

A Discussion on the Relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Muslim World

Concerning the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to the Muslim countries, usually, two questions can be posed:

1. What is the status of the Muslim world in the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran?

2. What is the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the Muslim world?

Venturing to address the above questions is possible from two viewpoints. The first outlook regards the Muslim world as an external affair and parallel to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In other words, it is considered as an independent institution. The second outlook treats the Muslim world as an internal affair and an inseparable part of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the realization of the ardent desires of the Muslims.

This paper endeavors to answer the above questions within the framework of the two outlooks.

First outlook

In describing the status of the Muslim world' in the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the outset, it (Iran) has to clarify its objective for this endeavor because the following three general options can seemingly be regarded as the possible objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

1. The protection of the Muslim world, individually and collectively, will prevent the formation or execution of any kind of threat to the national security or national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran;

2. The protection of the Islamic Republic of Iran will prevent the formation and execution of any kind of threat to the national security or national interests of all Muslim countries; and

3. In a mutual relationship, the expectations of one another can be appropriately answered.

As what we can notice, the three mentioned points are inextricably interwoven with one another in such a manner that they can be classified in a more comprehensive perspective. One outlook views the Muslim world as an external affair, independent institution, and an issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is very clear that if a country or a group of countries is assumed to be independent or even quasi-independent player or players, the scenarios of cooperation on the basis of the oneness of objectives will take form. The expectation of political units from mutual cooperation will be to maximize the national interests and minimize the security and political threats. Yet, the events and experiences of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran show that with this viewpoint, one cannot succeed in describing the status of

the Muslim world as an independent and excellent affair in the foreign policy strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Religious and political precepts have taught us that through adjusting the conditions and withdrawal one cannot succeed in ultimately solving the existing differences and preserve the considerable achievements in relation to the Muslim countries.

The reason behind it is clear. The existing contradictions are traceable from the nature of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran. The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran has made the political systems dominant in the Muslim world, which prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution had acquired a sense of limited and imposed legitimacy in their respective societies, to lose at once all their political bases. The fact of the matter is that the Islamic Republic of Iran (as a system), which in the domestic and international dimensions, and above all, in the context of political and historical standards is acceptable for all Muslims (whether from the viewpoint of the Ahl as-Sunnah—consensus [ijma]—and that of the Shi'ah—guardianship [wilayah) is a legitimate institution that enjoys strong support both from the top—the institution of leadership—and the bottom—the people. Similarly, on account of the profound link that has emerged between the people and the leadership in administering the affairs of the country, it is a sort of motivating ideal and model for putting an end to the historical isolation of Muslims in the affair of participating in determining their own destiny vis-à-vis the ruling states. As such, we can notice that the states and countries in the Muslim world are in a dilemma as far as establishing relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, most of whom are experiencing inconsistencies and worries—inconsistencies whose real roots must be examined in the crisis of legitimacy and not in political action. They regard themselves in a dilemma; if they would get closer to the Islamic Republic of Iran, though their clout of legitimacy will increase, they will face two crucial threats. The first challenge is with the dominant system under the U.S. leadership, which is the source of stability and permanence of the familial or political hereditary governments in the Muslim world,' and the one guaranteeing their international legitimacy. The second challenge is with the Muslim people residing in those countries who would pressure their respective government in abiding with their demand in administering the affairs of the country under the pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

If they would distance themselves from the Islamic Republic of Iran, their legitimacy crisis will intensify and they will also face two other serious and significant challenges. The first is with the people because they will refuse submitting and obeying the governments and their inclination to rise up will increase. The second challenge is with the dominant system that will experience more difficulty in protecting and supporting them. In view of this, because of the desire to stay in power in a traditional way, on one hand, and the pressures of the dominant system in ensuring and guaranteeing the realization of their objectives and interests in the soonest possible time, on the other, in forging relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran the Muslim governments and countries are under multiple political pressures, and in order to prevail over this critical situation, they resort to the three main strategies commensurate to the kind of the problems they have.

First strategy

The first strategy is the attempt to acquire legitimacy through severe international pressures on the Islamic Republic of Iran to adjust the situations vis-à-vis the important and serious problems of the Muslim world, such as the Arabs' compromise with Israel, which hides behind the official recognition of the Quds-occupier regime (Israel) and expansion of extensive cooperation with it. This compromise, as what a statesman has said, has been the peace (accord) and compromise between personalities and not nations, and it is natural that with the aim of making it "popular" there is no way except the conformity of the Islamic Republic of Iran with this process, otherwise Israel will remain forever in the sea of hatred.

Second strategy

The second strategy is besmirching the image of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Muslims through religious, political and economic problems and other possible means such as the magnification of the economic problems, problems related to human rights, religious minorities, internal differences, etc.

Third strategy

The third strategy is attack against the Islamic Republic of Iran to weaken it on issues which, on account of belief and commitment to observe the Islamic principles it has limitation in confronting the likes of them, e.g. the massacre of Iranian and non-Iranian Hajj pilgrims during the rites of Hajj, not allowing the performance of the "disavowal against the polytheists" ritual [bara'ah al-mushrikin], etc.

As to what extent is the effectiveness of the above strategies is as of the moment not the topic of our discussion. The aim was for us to show that in the exterior perspective that has the nature of government-country, the relationship of the Muslim world with us in more cases is out of having no other option. In the same way, their opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran is an institutional and permanent opposition having its root in the legitimacy crisis caused by the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, the attempt to find and describe the status of the Muslim world in the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the government-country tendency and with the objectives mentioned at the beginning of discussion will be a not-so-fruitful attempt and search, and so long as there are the legitimacy crisis in those countries our "hal min nasir (is there any supporter)" call will receive no response.

Second outlook

In this outlook, we regard the Muslim world as an internal affair and instead of engaging in a not-so-fruitful search for the status of the Muslim world in the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, our attempt will focus on dealing with

the subject from a different angle—an angle that makes us immune from mistake is the current and important reality that can be realized and understood in the practical conduct of His Eminence Imam Khomeini (r) and the foreign policy that the Islamic Republic of Iran has consciously implemented on the basis of those not so few years. In other words, we are not looking for a new way and strategy. Instead, based on the description of this approach, we want to know: What is the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Muslim world?

In this outlook, the Muslim world is an integral part of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its internal addressee. In this view, the victory of the Islamic Revolution is the materialization of the ardent desire and common will of the global Muslims. In this outlook, the triumph of the Islamic Revolution over the Western political system and the tyrannical Pahlavi monarchial regime is in reality the repetition of the same magnificent honors of Muslims in the conquest of Iran, Andalus (Spain), Crusades, and the conquest of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. It is a response to the last century's Western hounds in the onslaught to the Muslim world and the irreparable defeats such as the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, colonization of the Muslim countries, establishment of the Zionist usurper state (Israel), promotion of ultra-nationalism, and finally, the establishment of Westernized and anti-Islamic states in the Muslim world. The religious and political precepts, which in the first outlook used to make us feel frustrated in finding a status of the Muslim world in the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the same have achieved nothing except victory and honor in this outlook. It is because in this view the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the identity and prestige of the Muslims. Its founder, Imam Khomeini, is their Imam. Its desire and stances are their desire and stances. In the purest expression, the Islamic Republic in Iran is the most sacred and inspiring political unit of the global Muslims. Imam Khomeini believed that clear aims and strategies in relation to the Muslim world must be conceived and pursued. Before dealing with these aims and strategies, it is fitting for us to recognize first their principles and presumptions in the political thoughts of the Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Principles and presumptions

The principles and presumptions existing in the political thought of Imam Khomeini can be enumerated in this manner:

1. As what can be deduced from a comparative study regarding the fundamentals of foreign policy in Islam with the practical conduct of Imam Khomeini on issues under discussion, in choosing any strategy and aim, he has always taken into account three constant principles: do 'wah [Islamic call], nafi sabil [protection of independence and rejection of dominance by non-Muslims] and preservation of the dar al-islam [Abode of Islam].
2. Imam Khomeini used to regard himself and the Islamic Republic of Iran as the responsible for the foreign and international policy of the Muslim countries vis-à-vis Zionism, communism, capitalism, and atheistic currents.

3. Imam Khomeini believed that on account of the religious and doctrinal differences that have been mistakenly regarded as rooted in history, the Muslim world is heedless of its internal, unity-fostering and movement engendering assets. The intellectuals of the Muslim world, especially in the last two centuries, have been negligent of the historical and permanent institutions that have decisive presence in the heart of their societies, and most of them have been in opposition with these institutions. Thus, so long as the nations have not been changed, power transfer or change in the policy of governments will either be impossible at all or in the end will lead to limited and insignificant reforms.

4. Imam Khomeini regarded the political legitimacy and survival of the despotic governments in many Muslim countries, particularly in the past two centuries, whether in the hereditary monarchial systems or hereditary political systems, as relying upon strong dependence of these countries upon the big transnational powers. Since he opined that the global superpowers are not relying on themselves, he regarded this dependency as a kind of humiliation and degradation for the countries-states and Muslims. For this reason, he was about to decide attacking these powers, America in particular.

5. Imam Khomeini accepted the political classifications and players of the international relations. He equally acknowledged and believed in the reality of nation-state except the case of the Quds-occupier regime (Israel). He used to treat the political elites as the main players and many of the international governmental and legal organizations—with the exception of the UN Security Council in some cases on account of its authoritative nature as exemplified by its veto power—as current parts and pillars of the international system.

6. The strategies of Imām Khomeini in the Muslim world were not expecting for the response. In fact, it was a response to the demand, inclination and problems of the Muslims and the Muslim world. Of course, these strategies have targeted some particular addressees in the sovereignty of Muslim states-countries.

7. The vacuum caused by the elimination of the position and institutions for political theorization and setting important and fundamental strategies, on one hand, and the political-religious personality of Imam Khomeini, on the other hand, prompted Imam Khomeini to involve himself personally in the main part of the issues relating to the foreign relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran even in the domains of tactics and political conduct. In this regard, one should not neglect mentioning two important points. The first point is that recognizing and comprehending the foreign policy of Islam and the Islamic nature or otherwise of some current principles and policies in the international relations was not that easy for all during the initial years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and it was feared that deviation in the foreign policy would threaten the dynamic system of the Islamic Republic. The second was that up to 1367 ABS the organ in charged with the foreign policy had experienced many limitations in its activities on account of the entanglement with the war with Iraq. For this very reason, the role of Imam Khomeini in these strategies is

not only in terms of giving approvals and giving guidelines but also in actual conduct and giving commands.

8. Imam Khomeini would not accept a breathing space for the superpowers' animosity against the Islamic Republic of Iran, for he considered these confrontations as painful for the countries under oppression. For the same reason, he used to regard the policy of the "neither East nor West" even during the period of the Iraqi war against Iran as the international option of foreign policy.

9. In observing the mode of conduct of Imam Khomeini one must not also be negligent on another important affair and that was the presence of two images and in some limited cases, two levels of outlook and strategy to the Muslim world. That is, it is the state-country level which is restricted to the common and customary diplomacy of the international system and the other is the level of the ummah, which consists of powerful and authoritative Islamic political bloc. In other words, Imam Khomeini was of the opinion that any power whose origin is the "state-country" is necessarily pursuing national interests and it is because of this affair why the main part of the problems of the Muslim world is discussed in the national, racial and regional contexts. He believed that the power emanating from this source could not endure confronting the power emanating from the Western political and cultural bloc.

Now, it seems expedient to point out that the above items, apart from assisting us in understanding better the strategies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to the Muslim world, also present to us another reality which is contrary to the subject under consideration, and that is the two-level nature of the political formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

A) The domain of the institution of leadership

The domain of the institution of leadership in the outlook of Imam Khomeini consists of the religious seminaries, universities, religious authorities, and political elites. Imam Khomeini used to identify this assembly in the domain of the institution of leadership, regarding their station and rank in selecting the objective or objectives with the strategic nature.

The domain of the institutions of foreign policy

The domain of the institutions of foreign policy consists of the institution of the President, National Security Council, Islamic Consultative Assembly, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and others, and their station and rank are confined to the domain of political conduct and tactics.

It is also necessary to note that the above classification is absolutely understood. Instead, it is attention to a key point that guides us to the domain of the main responsibility of the two institutions; otherwise, the two institutions are mutually interrelated.

Objective or objectives

In determining the objective or objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Muslim world, we face many difficulties because in the course of time and based on the different circumstances and events we have engaged in defining the objective with diverse tendencies. Sometimes, they have viewed from the political perspective, with cultural tendency in another, in yet another time in unity and at times, in diversity.

Sometimes our addressees have been the West and Zionism, at another the Muslims, and yet at another time, the rulers and elites. However, since the main purpose of this study is the examination of the strategies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and not their objectives, it is only enough for us to mention some of these objectives—and only those from the ultimate to the medium levels. Along this line, we will discuss objectives which, firstly, have more permanent nature and cannot easily be obtained. Secondly, they are closer to the domain of the political thought of Imam Khomeini and not his political views. In this manner, we will have the following classification:

1. Propagation and revival of the Islamic system of the Messenger of Allah (s), or in other words, the pure Muhammadan Islam;
2. Explanation of the universality and potentiality of the religion of Islam in meeting the needs of the Muslim world and the world of the downtrodden;
3. Resistance against any religious tendency that portrays the present condition of administering the affairs of Muslims as desirable;
4. Acquisition of power of the religious Muslims in the Muslim countries;
5. Revival of the power of Islam transcending behind sectarianism (single ummah); and
6. Promotion of antipathy toward the Western political systems, America in particular, and isolating the anti-religious institutions and imported isms.

Strategy

In embarking on the main part of the discussion, at the outset it is necessary for us to have a common definition of “strategy” and then we will deal on its description and explanation. As what we know, the concept of strategy from the beginning of the development of the strategic thoughts that have been founded by Sun Tsu up to this day wherein the nations are experiencing a great political dilemma has undergone fundamental change and transformation. Similarly, its scope which was before limited only to the knowledge and technique of commanding a war, today it embraces all domains of the domestic and international activities of states. For this reason, in the recent years many institutes and institutions have tried to obtain a comprehensive and meaningful definition of it. The researchers of the American Institute of Military Studies in 1963 have defined “strategy” in this manner: “The knowledge and technique of expanding and utilizing the

political, economic, cultural, and military powers of the nation—both in times of war and peace—with the aim of ensuring the maximum protection of the national policies and augmenting the desirable possibilities and results for victory and minimizing the possibility of defeat.”

In spite of its apparent comprehensiveness, the above definition cannot be desirable for the Islamic Republic of Iran because it regards the nation and national policies as the criteria of legitimacy while the Islamic Republic of Iran acquires its legitimacy, beside the national institutions, from the Islamic ideology and worldview as well as the absolute guardianship of the jurist [Wilayat-e mutlaq-e faqih] system. So, we have to look for another definition, which in the first place have no ideological and value limitations. Secondly, we will not face ambiguity and problem in analyzing the performance of the Islamic Republic of Iran. My efforts in defining “strategy” have arrived at the following conclusion: “Strategy is the permanent and all-encompassing part with which a system is committed in all its performances, be they internal or external.”

In this outlook, as what can be noticed, strategy is, in the first place, is not an instrument, although it can also be used as an instrument. Secondly, it is not manifold although it can possibly have different manifestations. Thus, in this definition of ours, we do not have “strategies”; we only have “strategy”, and the other matters we classify as “strategy” are either its special features, or arc policy or tactics that we mistakenly called “strategy”. Of course, finding this permanent and all-encompassing characteristic’ will not be an easy affair. Understanding the “strategy” of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Muslim world at that is in fact discovering the secret behind the political thought of Imam Khomeini to search for it is so difficult. As such, not with absoluteness and clarity but through reflection on the statements and sayings as well as his conduct and method, we will embark on searching for the permanent, yet all-encompassing, feature of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For this reason, we will first presume it and then describe and explain it, and finally, we will deal with its special features so as to obtain more tip and guideline in our research.

Keeping in view our definition of “strategy”, we will look for it in the foreign policy performance of the Islamic Republic of Iran. “Negation of dominance” [nafyi sultech], “repudiation of oppression” [zulm-setizi], “fear and hope”, and giving awareness are among the characteristics that are concordant with our definition in the first view, and since they can be deduced from the set of performances in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Muslim world, one of them can be selected as the main mode of conduct” of the Islamic Republic:

A. “Negation of dominance”: This feature is approximately present in all conducts and stances in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, since negation of dominance has a single nature and takes form more on negation than on affirmation, although ii pays attention to the performance of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the environment replete with the hostility of the present big and small powers, it is not target-oriented and

objective-centered, and particularly in the course of time and in the case of elimination or marginalization of the issue of system of dominance, it needs change.

B. Repudiation of oppression: An equivalent of which in this context can be thought of. Yet, as what we can notice, this concept is more akin to the method of foreign policy and its feature than to a strategy. Thus

C. "Fear and hope": On this basis, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has also done innumerable options and many stances which are perhaps closer to our definition of the "negation of dominance" and "repudiation of oppression". Yet, the activities can again be defined for the diplomacy of the country that cannot be confined in the domain of fear and hope, or in other words, it may not be in the category of the issues relating to the national security or national interests.

D. "Awareness": As you may remember, in the part of presumptions, principles and axioms of Imam Khomeini, we mentioned three foundations, which in the form of the pillars of a pyramid, used to organize and regulate, control and guide his political thoughts. They are the boundaries of theoretical and practical legitimacy of foreign policy in Islam, i.e. the principles of da'wah [Islamic call], nafi sabil [protection of independence and rejection of dominance by non-Muslims] and preservation of the dar al-islam [Abode of Islam]. If we deeply take a look at the above three principles, and compare their manifestation with the performance of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and performance of Imam Khomeini; it is a factor which we can name as "awareness". "Giving awareness" is a permanent and all-embracing part, which in all segments of conduct of foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and international stances of Imam Khomeini and as priority in the context of "enjoining what is good" and "forbidding what is wrong" has been famous in the Muslim world, and we can consider it as our real presumption. In other words, we can label it as the "strategy" of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Muslim world. Before embarking on any sort of description and explanation, at the outset, it is necessary to mention the fact that "awareness" in the Islamic way of thinking is first and foremost not "news" and "giving information". Secondly, by justifying and overlooking the existing problems, it has (basis) in the nature of differences. So, "giving awareness" means guiding, uncovering of veils, and incitement, and not "to inform". It is because in this "strategy" the addressees of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the late Imam are the pure souls and dispositions of the Muslims and downtrodden in the Muslim world and other parts of the globe.

Giving awareness is the same with what the Qur'an states, i.e. facilitating the eyes and ears of the people in having the choice and provision for their thinking. This spirit and "strategy" has ever been dominant in the conduct and manner of Imam Khomeini in the domestic and international dimensions. By giving awareness, the eminent Imam made the Islamic Republic of Iran as the

Abode of Islam. This “strategy” is concordant with the international rules so long as it is not tainted, and accepts limitation when the duty is silent about it. As such, giving awareness is in reality the performance of duty. So many times that he negates: “Israel must be effaced” and so many times also that he posits: “We do share with the oppressed of the world in their adversity”. So many times too that he describes: “All the difficulties of the Muslims are caused by America” and equally many instances that he would declare: “We will hoist the banner of “There is no deity but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah” in all rooftops in the world.” Giving awareness is surging in his messages, in his speeches, in his stances, and in sum, in his conduct, manner and writing. Indeed, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is the trumpet of Israfil in the Muslim world, which like the divine call on the Day of Resurrection, it enthusiastically addresses everybody that supporting the Islamic Republic of Iran means supporting all the Muslims and the downtrodden in every corner of the world. Thus, the “strategy” of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as what can be noticed in the conduct and manner of the eminent Imam, is “giving awareness”.

Examining the special features of the “strategy” of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Muslim world

Examining the special features of the “strategy” of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Muslim world is important in the sense that, firstly, it helps us in understanding better the main option. Secondly, with “strategy” which sometimes creates ambiguity on some issues cannot be mistaken. Thirdly, in geographical and topical division of the issues in foreign policy as well as in classifying the types of addressees, it will assist us. The main features of the “strategy” of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Muslim world as the following:

1. Constantly espousing the political nature of Islam and the preeminence of the rulings relating to the policy over the broad part over the devotional rulings related to the individual duties and rights;
2. Revival of the Prophetic Sunnah in performing the Islamic obligations and mottos, especially the ritual of declaring disavowal against the polytheists during Hajj, and paving the ground for integration in the Muslim world through any kind of slogans;
3. Setting the view of Islam as the criterion in assessing the stances of Muslim states-countries;
4. Revival of the religious zeal and enthusiasm in opposition to its atheistic counterpart,
5. Revival of the, culture of jihad (struggle in the way of Allah), resistance and presence in the scene as the criteria of asceticism and piety in opposition to retirement from the world;

6. Revival of the tradition and obligation of enjoining what is good and forbidding what is wrong, particularly in relation to government;
7. Preference of collective salvation to individual salvation;
8. Transformation in the juristic viewpoint and novelty of the jurists;
9. Resistance against besmirching the image of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
10. Thwarting the conspiracies of the West against Islam and the Muslims;
11. Resistance against deviant and surrogate currents: and
12. Elimination of irreligious institutions and marked with imported names.

As what we can observe, the above features have precise conformity with the “strategy” of “giving awareness”. Without any sort of ambiguity, they are “real,” “transparent,” “interesting,” and “practical” in such a manner that the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has never retired even in the most pressing international and domestic circumstances. Although sometimes some individuals have felt the sense of retirement, everybody knows that the Islamic Republic of Iran in reality has never been isolated and alone—even during the Iraqi imposed war when it has been under the pressure of most of the Arab states.

The “strategy” of “awareness” along with above four features and characteristics has made our political slogan exactly like our religion. In the Muslim world it would be a motivation for the devoted Muslims’ acquisition of power. Those who want to resist or rise up against the domineering powers and corrupt domestic systems will consciously or unconsciously seek refuge in the Islamic Republic of Iran. They draw the real boundaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran and they will isolate the enemies of Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Muslim world. They are the ones who, in their eagerness for martyrdom, made to explode the American military station in Beirut. Everyday, they are killed in Algeria, Bosnia, Balkan, Egypt, Jordan, Occupied Palestine, Lebanon, Turkey, Sudan, and elsewhere. They are the ones who approximately have made the Islamic Republic of Iran as the criterion for the legitimacy of their own systems, growing bigger everyday a powerful political bloc—the single ummah. Of course, it is needless to say that Imam Khomeini had paid attention to these many pertinent international events. He always tried and he succeeded not to let mistakenly equate the revolutionary search for martyrdom with the revolutionary adventurism. He established the boundaries of the legitimacy of the resistances of the Muslims in the world and the Muslim world in shunning adventurism and collaboration with polytheism, unbelief and Western tendencies. In any case, these features on the “strategy” of “awareness” gives approval to the spirit of presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Muslim world. Except victory it has not achieved anything provided that we would not neglect it along with all its features.

Conclusion

This paper is an attempt to show that the criteria of integration with Muslim world have not been consisted of capital, technology, political support, and concordance on issues of human rights, etc. Instead, it is based upon giving awareness to the individuals and units whose objective is the formation of a single ummah. Relying upon the monotheistic values that emanated from the pure Mul3ammadan Islam and resisting against the American anthropomorphic and polytheist political-philosophical system, it can be able to attain victory.

Certainly, it is attainable not through capital, technology and concordance of views on some issues. The present and West- centered political system of the world is a hollow, barbaric and harsh system that gives no respite to the petitioners; it understands nothing except the language of force. This system has a clear pattern for struggle. First, it takes away the sources of power from its own opposite systems and then takes them to the farthest corner of the world and it is not convinced except through absolute surrender. Meanwhile, the "strategy" of the Islamic Republic of Iran can never be anything except to continue spreading awareness. It is an approach that it has formidably and honorably maintained for many years amidst the severest military, political, cultural, and propaganda onslaughts.