shāh's reign, with his wrong actions. Bakhtiyār accelerated revolutionary moves and made the fall of the regime more rapidly and easily possible than it was imagined.

Immediately following the formation of Bakhtiyār's government, Āyatullāh Khomeinī called the government illegal and in an important message from Paris, declared the formation of the Islamic Revolutionary Council and the quality of transfer of government.[4] The presence of this

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[1] Cyrus Brawm, *Iranian Revolution and the Principles of Imām Khomeinī's Leadership*, Trans. P. Shīrāzī, Tehran: No publisher, no date, p. 76..

[2] Barry Rubin, op. cit., pp. 167-175.

[3] Maḥmūd Ṭulūʿī, op. cit., p. 400.

[4] *Ibid*, pp. 430-438.

council along with Bakhtiyār's government meant the existence of dual sovereignty in the country.

On February 3 with popular insistence, Bakhtiyār's government retreated and Mehrābād Airport was opened, so Imām returned home in unprecedented welcome of the people who stood from their airport to the Behesht-e Zahrā Cemetery. In his short speech at the airport, he indicated that although to dismiss the Shāh was a great job, the bigger victory is to rupture foreign influence. Then he went directly to the cemetery where he rendered a highly important speech, threatening Bakhtiyār's government with overthrow. Moreover, in his first press conference, he suggested that soon he would appoint an interim legitimate government. This statement made Bakhtiyār worried in such a way that he said that if Imām's statements were to be realized, unexpected problems and issues would be raised, adding that he could go to Qum, establish an interim government and act like a Vatican City.

In this stage of the revolution, there was almost consensus among political groups over opposition to and struggle against the regime. Various political-cultural currents together engaged in extensive mass mobilization – though each pursued its own path and goals- strikes and demonstrations ensued, all social strata from the traditional middle class to modern middle class played a role in the advent of the revolution controlled the situation competently. The Revolutionary Council formed for bringing the condition under order began meetings with moderate officers in order to prevent further street bloodshed. On February 6, Imām Khomeinī entrusted to Engineer Bāzargān the task of forming a cabinet as prime minister. With the appointment of Bāzargān as prime minister, every day revolutionary movement received more momentum and influence. In contrast, the army as the major means possessed by the Shāh and Bakhtiyār began weakening and Field Marshal Qarahbāghī, chief of the army that was hopeful about his negotiations with the authorities of the Revolutionary Council, attempted to show himself a moderate and mild figure, for this reason approached Bāzargān's revolutionary government. At the same time, a number of the regime's high-ranking commanders still insisted upon suppression particularly the members of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces who were directly selected by the Shāh sat in on daily meetings that did not go anywhere due to disagreements among the members. They, ultimately,

withdrew from political scene and expressed their loyalty to the revolutionary incrementally.[1]

The last stage of events leading to the fall of the regime took shape on February 12 and 13. On Thursday February 10, a number of Air Force personnel gathered in front of Āyatullāh Khomeinī's residence at the Refāh School with their uniform and expressed their solidarity with the revolution. At Friday night (February 11) in the Air Force headquarters in Dūshān Tappeh, clashed and shooting occurred between the Air Force personnel who expressed feelings for the revolutionary leader when the TV broadcast his returning home and members of the Imperial Guard. People went to help the Air Force personnel, opened the arsenal's doors, and distributed arms among themselves.

Until Saturday noon, February 12, clashes surrounding the air training center spread to the whole city. From afternoon 1 pm, raids on police stations and military facilities began putting the revolutionaries in a stronger position.[2]

The following day, the army declared neutrality. Bakhtiyār hid, the revolutionaries attacked state buildings, and captured them one by one. State TV and radio station was captured by the revolutionaries at February 13 afternoon. The regime's fall became definite, thus the Pahlavī dynasty collapsed in Iran. ✍

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[1] See Ibrāhīm Yazdī, *The Last Efforts in Last Days*, Tehran: Qalam, 1998; *Negotiations of the Army Commanders*, Center for the Islamic Revolution Documentation.

[2] Maḥmūd Ṭulūʻī, op. cit., p. 462.